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Minimum Quality Standards in Hedonic Markets with Environmental Externalities

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Abstract

We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard (MQS) in a vertically differentiated duopoly with an environmental externality. We establish that the MQS bites only if the hedonic component of consumer preferences is sufficiently strong. Then, we illustrate an underlying trade-off between the beneficial effects of quality enhancement on prices and the associated undesirable increase in the environmental externality.

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Notes

  1. Assuming partial coverage is conducive to a fully analytical solution. Additionally, it is also a realistic assumption in modelling markets where hedonic preferences and prices matter. Observe that those who are not able to purchase any of the vertically differentiated varieties have nonetheless access to an outside (undifferentiated) good whose utility is normalised to zero.

  2. Quality can be thought of as the result of R&D efforts previously carried out by firms and summarised in a fixed cost ε > 0 that is taken to be small enough for profits to be positive throughout. In the last part of the note, we will take into account quality-dependent fixed and convex costs to show that results are qualitatively similar.

  3. It is worth noting that this is not a crucial assumption, as admitting the possibility for consumers to be environmentally concerned, with U = θq i  − p i  − s would not modify the expressions of \(\widehat{\theta }\) and \( \widetilde{\theta }\) resulting from \(\widehat{\theta }q_{H}-p_{H}-s=\widehat{ \theta }q_{L}-p_{L}-s\) and \(\widetilde{\theta }q_{L}-p_{L}-s=-s\), respectively.

  4. The alternative case in which firms bear convex variable costs of the type C i  = g i (q i ) x i , \(g_{i}^{\prime },g_{i}^{\prime \prime }>0\), does not lend itself to an equally manageable treatment.

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank two anonymous referees for the helpful comments and HERA SpA for sponsoring this project. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Correspondence to Luca Lambertini.

Appendix

Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1

For all ΘQ ∈ (2b, 6b),

$$ \begin{array}{rll} &&{\kern-6pt}\pi _{H}^{\textrm{MQS}}+\pi _{L}^{\textrm{MQS}}-\pi _{H}^{\textrm{N}}+\pi _{L}^{\textrm{N}}\equiv \Delta \Pi \\ &&{\kern12pt} = \frac{\left( \Theta Q-2b\right) \left( 2b-3\Theta Q\right) }{Q}<0 \end{array} $$
(22)
$$ \textrm{CS}^{\textrm{MQS}}\!-\!\textrm{CS}^{\textrm{N}}\equiv \Delta \textrm{CS}=\frac{3\left( \Theta Q\!-\!2b\right) \left( 7\Theta Q\!-\!2b\right) }{64Q}>0 $$
(23)
$$ s^{\textrm{MQS}}-s^{\textrm{N}}\equiv \Delta s=\frac{3b\left( \Theta Q-2b\right) }{16Q}>0. $$
(24)

As a consequence, the fact that in the same range \(W^{\textrm{MQS}}>W^{\textrm{N}}\), or equivalently

$$ \Delta \Pi +\Delta \textrm{CS}-\Delta s>0, $$
(25)

is due to the price effect enhancing consumer surplus largely enough to more than offset the reduction in industry profits and the increase in the environmental externality. Moreover, firms now compete over a product that now consumers value more. That is to say, the introduction of a binding MQS causes an increase in the average quality available to consumers as compared to the unregulated setting.□

Proof of Proposition 3

The result in Eq. (21) can be obtained by decomposing the effect of a variation of q L on each component of social welfare when \(\partial \pi _{L}/\partial q_{L}=0\). Differentiating π H , s, and CS with respect to q L yields

$$ \frac{\partial \pi _{H}}{\partial q_{L}}=-\frac{4\Theta ^{2}q_{H}^{2}\left( 2q_{H}-q_{L}\right) }{\left( 4q_{H}-q_{L}\right) ^{3}}<0, $$
(26)
$$ \frac{\partial s}{\partial q_{L}}=\frac{3b\Theta q_{H}}{\left( 4q_{H}-q_{L}\right) ^{2}}>0, $$
(27)
$$ \frac{\partial \textrm{CS}}{\partial q_{L}}=\frac{4\Theta ^{2}\left( q_{H}\right) ^{2}\left( 28q_{H}+5q_{L}\right) }{2\left( 4q_{H}-q_{L}\right) ^{3}}>0 $$
(28)

By adding Eq. (26) to Eq. (28) and subtracting Eq. (27), we obtain Eq. (21). Therefore, as in Proposition 1, the fact that W MQS > W N is due to an increase in consumer surplus large enough to more than compensate the reduction in industry profits and the increase in the environmental externality.□

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Ecchia, G., Lambertini, L. & Tampieri, A. Minimum Quality Standards in Hedonic Markets with Environmental Externalities. Environ Model Assess 18, 319–323 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-012-9345-z

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