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Labour-incentive reforms at preretirement age in Austria

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Abstract

Low participation rates of older workers in the labour market threaten the sustainability of the pension system in Austria. Given the current political debate on this issue, we try to shed light on employment and retirement behaviour of Austrian couples when income support is provided and pension benefits are reduced. Using a sample of married couples with both partners aged 50–65, we find that the proposed reform increases the labour supply of middle-income men whereas the effects on women are weaker. However, somehow surprisingly, we find that these reforms have an increasing effect on unemployment/inactivity probabilities which in turn is outweighed by a decreasing effect on the retirement probabilities in case of women. These findings emphasize the importance of a joint consideration of labour supply and retirement behaviour of married couples when introducing pension reforms and tax-benefit policies.

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Notes

  1. However, the Austrian government has introduced few active labour market policies, both on the supply and demand side, such as part-time allowance for older workers (Altersteilzeitgeld) and different forms of part-time and flexible pension arrangements. See Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour (2008).

  2. For more details on pension reforms, see Bovenberg (2003), Keuschnigg et. al (2010), Feldstein (2005), Fenge and Pestieau (2005), Casamata et. al (2001), Lindbeck (2001), Lindbeck and Persson (2003), McHale (1999) and Gruber and Wise (1999, 2002, 2005).

  3. While the pension reforms 2003–2004 raised benefit deductions for early retirement to 4.2% per year, the 2007 pension reform halved it to 2.1% despite the OECD policy recommendation. For a comprehensive overview of the Austrian pension system, see Hofer and Koman 2006.

  4. A pension corridor means that the individuals can retire within a corridor between 62 and 65 with a pension discount, and between 65 and 68 with a pension supplement.

  5. See the OECD report 08/09/2005 “OECD urges Austria to do more to encourage older people to work longer” and also Zaidi, Makovec and Fuchs (2006) “Transition from work to retirement in EU25”.

  6. Even though several political initiatives have been taken to fulfil the Stockholm goal of 50% participation of older employees, the total employment rate has remained almost unchanged over the last decade.

  7. Source: Eurostat (2004) (see Tables 10 and 11, Appendix 1).

  8. See OECD report (2005a, b) “Aging and Employment Policies, Austria”.

  9. See The OECD Observer No. 212 (1998) “Retire early, stay at work?”.

  10. See Hefler (2006), Labour Market Participation of Older People (55–64) in Austria—A Background Report.

  11. Reductions in pension entitlement would be linked to lower statutory contributions, which imply lower tax rates and therefore fewer disincentives to labour market performance.

  12. The vertical axes stand for the percentage of individuals across alternatives. There are 6 discrete alternatives of hours of work which are given in the right-hand side of Figs. 3 and 4. The 1st alternative refers to unemployment and inactivity status, the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and the 5th respectively to the working hours interval (17–32), (33–48), (49–64) and (65–80) and the last alternative to the pension status. The difference between the first and the last alternative is income-driven such that in the former the individuals perceive only family benefits and other similar benefits while in the latter, the generated income are simply the pension benefits.

  13. We have modified the Austrian input database in EUROMOD to incorporate the working hours alternatives and generate their respective gross earnings for each couple. However we must point out that here, EUROMOD is used only to calculate budget sets for all the alternatives simultaneously while the tax-benefit reforms are modelled separately.

  14. Colombino (2003) develops and estimates both forward-looking and myopic versions of a structural model of retirement by including or dropping the term measuring the future loss of retiring. We intend to follow this approach in a future study.

  15. See Bovenberg (2003).

  16. Thus, the opportunity set of households is composed of 36 alternatives, which is a combination 6 × 6 of the alternatives for both partners (5 alternatives of weekly working hours and 1 for the decision to retire per partner).

  17. The social security contributions are treated as in the current system.

  18. Moreover, the data do not provide information on the earnings history and do not allow in this way to apply the rules for the calculation of the pension benefit computation.

  19. EUROMOD does not simulate the unemployment benefits and for that reason we do not separate the inactive from the unemployed. This is one of the limitations of this model.

  20. Negative Income Tax is based on the provision of a subsistence income level such that earnings above this level are normally taxed while those below it are entitled to receive benefits, which is otherwise called a “negative tax”. The Negative Income Tax has been largely tested in the United States and was introduced by Friedman in 1962. Such a scheme provides the largest transfers to the lowest income earners who are presumably most in need of support.

  21. The WF is very similar to the NIT but the income support to households with gross income under the poverty line is given only if at least one of the partners work not less than 20 h per week. Workfare system is comparable to the recent reforms introduced in the US and the UK such as Earnings Tax Credit and In-work benefits. See Colombino et.al (2008).

  22. We have tested four different levels of generosity level but our comments will disregard the highest level (1.25) as the simulated marginal tax rate exceeds the 50% level, which is the top marginal rate actually applied in Austria.

  23. This finding holds for both values of pension reductions (2.1 and 4.2%).

  24. Gruber and Wise (2004) show that social security incentives have a strong impact on retirement decisions which is similar in countries with very different cultural histories, labor market institutions, and other characteristics. The main variables used to measure the social security incentives are the social security wealth (SSW, the present discounted value of the sum of expected future pension benefits) and the accrual in social security wealth (ACC, the difference in social security wealth by postponing retirement by one year). Under an actuarially fair pension system, the probability of retirement should be an increasing function of the SSW and a decreasing function of the ACC. The incentive effect that social security may have on the retirement decisions of the old workers can be split up into an income effect (under the rational that leisure is a normal good, one would consume more of it if a higher value of SSW is excepted) and a substitution effect (a positive value of ACC induces individuals to postpone the retirement decision by one year and consequently consume more leisure). The effects of the ACC on the retirement decisions are significantly negative both for men and women.

  25. We tried to insert the dummy variables of being self-employed or working in the public sector as in Colombino (2003) but it turned out to be insignificant.

  26. Van Soest and Das (2001) use a different mechanism to account for "peaks and holes" in observed hour distribution, namely fixed cost of working. This leads, however, to a more complicated estimation and therefore we would not advise the adoption of this procedure in the basic model estimation.

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Acknowledgments

The authors thank the Department of Economics “Cognetti de Martiis” and the European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research for providing research funding and facilities. We would like to thank Ugo Colombino, Horacio Levy and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments. Special thanks are addressed to the participants of the ICUE 2008 Conference in Vienna and the Welfare State Performance and Design Conference in Zagreb in April 2008. This paper uses EUROMOD version D1. We are indebted to all past and current members of the EUROMOD consortium for the construction and development of EUROMOD. However, the views expressed in this paper, as well as any errors, are the responsibility of the authors and do not implicate the institutions to which they are affiliated. EUROMOD relies on data from the Austrian version of the EU-SILC made available by Statistik Austria.

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Correspondence to Edlira Narazani.

Appendices

Appendix 1

See Appendix Box 1, Tables 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14.

Box 1 Parametric reforms in Austria (2003)
Table 10 Pensions as percentage of GDP in 2004
Table 11 Expenditures as percentage of GDP in 2004
Table 12 Austrian Economically Inactive Population by Reason for Inactivity in 2006
Table 13 Earning equation for men and women (regression model with sample selection)
Table 14 Pension entitlement equation for men and women (regression model with sample selection)

Appendix 2: Prediction of earnings

Table 13 shows that labour market participation is lower for males with longer contributory period and residing in regions with high unemployment rates, while it is higher for those who are more educated and cohabitate. As for females, labour market participation is lower for those women with more years of contribution and is higher for the more educated ones. These features of labour supply behaviour reflect the attitudes of the working force close to the retirement phase. The estimates of earning equation show a significant and positive effect of education, experience and cohabitating status for both men and women pointing out that earnings possibilities improve with the increase of experience and higher education as shown in the human capital theory and labour market signalling.

Appendix 3: Prediction of pension entitlements

The Heckman selection model helps to predict the pension’s entitlement in case this alternative is not chosen by the individual. The imputation takes place as follows:

  1. (a)

    first we estimate the propensity to retire early based on a vector of characteristics \( \Upphi (\lambda^{'} Z_{Pt} ) = {\text{Prob}}(\varepsilon_{pt} > - \lambda^{'} Z_{Pt} ) \) where Z Pt is a vector of characteristics, λ is a vector of parameters and ɛ pt is a standard normal random variable

  2. (b)

    Pension entitlements specification used in this paper is based on a similar specification used by Colombino (2003). Pensions received at a certain time t depend on the initial value of pension after τ years of employment,

$$ \, P_{t} (\tau ) = A_{\tau } \vartheta \Uppsi (R_{\tau } ,R_{\tau - 1} , \ldots ,R_{\tau - n} )\tau e^{\rho (t - \tau )} \xi_{Pt} \, $$
(8)
$$ {\text{where}}\,\Uppsi (R_{t} ,R_{t - 1} , \ldots ,R_{\tau - n} ) = {\frac{{\sum\nolimits_{i = 0}^{n} {R_{\tau - i} } }}{n + 1}} $$
  • ϑΨ (Rτ,Rτ-1, … Rτn) represents the proportion \( \vartheta \) of the average employment earnings over the last n + 1 years

  • τ represents the number of years of being employed (seniority)

  • A τ  = 1 when the individual is eligible for early retirement pension and 0 otherwise

  • ρ represents the annual rate of increase of the pension

  • \( \xi_{\text{Pt}} \) is the stochastic component assumed to follow a lognormal distribution

If we ignore the stochastic component, we get

$$ \Uppsi (R_{t} ,R_{t - 1} , \ldots ,R_{\tau - n} ) = R_{\tau } \sum\limits_{i = 0}^{n} {{\frac{{e^{ - i} }}{n + 1}}} . $$
(9)

And therefore, the Eq. 8 can be expressed in a logarithmic way as follows:

$$ \ln (P_{t} (\tau )) = \ln (\vartheta ) + \ln \left( {\sum\limits_{i = 0}^{n} {{\frac{{e^{ - i} }}{n + 1}}} } \right) + \ln (R_{\tau } ) + \ln (\tau ) + \rho (t - \tau ) + \ln (\xi_{Pt} ) $$
(10)

where ln (R τ ) represents labour income calculated using the Heckman selection regression for earnings (Table 13).

(c) Summing up the Eq. 10, we need to estimate the following equation on the sample of early retired individuals.

$$ E(\ln (P_{t} )) = \eta '{\text{Region}} + \ln (R_{\tau } ) + \ln (\tau ) + \rho (t - \tau ) + {\frac{{\text{cov} (\ln (\xi_{\text{Rt}} )n(\xi_{Pt} ))}}{{\sqrt {n(\xi_{\text{Pt}} )} }}}{\frac{{\phi (\lambda 'Z_{\text{PT}} )}}{{\Upphi (\lambda 'Z_{\text{PT}} )}}}. $$
(11)

As P t represents the pension that the individual would receive at time t if he had to retire at the same time, t equals τ and therefore the term ρ(t − τ) cancels out.Footnote 25

We include in the vector Z PT the following characteristics variables:

  1. 1.

    Education

  2. 2.

    Married or not

  3. 3.

    Income from self-employment

  4. 4.

    property income

  5. 5.

    income from investment

  6. 6.

    private pension

  7. 7.

    regional unemployment

Table 14 shows the estimates of the pension entitlement counting for the Heckman selectivity. The pension entitlements increase with wages and the number of contribution both for men and women. Income from self-employment and holding a private pension seem to be important for the retirement decision. In addition, the lack of job possibilities (signalled by a high unemployment rate) makes the retirement option more attractive. Lastly, the decision to opt for the retirement decision is more likely for those couples coming from small size households.

Appendix 4

4.1 A. Utility function specification

The specification is linear-in-parameters, which allows the use of potential estimation procedures available in most econometric or statistical packages. We chose a quadratic specification since it represents a good compromise between flexibility and ease of estimation:

$$ \begin{aligned} V(X,h_{F,} h_{M;} b) = & b_{x} X + b_{F} (T - h_{F} ) + b_{M} (T - h_{M} ) + b_{xx} X^{2} + b_{FF} (T - h_{F} )^{2} + b_{MM} (T - h_{M} )^{2} \\ + b_{xF} X(T - h_{F} ) + b_{xM} X(T - h_{M} ). \\ \end{aligned} $$
(12)

Some of the above parameters b s may depend on household or individual characteristics Z. A convenient choice might be to interact the disposable income and the leisure variables with the individual characteristics as follows:

$$ b_{F} = b_{F1} \left( {G\_60_{\text{wife}} } \right) + b_{F2} b_{F1} \left( {G\_65_{\text{wife}} } \right) $$
$$ b_{M} = b_{M1} \left( {G\_60_{\text{husband}} } \right) + b_{M2} (G\_65) $$
$$ b_{x} = b_{x1} \left( {{\text{Age}}_{\text{husband}} } \right) + b_{x2} \left( {{\text{Age}}_{\text{wife}} } \right). $$

4.2 B. Choice set specification and hours distribution

The choice set is composed of 6 alternatives for each individual by specifying the interval of hours of work and sample randomly within this interval which has a length of 16 h. The first alternative refers to zero hours of work, and the last to the pension choice. The actual observed hours will be rounded to the closest discrete value. The basic idea can be appropriately modified when one directly observes annual hours or weeks worked.

To capture the effect of each alternative on the utility, we use some alternative dummies and calling them with a common variable A, we express the probability function as follows:

$$ P^{n} (f,m;\vartheta ) = {\frac{{\exp \left\{ {\Uppsi^{n} (f,m;\vartheta ) + \gamma A} \right\}}}{{\sum_{f \in \Upomega } {\sum_{m \in \Upomega } {\exp \left\{ {\Uppsi^{n} (f,m;\vartheta ) + \gamma A} \right\}} } }}} $$
(13)

where the \( \gamma {\text{s}} \) are parameters to be estimated.

The dummies can be interpreted as reflecting quantity constraints on the labour market (as in Aaberge et al. 1999) or specific utilities of full-time, part-time, extra-time jobs or maybe both (as in Van Soest and Das 2001, 2002).Footnote 26

The simulations are run under a neutral budget provided that this age group is treated differently from the others in terms of tax rates.

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Mara, I., Narazani, E. Labour-incentive reforms at preretirement age in Austria. Empirica 38, 481–510 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10663-010-9137-0

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