Abstract
Many growing studies have examined the impact of Covid-19 on altruism; the results, however, are divergent. This study synthesizes the rapidly expanding literature and performs a meta-analysis based on 24 dictator game studies reporting data collected after the start of the pandemic to examine whether Covid-19 framing and Covid-19-related recipients significantly impact altruism compared to neutral frame and non-Covid-19 recipients, respectively. Overall, the dictators donate about 42% of their endowment and depict relatively higher altruism when compared with other meta-analyses that used pre-pandemic studies. I also find that the Covid-19 and neutral frames lead to identical altruism. However, the dictators donate a higher fraction of endowment (about 6–9% higher) to the Covid-19-related recipients compared to those unrelated to Covid-19. These findings will provide helpful guidelines for future experiments focusing on the interplay of pandemic and altruism.
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Data availability
Data and STATA code can be directly acquired from the author.
Notes
Altruism can take multiple forms, such as volunteering, helping others and donating money to individuals or charities. In this study, we restrict altruism to monetary donations to individuals or charities.
Several existing studies show that altruism is an effective predictor of the Covid-19 related prevented behaviors (for example, Campos-Mercade et al. 2021; Umer 2022). Therefore, the importance of altruism and its potential role in the health economics domain has increased manifolds, specifically during the ongoing pandemic.
For a review of the literature on Covid-19 and preferences, please see the recent study by Umer (2023c).
As the literature on pandemic and altruism is scarce, unpublished studies are also included in the analysis. Moreover, using unpublished studies in the meta-analysis is a frequently used practice in economics, as seen in the recent works of Brada et al. (2021), Umer et al. (2022) and Umer (2023a). However, as a robustness check, I also perform meta-analysis with published studies only. The main findings remain consistent and further discussed it in Sect. 4.
The search was limited to research articles in Economics and Development section.
The phase “dictator game” was searched using quotation marks.
I did not use Google Scholar in the second stage of the data extraction because other sources provided a reasonable number of studies.
An email was sent to the corresponding author of studies with missing relevant information or with SE/SD reported in bars. Three authors shared the relevant information.
Umer et al. (2022), in a recent meta-analysis of dictator game studies, report average donations of about 30%.
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Professor Takashi Kurosaki and Professor Ichiro Iwasaki at the Institute of Economic Research (IER), Hitotsubashi University, for their valuable guidance in conducting the meta-analysis. I also thank the editor and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Countries covered in the meta-analysis
No | Country | Studies | Estimates (K) |
---|---|---|---|
1 | Austria | 1 | 3 (2.44%) |
2 | China | 4 | 7 (5.69%) |
3 | England | 1 | 2 (1.63%) |
4 | France | 1 | 1 (0.81%) |
5 | Germany | 2 | 22 (17.89%) |
6 | Italy | 1 | 1 (0.81%) |
7 | Netherlands | 1 | 40 (32.52%) |
8 | Poland | 1 | 2 (1.63%) |
9 | Russia | 1 | 1 (0.81%) |
10 | South Africa | 1 | 5 (4.07%) |
11 | Spain | 2 | 3 (2.44%) |
12 | Sweden | 1 | 2 (1.63%) |
13 | Taiwan | 1 | 4 (3.25%) |
14 | USA | 10 | 30 (24.39%) |
Total | 14 | 24 | 123 |
Appendix A1: Studies classified by framing and recipient type
ID | Study | Year | Neutral frame | Covid-19 framing | Covid-19 recipient | Other recipients |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Adena and Harke | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||
2 | Aksoy et al. | Yes | Yes | |||
3 | Aksoy et al. | Yes | Yes | |||
4 | Alsharawy et al. | Yes | Yes | |||
5 | Blanco et al. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
6 | Brañas-Garza et al. | Yes | Yes | |||
7 | Chapkovski | Yes | Yes | |||
8 | Chisadza | Yes | Yes | |||
9 | Fanghella | Yes | Yes | |||
10 | Fridman et al. | Yes | Yes | |||
11 | Grimalda | Yes | Yes | |||
12 | Grimalda et al. | Yes | Yes | |||
13 | Guo et al. | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||
14 | Hellmann et al. | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||
15 | Lee et al. | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||
16 | Li and Zheng | Yes | Yes | |||
17 | Liebe et al. | Yes | Yes | |||
18 | Livingston and Rasulmukhamedov | Yes | Yes | |||
19 | Moon and VanEpps | Yes | Yes | |||
20 | Romero-Rivas et al. | Yes | Yes | |||
21 | Shachat et al. | Yes | Yes | |||
22 | Sweijen et al. | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||
23 | Wang | Yes | Yes | |||
24 | Yue and Yang | Yes | Yes |
Appendix B: Meta-synthesis based on the traditional models
Aggregation category | # of estimates (K) | Fixed effect modela | Random effects modela | Homogeneity test Q statistic [p-value]b |
---|---|---|---|---|
All observations | 123 | 0.375*** (0.001) | 0.419 *** (0.014) | 36,178.68 *** [0.000] |
Neutral frame | 116 | 0.371*** (0.001) | 0.417*** (0.014) | 34,540.27 *** [0.000] |
Covid-19 frame | 7 | 0.528*** (0.006) | 0.447*** (0.071) | 947.83*** [0.000] |
COVID unrelated Recipient | 100 | 0.377*** (0.001) | 0.401*** (0.015) | 26,927.31 *** [0.000] |
Covid-19 recipient | 23 | 0.360*** (0.002) | 0.498*** (0.032) | 9209.95 *** [0.000] |
Appendix C: MRA with random effects model
Estimator | Random effects |
---|---|
Regression # | [1] |
Covid-19 frame | 0.074 |
(0.059) | |
Covid-19 recipient | 0.072** |
(0.035) | |
Dictator type (base: students) | −0.200*** |
(0.045) | |
Incentivized decisions | −0.067 |
(0.048) | |
Gender (base: mixed) | |
Female | 0.074 |
(0.054) | |
Male | 0.033 |
(0.054) | |
Other | 0.142 |
(0.103) | |
Multiple donations | −0.007 |
(0.053) | |
Matching subsidy | 0.152*** |
(0.051) | |
RPSP | 0.084 |
(0.066) | |
BRIS | 0.084* |
(0.048) | |
Country (base: upper income) | −0.119*** |
(0.042) | |
Year | 0.010 |
(0.020) | |
Published | −0.173** |
(0.078) | |
Constant | −18.662 |
(39.447) | |
K | 123 |
R-Squared (%) | 37.40 |
Homogeneity test \(\chi^{2}\) | 12,719.15 |
p-value | 0.000 |
Appendix D: MRA with the two focus meta-independent variables combined
I created a new variable, “Framing + Recipient,” that takes on a value of 1 if either Covid-19 framing or Covid-19 related recipient is used and zero otherwise. The mean value for this combined variable is 0.23.
Estimator | Cluster-robust OLS | Cluster-robust WLS [df] | Cluster-robust WLS [1/SE] | Cluster-robust WLS [1/EST] | Cluster-robust random effects panel |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Regression # | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] |
Framing + Recipient | 0.085** | 0.136** | 0.119** | 0.074 | 0.050*** |
(0.035) | (0.057) | (0.044) | (0.079) | (0.018) | |
Dictator type (base: students) | −0.211*** | −0.290*** | −0.315*** | −0.145** | −0.072 |
(0.074) | (0.069) | (0.065) | (0.067) | (0.077) | |
Incentivized decisions | −0.063 | 0.062 | 0.003 | 0.011 | −0.097 |
(0.093) | (0.115) | (0.100) | (0.098) | (0.083) | |
Gender (base: mixed) | |||||
Female | 0.076* | 0.050 | 0.071 | 0.053 | 0.005 |
(0.041) | (0.042) | (0.042) | (0.055) | (0.052) | |
Male | 0.033 | 0.060 | 0.058 | 0.030 | -0.038 |
(0.051) | (0.045) | (0.049) | (0.064) | (0.061) | |
Other | 0.150** | 0.100 | 0.146** | 0.110 | 0.075 |
(0.061) | (0.075) | (0.063) | (0.086) | (0.055) | |
Multiple donations | −0.016 | −0.074 | −0.033 | −0.113 | −0.028 |
(0.086) | (0.072) | (0.074) | (0.108) | (0.088) | |
Matching subsidy | 0.159** | 0.048 | 0.119 | 0.135 | 0.122* |
(0.059) | (0.082) | (0.070) | (0.082) | (0.070) | |
RPSP | 0.088 | 0.105 | 0.137 | 0.132* | 0.156** |
(0.099) | (0.091) | (0.085) | (0.065) | (0.071) | |
BRIS | 0.083 | 0.004 | 0.111 | 0.006 | 0.122*** |
(0.080) | (0.107) | (0.080) | (0.069) | (0.044) | |
Country (base: upper income) | −0.134** | −0.168** | −0.195*** | −0.126* | −0.050 |
(0.059) | (0.074) | (0.069) | (0.062) | (0.064) | |
Year | 0.008 | 0.009 | 0.010 | 0.015 | −0.015 |
(0.024) | (0.049) | (0.028) | (0.029) | (0.033) | |
Published | −0.181 | −0.147 | −0.211 | −0.278** | −0.174 |
(0.128) | (0.117) | (0.125) | (0.122) | (0.107) | |
Constant | −15.279 | −18.190 | −20.364 | −29.208 | 30.202 |
(48.133) | (99.270) | (57.203) | (57.659) | (67.362) | |
K | 123 | 123 | 123 | 123 | 123 |
R-squareda | 0.455 | 0.418 | 0.520 | 0.388 | 0.114 |
Number of IDs | 24 | ||||
Breusch-Pagan test \(\chi^{2}\) | 0.12 | ||||
[p-value]b | [0.363] | ||||
Hausman test \(\chi^{2}\) | 13.14 | ||||
[p-value]b | [0.069] |
Appendix E: MRA for between protocol comparison
A between-protocol comparison is performed to examine the relative impact of the Covid-19 frame and Covid-19-related recipients on altruism. The base category for such a comparison consists of the neutral frame and non-Covid-19 recipients. The impact of the Covid-19 recipient is significant in three regressions and shows that the dictators donate about 6–10% more to such recipients than the control group, ceteris paribus.
Estimator | Cluster-robust OLS | Cluster-robust WLS [df] | Cluster-robust WLS [1/SE] | Cluster-robust WLS [1/EST] | Cluster-robust random effects panel |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Regression # | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] |
Between protocol comparison (base: neutral frame + Non-Covid recipients) | |||||
Covid-19 Frame | 0.122 | 0.277*** | 0.193* | 0.103 | 0.023 |
(0.095) | (0.085) | (0.110) | (0.083) | (0.057) | |
Covid-19 Recipient | 0.077** | 0.085 | 0.103** | 0.053 | 0.056*** |
(0.031) | (0.058) | (0.040) | (0.108) | (0.015) | |
Dictator type (base: students) | −0.210*** | −0.288*** | −0.311*** | −0.144** | −0.069 |
(0.073) | (0.069) | (0.064) | (0.068) | (0.077) | |
Incentivized decisions | −0.072 | 0.015 | −0.013 | −0.004 | −0.096 |
(0.091) | (0.114) | (0.095) | (0.096) | (0.084) | |
Gender (base: mixed) | |||||
Female | 0.079* | 0.062 | 0.076* | 0.062 | 0.001 |
(0.040) | (0.038) | (0.040) | (0.052) | (0.054) | |
Male | 0.036 | 0.071* | 0.063 | 0.038 | −0.042 |
(0.050) | (0.041) | (0.047) | (0.060) | (0.064) | |
Other | 0.148** | 0.109 | 0.144** | 0.113 | 0.071 |
(0.061) | (0.072) | (0.062) | (0.086) | (0.058) | |
Multiple donations | −0.017 | −0.074 | −0.031 | −0.117 | −0.025 |
(0.086) | (0.072) | (0.074) | (0.110) | (0.088) | |
Matching subsidy | 0.173*** | 0.112 | 0.145** | 0.159 | 0.115* |
(0.058) | (0.083) | (0.064) | (0.097) | (0.069) | |
RPSP | 0.094 | 0.128 | 0.144* | 0.135** | 0.155** |
(0.097) | (0.087) | (0.081) | (0.063) | (0.072) | |
BRIS | 0.087 | 0.028 | 0.119 | 0.008 | 0.124*** |
(0.077) | (0.104) | (0.073) | (0.067) | (0.044) | |
Country (base: upper income) | −0.139** | −0.164** | −0.203*** | −0.127** | −0.045 |
(0.066) | (0.068) | (0.070) | (0.061) | (0.069) | |
Year | 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.014 | 0.019 | −0.017 |
(0.025) | (0.045) | (0.028) | (0.026) | (0.034) | |
Published | −0.188 | −0.167 | −0.219* | −0.291** | −0.165 |
(0.131) | (0.118) | (0.126) | (0.128) | (0.110) | |
Constant | −20.841 | −21.354 | −28.469 | −37.242 | 35.656 |
(49.621) | (90.897) | (57.272) | (51.726) | (69.123) | |
K | 123 | 123 | 123 | 123 | 123 |
R-squareda | 0.457 | 0.452 | 0.525 | 0.391 | 0.121 |
Number of IDs | 24 | ||||
Breusch-Pagan Test \(\chi^{2}\) | 0.08 | ||||
[p-value]b | [0.386] | ||||
Hausman test \(\chi^{2}\) | 13.21 | ||||
[p-value]b | [0.105] |
Appendix F: Bayesian model averaging
Meta-independent variable | Coefficient | Standard error | PIP |
---|---|---|---|
Covid-19 frame | 0.04 | 0.05 | 1.00 |
Covid-19 recipient | 0.10 | 0.04 | 1.00 |
Dictator type | −0.14 | 0.03 | 1.00 |
Incentivized decisions | −0.00 | 0.01 | 0.09 |
Gender | −0.00 | 0.01 | 0.11 |
Multiple donations | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.22 |
Matching subsidy | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.56 |
RPSP | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.14 |
BRIS | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.13 |
Year | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.09 |
Published | −0.02 | 0.05 | 0.24 |
Country | −0.14 | 0.04 | 0.98 |
Intercept | −0.40 | 11.10 | 1.00 |
Observations | 123 | ||
Model space | 1024 |
Appendix G: MRA with robust meta-independent controls and published studies
Estimator | Cluster-robust OLS | Cluster-robust WLS [df] | Cluster-robust WLS [1/SE] | Cluster-robust WLS [1/EST] | Cluster-robust random effects panel |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Regression # | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] |
Covid-19 frame | 0.055 | 0.161** | 0.100 | 0.090 | 0.003 |
(0.049) | (0.065) | (0.061) | (0.056) | (0.043) | |
Covid-19 recipient | 0.104*** | 0.067 | 0.099** | 0.062 | 0.061*** |
(0.032) | (0.063) | (0.039) | (0.080) | (0.012) | |
Dictator type (base: students) | −0.144*** | −0.148*** | −0.173*** | −0.089* | −0.069 |
(0.027) | (0.036) | (0.041) | (0.048) | (0.056) | |
Country (base: upper income) | −0.166*** | −0.153*** | −0.195*** | −0.153*** | −0.134*** |
(0.038) | (0.051) | (0.030) | (0.044) | (0.048) | |
Constant | 0.497*** | 0.518*** | 0.501*** | 0.471*** | 0.449*** |
(0.016) | (0.017) | (0.009) | (0.041) | (0.057) | |
K | 118 | 118 | 118 | 118 | 118 |
R-squared a | 0.384 | 0.322 | 0.392 | 0.236 | 0.024 |
Number of IDs | 22 | ||||
Breusch-Pagan test \(\chi^{2}\) | 0.74 | ||||
[p-value]b | [0.195] | ||||
Hausman test \(\chi^{2}\) | 6.55 | ||||
[p-value]b | [0.088] |
Appendix H: Assessment of publication-selection bias by focus meta-independent variables
Figure
4 reports a funnel plot with fraction of endowment donated on the horizontal and standard errors on the vertical axis for two focus meta-independent variables. The plot for the neutral frame and non-Covid-19 related recipients appears to be symmetric and in the shape of an inverted funnel. However, for the Covid-19 frame and recipient, the shape does not appear to be inverted funnel; therefore, we perform the FAT-PET tests and summarize the findings in Table
7.
The FAT test confirms publication-selection bias for the Covid-19 frame and the Covid-19 recipient protocols. I do not find conclusive evidence for publication-selection bias for the remaining two protocols. I follow the procedure of Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) and Brada et al. (2021) to obtain publication-selection bias-adjusted estimates for the Covid-19 frame protocol. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
The null hypothesis \(\alpha_{1} = 0\) tests whether a true effect exists. In the presence of a true effect, \(\alpha_{1}\) is considered its publication-selection bias adjusted value. Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) call this process as precision-effect estimate with standard error (PEESE). I use three estimators (unrestricted WLS, cluster-robust unrestricted WLS, and random effects panel ML) to estimate equation H and reject the null hypothesis (\(\alpha_{1} = 0\)) if at least two estimators provide significant value for \(\alpha_{1}\). The publication-selection bias-adjusted estimate for the Covid-19 protocol is 0.597 and shows a donation rate of about 7% higher than that obtained from WAAP, reported in Table 3 in the main text. Similarly, publication—selection bias adjusted maximum value for the Covid-19 recipient protocol is 0.354, and closely matches WAAP reported in Table 3 in the main text.
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Umer, H. Covid-19 and altruism: a meta-analysis of dictator games. Empirica 51, 35–60 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10663-023-09592-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10663-023-09592-x