Abstract
This paper tackles the increasingly significant problem of irrigation-induced soil salinity within a groundwater management model. Irrigation can result not only in heavier salt concentrations but also in the removal of salt from the soil through return flows. Given these contradictory observations, we are interested in the effects on soil salt concentration if irrigation efficiency is improved. We develop a model of salt concentration patterns in both soil and groundwater. We introduce a negative externality to the production process by assuming that soil degradation due to higher soil salinity affects total factor productivity. Within this framework, we show that in the presence of this externality, increasing irrigation efficiency can lead to higher or lower soil salt concentration, depending on the social cost of transferring salt from one reservoir to another.
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Notes
Private management of a common pool aquifer entails several inefficiencies, but the literature widely focuses on the following: (1) the stock externality arises from the fact that water extraction by one individual reduces the stock and, in turn, increases the costs of pumping for all and (2) the strategic externality arises from competition among farmers to appropriate groundwater since property rights are not well defined (stock externality and strategic behavior result from private exploitation of a common pool resource).
This means that soil becomes saturated with water. Especially, irrigation water may raise the water table of shallow aquifers from beneath.
Changing this assumption does not lead to significant changes in our results, but makes a more confusing discussion and leads to distinguish different cases.
Brown [5] reports that some farmers in Beijing are now pumping from a depth of 300 m and “pumping water from this far down translates into exorbitant costs and reduced profit margins.”
For a view of the type of cost functions that we introduce here, one can refer to \(c( S) =\frac {(\overline {S}-S)^{2}}{S}.\) This function satisfies assumption 2 \(\forall S\leq \overline {S}\).
As with the assumption on the marginal effect of salt concentration, avoiding these assumptions does not lead to significant changes in our results while adding unnecessary complications to the related discussion.
Using Eq. (2), we easily observe that \(\frac {\partial C_{t}^{S}}{\partial S_{t}}=\frac {\partial C_{t}^{S}}{\partial C_{t}^{\theta } }\cdot \frac {C_{t}^{S}}{\theta }\). But, we can also use Eq. (2) to derive \(\frac {\partial C_{t}^{\theta }}{\partial S_{t}}\) which is equal to \(-\frac {C_{t}^{S}}{\theta }\).
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 1
By construction, the steady state \(\{w^{\ast };S^{\ast };C^{\theta \ast };\mu ^{\ast }\}\) satisfies:
We only have to verify that \(\phi (S)=0\) admits at least one solution. First, given assumptions 1 and 2, we observe that
with \(\overline {M}=\frac {M}{\overline {S}+\theta }\) defined above.
We can also show that the function \(\phi (\cdot )\) is monotonic under assumptions 1 and 2:
with \(u{}={}\frac {-\frac {M}{(S+\theta )^{2}}\cdot A^{\prime \prime }\left ({}\frac {M}{S+\theta }{}\right ) \cdot F^{\prime }(R)\cdot Z(S)\cdot (S+\theta )-A^{\prime }\left ({}\frac {M}{S+\theta }{}\right ) \cdot F^{\prime }(R)\cdot M\cdot \lbrack Z(S)+(\rho e\theta +R)(S+\theta )]}{Z^{2}(S+\theta )^{2}}{}>{}0\), given we assume that \(A^{\prime \prime }(\cdot ) \leq 0\). We therefore obtain that the function \(\phi (\cdot )\) monotonically increases from \(-\infty \) to \(\phi (\overline {S})\) for values of S between 0 and \(\overline {S}\). Thus, a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique steady state is that \(\phi (\overline {S})\) is positive.
If we remind that the elasticities \(\varepsilon _{F/R}= \frac {R\cdot F^{\prime }(R)}{F(R)}>0\) and \(\varepsilon _{F/\overline {M}}=\frac { \overline {M}\cdot A^{\prime }(\overline {M})}{A(\overline {M})}>0\), then the function \(\phi (\overline {S})\) is positive if
This concludes the proof.
Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 2
As usual, focusing on the local stability of the dynamic system, we can derive the following Jacobian matrix:
To find the properties of this matrix, we shall apply a method developed by Dockner [10] to investigate in a simple way the stability properties of a linearized four-dimensional dynamic system. Using this method, the eigenvalues of the system can easily be computed according to the following simple formula:
with
According to this method, the equilibrium of the system is saddle path if \(\det (J)>0\) and \(\Omega <0\).
Let use compute the required derivative.
We calculate \(\det (J)\) as follows:
Let us denote the term between the round brackets by \(D(S^{\ast })=\left . \left ( \frac {\partial \dot {w}}{\partial C^{\theta }}\cdot \frac {\partial \dot {\mu }}{\partial \mu }-\frac {\partial \dot {w}}{\partial \mu }\cdot \frac {\partial \dot {\mu }}{\partial C^{\theta }} \right ) \right \vert _{(w^{\ast },C^{\theta ^{\ast }},S^{\ast },\mu ^{\ast })}.\) Then, a sufficient condition for \(\det (J)\) to be positive is to have \(D(S^{\ast })\geq 0.\) Now, let us rewrite \(D(S^{\ast })\) as follows:
One can first remark that if the TFP is assumed constant (i.e., \(A^{\prime }(\cdot )\rightarrow 0\)), then \(D(S^{\ast })=0\) and \(\det (J)>0.\) Now, in the more general case, with \(A^{\prime }(\cdot )<0\), we can compute the condition on the parameters to have a positive \(D(S^{\ast })\) as follows:
with \(\varepsilon _{A^{\prime }/M}=\frac {MA^{\prime \prime }(\cdot )}{ A^{\prime }(\cdot )}>0\).
We therefore can deduce that \(\det J>0\) under this condition.
Besides, in a similar way, we find easily that
We therefore obtain that under condition (A), \(\det J>0\) and \( \Omega <0\), the sufficient condition for real eigenvalues to exist and thus for local monotonicity to hold are fulfilled. This concludes the proof.
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Le Kama, A.A., Tomini, A. Water Conservation Versus Soil Salinity Control. Environ Model Assess 18, 647–660 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-013-9368-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-013-9368-0