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Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial?

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Abstract

Using concepts from game theory, political economy, law and economics and the economics of asymmetric information, we describe the economics of one of the most famous trials in history—that of the Athenian philosopher Socrates. We discuss the question of whether Socrates’ actions during his trial were rational, using two different models. Our analysis sheds some light on institutional efficiency in trials that followed the classical Athenian pattern.

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Notes

  1. To discourage frivolous cases, the plaintiff had to pay the court a fine of 1,000 drachma if he failed to secure at least a fifth of jury votes in his favor (Hansen 1991; Christ 1998).

  2. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants used lawyers. Any man who would not present his own case was regarded as “having something to hide” and in fact using lawyers was illegal (Hansen 1991).

  3. We describe jury selection and composition in more detail in a later section.

  4. Hickie (1853) provides a translation of Aristophanes’ plays including the two we have just mentioned.

  5. The state made it obligatory for rich citizens to sponsor theatrical performances, which it regarded as educational for the masses. It also had a fund (theorica) for compensating the poor who attended such performances, on the grounds that wages would have to be foregone in order to watch plays.

  6. Socrates alludes to this relationship – and the advice – in Xenophon’s account of The Apology: also see Linder (2002).

  7. Hansen quotes Isocrates as saying “It must pierce every right-thinking person to the heart to see citizens undergoing a selection by lot that determines whether they get their daily bread or not”.

  8. According to Hansen these elaborate precautions were partly a reaction to occasional bribery scandals in the past (including one involving Anytus, Socrates’ accuser, in about 411).

  9. For instance, a uniform distribution, or a normal distribution.

  10. While this is regarded as a desirable feature in modern jurisprudence, there is no evidence that it was an objective in ancient Athens. As we have mentioned, the juror’s oath simply exhorted jurors to uphold the law and did not give specific guidelines with regard to appropriate punishments.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their suggestions.

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Correspondence to Brishti Guha.

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Guha, B. Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial?. Eur J Law Econ 31, 249–264 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9151-5

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