Abstract
Class action finance raises substantial principal agency problems between plaintiffs and lawyers, which limit the extent to which the class action can be used as an instrument to overcome market failure.
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References
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Backhaus, J. The law firm as an investment bank in class actions. Eur J Law Econ 32, 225–228 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9234-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9234-y