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Production of Scientific Knowledge and Radical Uncertainty: The Limits of the Normative Approach in Innovation Economics

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to explain that, in the context of the production of scientific knowledge, it is logically impossible to define some institutional structures enabling the maximization of the social surplus.Our argumentation relies on the theory of Popper according to which it is impossible to anticipate the result of a given process of production of scientific knowledge. Consequently, we conclude that it is impossible to compare the respective efficiencies of alternative structures of production of scientific knowledge.The document consists in a critical review ofthe literature in economics of innovation and knowledge.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Troyes Graduate School of Management, 217 avenue Pierre Brossolette, BP710, 10002, Troyes Cedex

    David Moroz

  2. Laboratory OMI-EDJ, University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne, 57 bis rue Pierre Taittinger, 51 096, Reims Cedex, France

    David Moroz

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  1. David Moroz
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Correspondence to David Moroz.

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JEL Classification: D8, L1, O3

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Moroz, D. Production of Scientific Knowledge and Radical Uncertainty: The Limits of the Normative Approach in Innovation Economics. Eur J Law Econ 20, 305–322 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-005-4198-4

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