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On the new gold standard in EU trade integration: reviewing the EU-Japan EPA

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Abstract

In 2011 the European Union’s free trade agreement with South Korea was considered its most ambitious agreement with any Asian economy. In 2019, however, this distinction was handed over to the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Japan. With Japan being a top-ten trading partner of the EU, the EPA is of economic and political importance in times of rising protectionism to support rule-based trading principles as well as international standards and sustainability goals. The paper reviews EU-Japan trade structures and the components of the EPA accompanied by a structural gravity estimation that builds on the experiences of the EU-South Korea agreement. Manufacturing industries benefit from reduced duties and application of the same international standards, facilitating approval. The greatest potential for cost reduction through tariff cuts remains in the strongly protected agri-food sector. Given the importance of non-tariff measures in negotiations of the EPA, we consider a counterfactual ‘gold-standard’ scenario, in which the regulatory gap for standard-like non-tariff measures between the EU and Japan closes. General equilibrium results suggest welfare effects for Japan of up to 0.05% of real GDP. Estimated GDP effects for the EU are in the magnitude of 0.01%, however, with marked differences across EU Member States.

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Fig. 1

Source: UN Comtrade

Fig. 2

Source: UN Comtrade

Fig. 3

Source: WTO I-TIP database; authors’ calculations

Fig. 4

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Data availability

References to sources of all data analysed in this article are included in the text.

Code availability

R code deriving trade and counterfactual welfare effects is available upon reasonable request.

Notes

  1. TPP economies: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States and Vietnam. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP) is the new agreement of the remaining 11 economies. It has been in force since 30 December 2018 for Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Singapore; since 14 January 2019 for Vietnam.

  2. GDP per capita at purchasing power parities in 2018, at current international dollars, was USD 39,661 for South Korea and USD 41,473 for Japan (World Bank, 2020). Both countries feature among the top 25 countries of the world, according to the Human Development Index of the United Nations, which considers the level of education and health in an economy in addition to GDP, with an index of 0.906 for South Korea and 0.915 for Japan for the year 2018 (UNDP 2019).

  3. Negotiations with Japan on an investment agreement take place in parallel. However, a review of the evolution of EU foreign direct investment (FDI) suggests that the FTA with South Korea was having a major impact on investment stocks and incomes generated (EC 2017), even without having an investment protection regulation in place. An illustrative example of Austria’s FDI outward stocks and FDI income generated in Japan and South Korea for the period 2000–2017 is available in Grübler et al. (2018).

  4. In fact, EU exports of motor vehicles to South Korea increased by more than 200% and imports by about 50% in the first four years of the FTA’s implementation. Within the EU, however, effects varied greatly among Member States, with preference utilisation rates ranging between 6 and 91% (EC 2016a). Between 2015 and 2018, the preference utilisation rate for South Korean exports to the EU increased from 85 to 88% and for EU exports to South Korea from 68 to 81% (EC 2019b).

  5. Additional early studies on the economic and social impact of the EU-Japan EPA are compared in Chowdhry et al. (2018), conducted for the European Parliament.

  6. The data can also be used to compute ad valorem equivalents of NTMs (Ghodsi et al 2016). However, in this paper we refer to the regulatory intensity, which is measure directly derived from underlying NTM data. The merits and flaws of this measure and NTM data based on notifications are discussed in the data section (chapter 4).

  7. Our model is also applied to WIOD in order to allow direct comparisons with earlier studies.

  8. Looking at the tariff schedules of the FTAs, it is discernible that negotiations of tariff cuts are often more complex than is assumed. Substantial reductions in sensitive sectors can sometimes be achieved only by introducing NTMs, such as tariff-rate quotas. South Korea seems to be particularly protective of vegetable products. For example, it charged an exorbitantly high tariff of 754.3% for specific ginseng root extract powder, to be eliminated within 15 years. However, Annex 3 of the FTA on agricultural safeguard measures specifies levels of import volumes per year, which – if exceeded – trigger higher tariffs. Similarly, Japan applied a mixed tariff of 85.7% or JPY 60.90/kg (whichever is greater) for glucose syrup. Within the EPA, parties agreed on a tariff-rate quota, increasing the aggregate quota quantity from 1,780 metric tonnes in the first year to 5,340 metric tonnes for the 12th year and thereafter. Imports exceeding the quota are subject to customs duties unaffected by the EPA.

  9. Some of the highest tariffs concern products containing sugar: caramel (HS 170,290,300) is currently taxed with a 50% tariff, or JPY 25/kg, but will enter the Japanese market duty-free from the 11th year of the EPA’s application.

  10. There are many different types of NTMs; for a detailed discussion, see e.g. Grübler and Reiter (2020) and Ghodsi et al. (2017) or the I-TIP Goods website of the WTO: http://i-tip.wto.org/goods/default.aspx?language=en.

  11. WTO documents G/SPS/N/EEC/397 (1 April 2011) and G/SPS/N/EU/15 (11 April 2012). Official Journal of the European Union, OJ L80, 26 March 2011.

  12. The report by UCTAD and the World Bank (2018) suggests that regulations are concentrated on products that are highly traded, as frequency indices are persistently lower than coverage ratios (which represent the share of trade flows affected rather than the number of products targeted). On the other hand, ad valorem equivalents computed for NTMs, based on estimations by Kee and Nicita (2017) and Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) underscore that some NTMs are particularly trade-restrictive, such that policies should not neglect little traded goods.

  13. All European countries except Kosovo, Belarus and Moldova, plus several major non-European economies.

  14. The main disadvantage of trade-weighted tariffs is that they decrease the importance of very high tariffs. In the extreme case, tariffs are bringing trade to a halt, resulting in zero trade flows and dropping out of the trade-weighted tariff measure. Simple averages, on the contrary, put the same weight to every product and therefor put too much weight to products that are not important for international trade flows.

  15. We make use of advances in the PPML estimation with high-dimensional fixed effects elaborated in Larch et al (2019) and Correia and Zylkin (2020).

  16. In 2017, intra-country trade flows are missing for some major economies, including South Korea and Japan.

  17. Values of MLR terms can only be solved relative to a reference country, whose inward MLR is set equal to one. We chose the United States due to the abundance of data. However, counterfactual results do not change when we choose India as a reference country instead.

  18. In theory, we could use the coefficient on \(\tilde{\tau }\). Yotov et al. (2016) note that estimates in the literature range between 2 and 12, such that our estimates would still lie in this range. However, performing a meta-analysis, Head and Mayer (2014) suggest an elasticity estimate greater than 5. As we rely on simple average tariffs on aggregate data, we opt for elasticity estimates of the recent trade literature.

  19. See the appendix for a formal description of the full endowment general equilibrium model.

  20. Estimates for all countries/territories can be found in the Appendix.

  21. This approach implies that we impose the restriction of immobile labour across sectors.

  22. See also Felbermayr et al. (2017b).

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Funding

Supported by funds of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank, Anniversary Fund, project number: 17822).

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All authors contributed to the study. They benefited from previous work at the wiiw.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Julia Grübler.

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Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Country coverage

See Table 10.

Table 10 Countries covered. 155 countries/territories were considered for our analysis. The counterfactual scenario performed for the year 2016 returned estimates for the following 97 economies

1.2 Full endowment general equilibrium model

Presented by Anderson et al. (2015) and Yotov et al. (2016):

$$X_{ij,t} = \frac{{Y_{i,t} E_{j,t} }}{{Y_{t} }}\left( {\frac{{t_{ij,t} }}{{{\Pi }_{i,t} P_{j,t} }}} \right)^{1 - \sigma }$$
(4)
$${\Pi }_{i,t}^{1 - \sigma } = \mathop \sum \limits_{j} \left( {\frac{{t_{ij,t} }}{{P_{j,t} }}} \right)^{1 - \sigma } \frac{{E_{j,t} }}{{Y_{t} }}$$
(5)
$$P_{j,t}^{1 - \sigma } = \mathop \sum \limits_{i} \left( {\frac{{t_{ij,t} }}{{{\Pi }_{i,t} }}} \right)^{1 - \sigma } \frac{{Y_{i,t} }}{{Y_{t} }}$$
(6)
$$p_{i,t}^{{}} = \left( {\frac{{Y_{i,t} }}{{Y_{t} }}} \right)^{{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma }n}} \frac{1}{{\alpha_{i} {\Pi }_{i,t} }}$$
(7)
$$E_{i,t} = \varphi_{i} Y_{i,t}$$
(8)

The value of output (\(Y_{i,t}\)) and expenditure (\(E_{j,t}\)) adapt by allowing prices (\(p_{i,t}^{{}}\)) to respond to changes in bilateral trade costs (\(t_{ij,t}\)) and by changes in multilateral resistance terms (\(\text{outward } {\Pi }_{i,t}^{{}}\) and \(\text{inward } P_{j,t}^{{}}\)). Production, however, is assumed to remain constant in the full endowment setting.

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Grübler, J., Reiter, O. & Stehrer, R. On the new gold standard in EU trade integration: reviewing the EU-Japan EPA. Empirica 48, 611–644 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10663-021-09506-9

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