Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

The Impact of Environmental Policy Stringency on Industrial R&D Conditional on Pollution Intensity and Relocation Costs

  • Published:
Environmental and Resource Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Stringent environmental regulations may encourage industrial innovation, as technological advancements lower the cost of pollution abatement (Popp et al. in Handbook of the economics of innovation, vol II. Academic Press, Burlington, pp 873–938, 2010). The pollution-havens hypothesis, on the other hand, indicates that, rather than innovating, dirty industries may relocate to countries with less stringent environmental regulations (Copeland and Taylor in J Econ Lit 42(1):7–71, 2004). Thus, more stringent environmental regulations may increase or decrease innovative activities. This paper examines empirically the impact of environmental regulations on R&D intensities and R&D expenditures in 21 manufacturing industries in 28 OECD countries from 2000 to 2007. I consider pollution intensity and the relative ease of relocation (immobility) as industry characteristics that determine the optimal industry response to increased environmental policy stringency. I find that more pollution intensive industries innovate less as regulatory environments become more restrictive relative to less pollution intensive industries. At the same time, more immobile industries innovate more than more mobile industries as environmental regulations become more stringent, illustrating innovation as an alternative to relocation.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Carbon costs, including indirect costs and abatement, are used as a part of the criteria for determining which sectors are at risk for relocation and are thus entitled free emissions allocations by the European Commission under Europe’s carbon market, the EU ETS (European Commission 2014).

  2. Eskeland and Harrison (2003) report a statistically significant correlation of 0.80 between toxic pollution emission intensities and abatement costs among U.S. industries. Cole and Elliott (2005) report high abatement operating costs for the four most pollution intensive industries in my sample.

  3. See Table A1 in the online appendix.

  4. This is similar to the use of U.S. industry characteristics in Maskus et al. (2012) and Rajan and Zingales (1998).

  5. A comparison with data from Cole et al. (2005) is provided in the online appendix in Table A2.

  6. For example, Mani and Wheeler (1998), Hettige et al. (1992), and Eskeland and Harrison (2003) use U.S. pollution intensities to rank or classify industries in cross-country analyses.

  7. The OECD’s STAN Database for Structural Analysis presents annual data on R&D expenditures by industry but does not distinguish between financing sources. I rely on the country fixed effects to absorb any unobserved heterogeneity among countries regarding R&D subsidies and the government financed share of R&D.

  8. Patents allow for the identification of environmental technologies (Popp 2005). This alternative measure can be problematic in industry specific studies as the industry code is not recorded by patenting offices (Jaffe and Palmer 1997). Although concordance tables attempt to link patent descriptions to industry codes, using patent data in industry specific studies introduces the potential for misclassification (Jaffe and Palmer 1997; Johnstone et al. 2012).

  9. The EPA’s National Emissions Inventory (NEI) data is available for 2002, 2005, and 2008. The 2002 inventory is selected because it is closest to the beginning of the data coverage period of 2000 to 2007. Using the 2005 or 2008 NEI data provides similar results. Table A3 in the online appendix compares total pollution intensity rankings from 2002, 2005, and 2008 NEI data.

  10. Industries are converted from U.S. SIC 1987 to two-digit ISIC using Jon Haveman’s industry concordances (2012).

  11. \(\mathrm {PM}\) includes \(\mathrm {PM}_{2.5}\) and \(\mathrm {PM}_{10}\). See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2012) for more information.

  12. Examples include the previously mentioned works by Kellenberg (2009), Wagner and Timmins (2009), and Johnstone et al. (2012).

  13. See the WEF Global Competitiveness Report 2007–2008 for more information on survey implementation, data collection, and aggregation techniques.

  14. Another proxy for environmental policy stringency is the U.S. Pollution Abatement Cost and Expenditures (PACE) survey, which provides data on the costs of compliance with environmental regulations at the industry level. This measure is limited to the U.S. and does not estimate capital and operating expenditures that would have occurred in the absence of environmental policies (Jaffe et al. 1995). Johnstone et al. (2012) find a negative correlation between the PACE and WEF measures.

  15. Clustering the standard errors in this particular dataset is not necessarily straightforward due to the fact that the dataset is non-nested and there are few clusters in each (country and industry) dimension. To be conservative regarding statistical inference, I cluster at the country-industry and industry level using the multi-way clustering method from Cameron et al. (2011) applied via the STATA command “cgmreg.”

  16. Many of the country, industry, and time dummies are also jointly significant.

  17. I thank two anonymous referees for pointing out these important points.

  18. Using a log transformation normalizes the right-skewed R&D expenditure data.

  19. With robust standard errors, \(\beta _1\) is significant at the 10 % level.

  20. Performing this analysis using each individual pollutant provides very similar results.

  21. To account for R&D intensity observations that are left censored at zero, I estimated a series of Tobit models. The interaction term coefficients remain significant in all cases but one. These results are provided in Table A4 in the online appendix.

  22. A similar institutional measure that relates to corruption yields nearly identical results.

  23. A composite stringency measure that includes both market and non-market approaches to environmental policies constructed by the OECD provides similar results. These results are not included due to differences in country availability (Botta and Koźluk 2014).

  24. \(\beta _1\) is significant at the one percent level with robust standard errors.

References

  • Acemoglu D, Aghion P, Bursztyn L, Hemous D (2012) The environment and directed technical change. Am Econ Rev 102(1):131–66

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aghion P, Howitt P (1998) Endogenous growth theory. The MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Bartelsman EJ, Gray W (1996) The NBER manufacturing productivity database. Working Paper No. 205, National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/t0205

  • Botta E, Koźluk T (2014) Measuring environmental policy stringency in OECD countries: a composite index approach. OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 1177

  • Brunel C, Levinson A (2013) Measuring environmental regulatory stringency. Working Paper

  • Brunnermeier SB, Cohen MA (2003) Determinants of environmental innovation in U.S. manufacturing industries. J Environ Econ Manag 45(2):278–293

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cameron AC, Gelbach JB, Miller DL (2011) Robust inference with multiway clustering. J Bus Econ Stat 29(2):238–249

  • Cole MA, Elliott RJ (2005) FDI and the capital intensity of dirty sectors: a missing piece of the pollution haven puzzle. Rev Dev Econ 9(4):530–548

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cole MA, Elliott RJ, Shimamoto K (2005) Industrial characteristics, environmental regulations and air pollution: an analysis of the UK manufacturing sector. J Environ Econ Manag 50(1):121–143

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Copeland BR, Taylor MS (2004) Trade, growth, and the environment. J Econ Lit 42(1):7–71

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ederington J, Levinson A, Minier J (2005) Footloose and pollution-free. Rev Econ Stat 87(1):92–99

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Emerson JW, Hsu A, Levy MA, de Sherbinin A, Mara V, Esty DC, Jaiteh M (2012) Environmental performance index and pilot trend environmental performance index. Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • Eskeland GS, Harrison AE (2003) Moving to greener pastures? Multinationals and the pollution haven hypothesis. J Dev Econ 70(1):1–23

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • European Commission (2014) Impact assessment accompanying the document commission decision determining a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage for the period 2015-2019. Commission Staff Working Document

  • Hettige H, Lucas RE, Wheeler D (1992) The toxic intensity of industrial production: global patterns, trends, and trade policy. Am Econ Rev 82(2):478–481

  • Hicks JR (1932) The theory of wages. Machmillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Jaffe AB, Palmer K (1997) Environmental regulation and innovation: a panel data study. Rev Econ Stat 79(4):610–619

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jaffe AB, Peterson SR, Portney PR, Stavins RN (1995) Environmental regulation and the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing: what does the evidence tell us? J Econ Lit 33(1):132–163

    Google Scholar 

  • Jaffe AB, Newell RG, Stavins RN (2002) Environmental policy and technological change. Environ Resour Econ 22(1–2):41–70

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnstone N, Hai I, Poirier J, Hemar M, Michel C (2012) Environmental policy stringency and technological innovation: evidence from survey data and patent counts. Appl Econ 44(17):2157–2170

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kellenberg DK (2009) An empirical investigation of the pollution haven effect with strategic environment and trade policy. J Int Econ 78(2):242–255

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lanjouw JO, Mody A (1996) Innovation and the international diffusion of environmentally responsive technology. Res Policy 25(4):549–571

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Magnani E, Tubb A (2012) Green R&D, technology spillovers, and market uncertainty: an empirical investigation. Land Econ 88(4):685–709

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mani M, Wheeler D (1998) In search of pollution havens? Dirty industry in the world economy, 1960 to 1995. J Environ Dev 7(3):215–247

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maskus KE, Neumann R, Seidel T (2012) How national and international financial development affect industrial R&D. Eur Econ Rev 56(1):72–83

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • National Science Board (2014) Research and development: national trends and international comparisons. Sci Eng Indic

  • Popp D (2002) Induced innovation and energy prices. Am Econ Rev 92(1):160–180

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Popp D (2005) Lessons from patents: using patents to measure technological change in environmental models. Ecol Econ 54(2–3):209–226

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Popp D (2006) International innovation and diffusion of air pollution control technologies: the effects of NOX and SO2 regulation in the U.S., Japan, and Germany. J Environ Econ Manag 51(1):46–71

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Popp D, Newell R (2012) Where does energy R&D come from? Examining crowding out from energy R&D. Energy Econ 34(4):980–991

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Popp D, Newell RG, Jaffe AB (2010) Energy, the environment, and technological change. In: Halland BH, Rosenberg N (eds) Handbook of the economics of innovation, vol II. Academic Press, Burlington, pp 873–938

    Google Scholar 

  • Porter ME, van der Linde C (1995) Toward a new conception of the environment-competitiveness relationship. J Econ Perspect 9(4):97–118

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rajan RG, Zingales L (1998) Financial dependence and growth. Am Econ Rev 88(3):559–586

    Google Scholar 

  • Robinson JC (1995) Impact of environmental and occupational health regulation on productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing. The. Yale J Regul 12:387

    Google Scholar 

  • Ulph D (1997) Environmental policy and technological innovation. In: Carraro C, Siniscalco D (eds) New directions in the economic theory of the environment. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 43–68

  • U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2012) Our nation’s air-status and trends through 2010. Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/2011/report/fullreport.pdf

  • Wagner U, Timmins C (2009) Agglomeration effects in foreign direct investment and the pollution haven hypothesis. Environ Resour Econ 43(2):231–256

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • World Economic Forum (2000–2007) The global competitiveness report. Oxford University Press, New York

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Sahar Milani.

Additional information

I thank Rebecca Neumann, Matthew McGinty, Itziar Lazkano, and two anonymous referees for their comments. All errors are my own.

Electronic supplementary material

Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.

Supplementary material 1 (pdf 61 KB)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Milani, S. The Impact of Environmental Policy Stringency on Industrial R&D Conditional on Pollution Intensity and Relocation Costs. Environ Resource Econ 68, 595–620 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-016-0034-2

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-016-0034-2

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation