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De Economist

, Volume 166, Issue 1, pp 89–109 | Cite as

Ex-Post Evaluation of Competition Law Enforcement Effects in the German Packaging Waste Compliance Scheme Market

  • Arno Rasek
  • Florian Smuda
Article

Abstract

We provide an ex-post evaluation of the impact of competition law enforcement activities in the German packaging waste compliance scheme market. Until 2003, the non-profit compliance scheme DSD enjoyed a monopoly in the market. Numerous antitrust cases, however, paved the way for competitive market structures. We show that these enforcement activities resulted in a series of market entries since 2004, a corresponding drop in DSD’s market share, increased innovation and substantial efficiencies. Furthermore, we apply a difference-in-differences approach to show that prices decreased by 63% and to estimate the aggregated consumer welfare gains achieved by 2011 at a total of €13 billion. In the given case imposing a non-profit obligation on the monopolist did not substitute for the efficiency-enhancing effects of competition.

Keywords

Ex post evaluation Competition law enforcement Compliance scheme Packaging waste Non-profit company De-monopolization Consumer welfare effects 

JEL Classification

D4 L4 L43 L9 

References

  1. Bundeskartellamt. (2011). Case summary coordination of tenders for sales packaging waste collection services by compliance schemes, case no. B4-152/07. www.bundeskartellamt.de.
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Bundeskartellamt (German Federal Cartel Office)BonnGermany

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