Abstract
In recent years, some smart cities that are keen on construction and operation in some cities have also emerged some strange phenomena and problems, such as “data islands,” “hidden dangers of information security,” “zombie apps,” “breakdown of public–private cooperation” and “digital divide.” These alienation phenomena reflect the complex conflicts and contradictions of interests among multiple stakeholders in project construction and operation from different perspectives. It also shows diversity, acuteness, complexity, and harmfulness, which is not conducive to the smooth development and effective operation of the project construction. The operation of smart city PPP projects is the key to the success or failure of the project, and the conflicts and game of multi-parties of interest in the project operation have a crucial impact on the smooth implementation and sustainable development of the project. This study further explores the multi-stakeholder entities involved in the operation stage of the project and their game relationships, and explores the equilibrium solution of the game. Through game analysis, it is found that the resolution and coordination of interest conflicts need to fully consider the mechanism of constraints and their changes in different cases, and the key is the government incentive and constraint mechanism. The difficulty of the interest game lies in how the government correctly treats the participation of the private sector and the public, how to perform the supervision and management duties, and the key to the coordination of interests lies in how to exert the power of public participation. The results are shown as follows. When the government’s incentive strength continues to increase from weak to strong, the corresponding tripartite stable equilibrium result will gradually evolve from the stability point (0, 1, 1) to the stability point (1, 1, 1). the project company will spontaneously carry out high-quality project operation under the role of the incentive mechanism, and the public will spontaneously and consciously participate in the project operation supervision process.
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Acknowledgements
This research is the phased result of the Anhui Provincial Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project “Research on the Interest Game and Integration of Smart City PPP Projects in the Perspective of People-Centered”(AHSKF2020D12).
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Zhang, Y., Zhang, Q. Equilibrium analysis of multi-parties of interest conflicts and game in the operation of smart city PPP projects. Econ Change Restruct 56, 4009–4041 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10644-023-09509-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10644-023-09509-5