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Financial crisis, effective policy rules and bounded rationality in a New Keynesian framework

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Abstract

This paper extends a standard open-economy New Keynesian model to include a third-generation “balance sheet effect” which is made operational through an endogenous risk premium impacting on investment. Using rational expectations and adaptive learning solutions, the efficiency of alternative monetary policy rules is examined during a period of financial crisis. We find that the Taylor rule is the welfare superior policy, questioning the idea of an “information encompassing” inflation-forecast based rule. Under adaptive learning we find additional policy traction and less instrument variability in rules augmented with the exchange rate. All rules, however, advocate a sharp initial interest rate response to the crisis.

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Notes

  1. The important issue of fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes is not addressed here. See Rogoff et al. (2003) for a thorough overview of this topic.

  2. The term “liability dollarization” describes the situation where large amounts of foreign currency denominated debt are held on the balance sheets of domestic firms.

  3. One notable exception is Morón and Winkelried (2003) who find support for an exchange rate-augmented policy rule in financially vulnerable economies.

  4. It is true that Thailand did not officially adopt IT until 2001 and, therefore, was unable to benefit from the standard pillars encompassed in this monetary framework prior to this period (see Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) for an overview of IT). However, our analysis abstracts from attempting to account for these and other credibility enhancing factors; thus, we assume that all policy rules are equally credible and the fact that Thailand was not officially engaged in IT during our sample does not impact on our findings.

  5. This is a massive empirical, theoretical, and political literature in itself and cannot adequately be covered here. See Lane et al. (1999) and Fischer (2004), for a comprehensive overview of the crisis, as seen by the IMF; and Radelet and Sachs (1999) and Feldstein (1998), for key themes in the “revisionist” literature.

  6. In it simplest form, the open-economy NKM is described by the following relations: Demand (IS curve), Supply (Phillips curve), uncovered interest parity, and a policy rule for closure. See Ball (1999), and Batini and Nelson (2000), for variants on this standard framework which we adopt.

  7. See the Appendix for details. In this study the learning behavior in agents is modeled using a least squares algorithm based on the Kalman filter (see Garrat and Hall (1995) and (1997) for similar set-ups). It is well known that the Kalman filter can be identified as a more general form of the weighted least squares procedure described in Marcet and Sargent (1989a,b) and employed in Orphanides and Williams (2004), thus permitting for the application of E-stability (or convergence criteria) as set out in these studies (see Garrat and Hall (1997) for proof). .

  8. Here we focus our discussion on investment to highlight the balance sheet approach. The remainder of model remains standard (see Svensson (2000)).

  9. Our investment and risk premium mechanism is similar to that found in Ban et al. (2000).

  10. In general, Tobin’s q is the ratio of the equity value of a unit of capital to its replacement costs and is usually proxied by incorporating some measure of the stock market value of the firm. Equity value in turn depends on the discounted value of expected profits and in this way links investment with expectations of future changes in the economy.

  11. Therefore, Tobin’s average Q can be written \( Q_{t} = {{V_{t} } \mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {{V_{t} } {K_{t - 1} }}} \right. \kern-\nulldelimiterspace} {K_{t - 1} }} \).

  12. In order to facilitate the adaptive learning behavior in agents, for any variable x, \( \hat{E}_{t} x_{t + 1} \) denotes the (possibly non-rational) expectation of variable \( x_{t + 1} \) formed in period t conditional on information available in period t-1. The “hat” symbol denotes areas in which expectations can either be adaptive learning or rational expectations. A full rational expectations solution is indicated by \( E_{t} \) without a “hat” symbol.

  13. Equation (5) could be written with the real interest rate alongside the risk premium to reflect the cost of capital; however, we choose to isolate the impact of liability dollarization through \( \rho_{t} \) on its own.

  14. We chose the value of 30% merely to effect a switch in the rule. Given the baht depreciated beyond this amount this threshold serves its purpose.

  15. We assume that policymakers are always rational about changes in the stock of foreign liabilities.

  16. Twenty percent is an appropriate value for Thailand given a relatively steady historical growth path in external indebtedness.

  17. All simulations are conducted using CEF software (CEF (2000)). The simulation horizon covers the period 1995Q1–2000Q4.

  18. The implicit policy rule is defined by the path of the nominal interest rate and the variability of key indicators over this period. It should be noted that a direct comparison against this policy rule is not necessarily feasible for reasons stated above, namely that we do not attempt to account for all factors contributing to the defense of the currency and, therefore, to the performance of the policy rule. Moreover, it is not clear if economic expectations during this period were “rational” or “boundedly rational” and if the authorities were even subscribing to a policy rule or not.

  19. The results in Table 2 are robust to both the specification of the welfare function and to the preference settings of the authorities. Analysis conducted under alternative measures of welfare, including the standard Barro and Gordon (1983) loss function and variants on this form, as well as the imposition of “hawk” and “dove” preferences (i.e. giving greater weight to inflation or output, respectively), arrives at similar rankings to those presented below.

  20. Using a Barro and Gordon-type loss function which excludes the exchange rate, we find that there is only some convergence in the average minimum variability across indicators of the exchange rate-based and inflation-forecast only rules under learning, and virtually no distinction between these measures under rational expectations.

  21. This latter point complements the findings of Morón and Winkelried (2003), who favor an exchange rate augmented policy rule for a small open economy with liability dollarization.

  22. More formally, a fixed point of the mapping (or learning process) between the PLM and the ALM represents a rational expectations (or E-stable) solution, and one which is not dependent upon an arbitrary terminal condition. More loosely, if the parameters of the PLM cease to change then this can be taken as evidence of E-stability since, in this case, by virtue of the learning algorithm the expectations error term is zero; the outcome is equal to the expectation and so the system has converged.

  23. More complicated rules, possibly containing the reduced form of the whole system can be employed. However, Beeby et al. (2002) conduct a study across a set of learning rules and conclude that making a rule more complicated does not necessarily improve its learning performance.

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Appendix

Appendix

Adaptive Learning is an alternative specification for expectations and represents a complete dynamic system enabling agents to learn adaptively using a least squares algorithm based on the Kalman filter (see Hall et al. (2000) and Garrat and Hall (1995)).

Under adaptive learning, agents are unaware of the true structure of the economy as it would exist under rational expectations and must learn about it over time using a ‘reasonable rule of thumb’. Therefore, agents employ their own ‘forecast rule’ (or perceived law of motion; PLM) to obtain estimates of the unobserved state variables, or the actual law of motion (ALM) of the economy. Using their PLM, agents optimally update their expectations of future endogenous variables each period subject to observed data. It is in this spirit that agents are boundedly rational. The system, therefore, is self-referential and we draw on the properties inherent in the E-stability principle where, under standard conditions, small forecasting errors made relative to the rational solution (ALM) are corrected over time.Footnote 22

Garrat and Hall (1995) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001), among others, note that there is no theoretical basis for modeling the PLM of agents, so we are left to form a guess as to how agents learn over time. As is common in the endogenous learning literature, we adopt simple forecast rules based on past values of relevant variables.Footnote 23 In this study, for any expected variable X, its PLM in time t follows

$$ \hat{E}_{t} X_{t + 1} = \rho_{0,t} + \rho_{1,t} X_{t - 1} . $$
(20)

This PLM forms the one period ahead expectation of X based on information held at time t where \( \rho_{0t} \) and \( \rho_{1,t} \) are a set of time-varying parameters each evolving over time according to the following stationary AR(1) process

$$ \rho_{i,t} = \alpha_{i} \rho_{i,t - 1} + \omega_{i,t} , $$
(21)

where \( i = \begin{array}{*{20}c} {0,} & 1 \\ \end{array} \) for each respective case, \( \omega_{i,t} \) is an iid error term, and \( \alpha_{i} < 1 \).

Given that (21) is a stationary process, over time \( \rho_{0} \to \bar{\rho }_{0} \) and \( \rho_{1} \to \bar{\rho }_{1} \) thus representing a stable mapping from the PLM to the ALM and satisfying the E-stability principle for convergence (see Evans and Honkapohja 2001 for a full proof).

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Al-Eyd, A.J., Hall, S.G. Financial crisis, effective policy rules and bounded rationality in a New Keynesian framework. Econ Change Restruct 45, 25–44 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10644-011-9108-x

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