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The law firm as an investment bank in class actions

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Abstract

Class action finance raises substantial principal agency problems between plaintiffs and lawyers, which limit the extent to which the class action can be used as an instrument to overcome market failure.

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Notes

  1. Koppel and Jones (2009).

  2. Knight (1921).

  3. The internet affords a new solution. Angies list provides experience reports on roofers, dentists, and other professionals. Lawyers could readily be included.

  4. Olson (1965).

References

  • Knight, F. (1921). Risk uncertainty and profit. Chicago: The Chicago Press.

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  • Koppel, N., & Jones, A. (2009). ‘Billable Hour’ under attack. The Wall Street Journal, CCLIV/46, 1.

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  • Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. USA: Harvard University Press.

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Correspondence to Juergen Backhaus.

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Backhaus, J. The law firm as an investment bank in class actions. Eur J Law Econ 32, 225–228 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9234-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9234-y

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