Abstract
We consider a small open economy that operates a carbon emission trading scheme and subsidizes green energy. Taking cap-and-trade as given, we seek to explain the subsidy as the outcome of a trilateral tug of war between the green lobby, the brown lobby and the consumer lobby. With parametric functions we fully solve the competitive economic equilibrium and the lobbying Nash equilibrium. The rate of the green subsidy results from complementary or opposing political pressures of the three interest groups. If the brown lobby is stronger than the green one, our main results are (i) that the outcome of the three-party lobbying game is a green tax, if preferences are not green, and (ii) that green consumer preferences are necessary but not sufficient for generating a green subsidy in the lobbying game.
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Notes
The EU climate and energy package (http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm) is a set of binding legislation that aims to ensure the EU meets its ambitious climate and energy targets for 2020. One of the key objectives is raising the share of EU energy consumption produced rom renewable resources to 20 %.
Depending on the energy aggregate under consideration (e.g. primary energy, electricity consumption etc.) the share of green energy in Germany is only in the range of 10 –15 % despite massive subsidization of green energy over the last years. See e.g. www.bdew.de/internet.nsf/id/DE-Energiedaten.
In our model, total emissions are fixed by the emission cap and remain fixed throughout the paper. Hence, the small open economy’s contribution to climate damage is fixed and is therefore ignored in our formal analysis.
Below we present some references for the argument that a green subsidy in addition to emission trading or emission taxes is welfare reducing.
Note that if preferences are green, welfare maximization requires adding a green subsidy to the ETS—as shown in Proposition 1 below.
To promote their vision of sustainability, individuals may be willing to substitute non-renewable fossil energy consumption with green energy consumption at an extra cost irrespective of whether carbon emissions generate a detrimental climate externality. Replacing the consumption of a non-renewable by a renewable resource may be considered per se as a step toward a more sustainable development.
For a literature survey see Mueller (2003).
The competing approaches to political-economic modeling of Becker (1983) and Grossman and Helpman (1996) have different strengths and weaknesses. Our own assessment of the ’energy turn-around’ (Energiewende) in Germany is that to a large extent the government accommodates to the strong pressures exerted by stakeholders which suggests that Becker’s modeling approach appears to be realistic in the present context.
We make use of the parametric functions throughout the paper. The general functional signs \(B\), \(G\) and \(X\) only serve to ease the notation where appropriate.
Note also that the fossil-fuel import assumption is not essential, because one can reinterpret the world market price \(p_e\) as a fixed technical coefficient (\(=\)capital input per unit output of fossil fuel) of the domestic production/extraction of fossil fuel.
Alternatively, \(t\) can be interpreted as an emission tax whose rate is set as to satisfy (6). Here we stick to the ETS interpretation which implies that the cap is politically determined and fixed, while the permit price \(t\) is an endogenous variable.
The more realistic modeling in form of a feed-in tariff would require a mark-up, say \(\tau \), on the consumer price of energy satisfying \(\tau \sum \nolimits _j z_{dj}=s g\). Consumer \(i\)’s corresponding budget constraint would then read \(x_{di} +(p_z + \tau ) z_{di} =(\pi _i/n_i) + (\bar{k} + t \bar{e})/n\). The lump sum tax in the present paper is assumed for analytical relief.
For analytical convenience—rather than for empirical relevance—we will also allow for a green energy tax \((s < 0)\), but we will not place much attention on scenarios where the outcome is a tax.
\(\hat{\Pi }^x (s)=0\) for all \(s\) is obvious due to the linear production technology.
The negatively sloped branch of the profit curve is outside the domain of feasible subsidy rates.
In “Appendix 2” we show that there is some threshold value \(\tilde{n} > 0\) such that \(w_{x1} \gtreqless 0\), if and only if \(n \lesseqgtr \tilde{n}\). Since we envisage an economy with a large population, we proceed assuming \(w_{x1} < 0\).
One could argue that it should be in the interest of the consumer group \(j=b, g\) to engage in lobbying itself rather than delegating the lobbying to the industry it owns, because \(\hat{U}^j(s) \ne \frac{\hat{\Pi }^j (s)}{n_j}\) according to (18). The assumption that the consumers owning the green or brown energy industry, respectively, do not form a lobby themselves but rather let ’their’ industry do the lobbying job for them is realistic, in our view, because the industry lobby is more effective in solving the free-rider problem associated with collective action than the lobby formed by the owners themselves. One can expect, therefore, that the former promotes its owners’ interests more effectively than the latter.
In Hillman and Ursprung’s (1992) study of trade policy formation, an environmental interest group plays an important role comparable to that of the consumer lobby in our model. According to these authors, the environmentalists are capable to cope with problems of information and coordination and thus exert significant influence on the political allocation via strategic decision-making.
Due to our simplifying assumption of linear production technology in the consumption-good industry, these profit incomes are zero and hence completely independent of the green subsidy rate.
The consumer of groups \(b\) and \(g\) do not form a lobby by assumption which implies that all consumers of these groups take the provision of green energy, \(g\), as given. Hence the size of \(\gamma \) does not matter for their consumption plans.
Note also that the capital market clearing condition (4) is now replaced by \(\bar{k} = k_g+k_x + r_b+r_g+r_x\).
The definition is \(r_{-i}:= (r_j, r_k)\) for \(i, j,k= b, g, x\); \(i \ne j,k\) and \(j \ne k\).
In the comparative static effects of \(\partial \rho _x^N / \partial \psi \) and \(\partial s / \partial a_x\) it is assumed that \(a_x>0\).
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Social Optimum
For an interior solution, the FOCs of solving (7) are:
These FOCs imply \(\lambda _k= \lambda _t = \lambda _x=1\), \(\lambda _b = \lambda _z\), \(\lambda _g = \lambda _z + n \gamma \) and give rise to the equations \(\lambda _z = V'(z_d)\), \((\lambda _z + n \gamma ) G'(k_g)=1\) and \(\lambda _z B'(e) = \lambda _e + p_e\), which imply (8), in turn.
Appendix 2: Proofs
1.1 Proof of Proposition 2
-
(i)
From profit maximization of the green industry [\(\pi _g'=0\), see also (11)], follows
$$\begin{aligned} k_g = (p_z+s)^2 \mu , \quad g = 2 \mu (p_z+s) \quad \text{ and } \quad \pi _g= \mu (p_z+s)^2. \end{aligned}$$(40)Inserting \(z_{d}= c - p_z\) and \(g\) from (40) in the equilibrium condition of the domestic energy market \(n z_d = \bar{b} +g\) we obtain after rearrangement of terms
$$\begin{aligned} \hat{p}_z = \bar{\kappa } - (1 - \kappa ) s \quad \text{ and } \quad \hat{p}_z + s = \bar{\kappa } + \kappa s, \end{aligned}$$(41)where \(\kappa := \frac{n}{n+2\mu } \in ]0, 1[, \bar{\kappa } := \kappa (c - \frac{\bar{b} }{n} )>0\) and \(\bar{b}:= \bar{e}^\beta \). The ’hat’ indicates that \(\hat{p}_z\) is the equilibrium price. Observe that \( \bar{\kappa } = c - \frac{\bar{b} }{n} = \hat{p}_z + \frac{\hat{g} }{n}>0\). In view of (40) and (41) we obtain the equilibrium profit (14).
-
(ii)
From profit maximization of the brown industry [\(\pi _b'=0\), see also (10)] follows
$$\begin{aligned} t = \beta p_z \bar{e}^{\beta - 1} - p_e>0 \end{aligned}$$(42)taking into account that the emission cap \(\bar{e}\) is strictly binding. Hence for given \(p_z\) the maximum profit is
$$\begin{aligned} \pi _b= (1-\beta ) \bar{b} p_z. \end{aligned}$$(43)In view of (43) and (41) we obtain the equilibrium profit (15).
-
(iii)
Next, we consider the utility of consumer group \(x\):
$$\begin{aligned} \hat{u}_x = c \hat{z}_d - \frac{\hat{z}_d^2}{2} + \hat{y}_x -p_z \hat{z}_d + \gamma \hat{g} = \left[ (c - \hat{p}_z) \hat{z}_d - \frac{\hat{z}_d^2}{2} \right] + \frac{\bar{k} + \hat{t} \bar{e} - s \hat{g}}{n} + \gamma \hat{g}. \nonumber \\ \end{aligned}$$(44)
Combine the term in square brackets with \(z_d = c -p_z\) and (41) to get
Insert (40)
to obtain the equilibrium utility
where \(\bar{w}_x:= \frac{(c - \bar{\kappa })^2}{4 \kappa \mu } + \frac{\bar{\kappa } + \beta \bar{b} \bar{\kappa } - p_e \bar{e}}{2 \kappa \mu n} + \frac{\gamma \bar{\kappa }}{\kappa }\), \(w_{x1} := \frac{(1- \kappa ) (c - \bar{\kappa }) }{2 \kappa \mu } - \frac{ 2 \bar{\kappa } \mu + (1- \kappa ) \beta \bar{b}}{2 \kappa \mu n}\) and \(w_{x2}:= \frac{1}{n} - \frac{(1-\kappa )^2}{4 \kappa \mu }\). Maximization of \(\hat{U}^x(s)\) with respect to \(s\) leads to the consumer group’s favorite subsidy rate (17).
The sign of \(w_{x1}\) and \(w_{x2}\): To prove \(w_{x2} >0\) we insert \(\kappa = \frac{n}{n+2 \mu }\) in \(w_{x2}= \frac{1}{n} - \frac{(1-\kappa )^2}{4 \kappa \mu }\) and rearrange terms to get \(w_{x2} = \frac{n+ \mu }{ n(n+ 2 \mu )}\).
Next, we prove
Verify that
The last equivalence establishes (48).
-
(iv)
For sufficiently large \(n\) the function \(\hat{U}^g\) is progressively increasing in \(s\): The quadratic term in \(\hat{U}^g\) is: \(- 2 \mu \kappa w_{x2} s^2 + \frac{1}{n_g} \mu \kappa ^2 s^2\) which is equivalent to \(\left( - 2 w_{x2} + \frac{\kappa }{n_g}\right) \kappa \mu s^2\). Insert \(w_{x2} = \frac{n+c\mu }{n(n+2\mu )}\) and \(\kappa = \frac{n}{n+2\mu }\) to obtain
$$\begin{aligned} - 2 w_{x2} + \frac{\kappa }{n_g}>0 \quad&\iff \quad -2 \frac{n+ \mu }{n(n+2\mu ) }+ \frac{n}{n_g(n+2 \mu )} >0 \\&\iff \quad - 2n -2 \mu +\frac{n^2}{n_g}>0. \end{aligned}$$
1.2 Proof of (19)
The sum of utilities of all consumers is given by
Making use of the trade balance (3) and \(x = k_x =\bar{k}- k_g\) in (50) we obtain
Next, we insert \(\hat{z}_d = c - \hat{p}_z\), (40) and (41) in (51) to obtain
where \(\bar{\xi } : = c - \bar{\kappa }\). Further rearrangements of (52) yield
Next, observe that
and that
Making use of (54) and (55) in (53) establishes
where \(\nu := c \bar{\xi } - \frac{ \xi ^2}{2} + 2 \gamma \mu \bar{\kappa } + \frac{\bar{k} - \mu \bar{\kappa }^2 -p_e e}{n}\).
1.3 Proof of Proposition 3
(ii) Rewrite (28) to get
Observe that the producer price \(p_z + s = \bar{\kappa } + \kappa s\) from (41) has to be strictly positive. Then we immediately get \(\frac{\bar{\kappa }}{\kappa } + s > 0\) which ensures \(\rho ^{N}_g > 0\) and hence we obtain \(S (\rho ^N_b, \rho ^N_g, \rho ^N_x) > S(\rho ^N_b, 0, \rho ^N_x)\).
(i) I. Proof of:
From (29) we obtain
where
and
II. Proof of:
For \(\rho ^{N}_x > 0\) the equation \(\Pi ^x_{r_x} = 0\) from (26) reads
Comparing (57) and (59) immediately yields
1.4 Proof of Proposition 4:
-
(i)
From (29) with \(a_g = 0\) we obtain
$$\begin{aligned} \rho ^{BX}_x = \frac{a_x \kappa \mu n_x 2 w_{x2}}{1+2a^2_x \kappa \mu w_{x2}} \left[ s^*_x (\gamma ) - S \left( \rho ^N_b, 0, 0\right) \right] , \end{aligned}$$(60)where
$$\begin{aligned} {\mathrm {sign}} \,a_x = {\mathrm {sign}} \,\left[ s^*_x (\gamma ) - S\left( \rho ^N_b, 0, 0\right) \right] . \end{aligned}$$(61)Next, \(\Pi ^x_{r_x} = 0\) from (26) implies
$$\begin{aligned} \rho ^{BX}_x = 2 \kappa \mu n_x w_{x2} \left\{ a_x \left[ s^*_x (\gamma ) - S\left( \rho ^N_b, 0, \rho ^{BX}_x\right) \right] \right\} . \end{aligned}$$(62)$$\begin{aligned} s^*_x (\gamma ) \gtreqless S\left( \rho ^N_b, 0, \rho ^{BX}_x\right) \gtreqless S\left( \rho ^N_b, 0, 0\right) \quad \iff \quad s^*_x (\gamma ) \gtreqless S\left( \rho ^N_b, 0, 0\right) . \end{aligned}$$ -
(ii)
For \(a_x = 0\), (28) turns into
$$\begin{aligned} \rho ^{BG}_g = \frac{a_g \mu \kappa ^2}{1- a^2_g \kappa ^2 \mu } \left( \frac{\bar{\kappa }}{\kappa } - a_b \rho ^N_b \right) = \frac{a_g \mu \kappa ^2}{1-a^2_g \kappa ^2 \mu } \left[ \frac{\bar{\kappa }}{\kappa } + S\left( \rho ^N_b, 0, 0\right) \right] . \end{aligned}$$(63)Due to \(\frac{\bar{\kappa }}{\kappa } + s > 0\), we get \(\rho ^{BG}_g > 0\) which implies \(S(\rho ^N_b, \rho ^{BG}_g, 0) > S(\rho ^N_b, 0, 0)\).
-
(iii)
For \(a_b= 0\), we rewrite (28) as
$$\begin{aligned} \rho ^{GX}_g = \frac{a_g \mu \kappa ^2}{1-a^2_g \kappa ^2 \mu } \left[ \frac{\bar{\kappa }}{\kappa } + S\left( 0, 0, \rho _x^{GX}\right) \right] . \end{aligned}$$(64)Due to \(\frac{\bar{\kappa }}{\kappa } + s > 0\), we get \(\rho ^{GX}_g > 0\) and hence \(S(0, \rho ^{GX}_g, \rho _x^{GX}) > S(0, 0, \rho _x^{GX})\).
From (29) with \(a_b = 0\) we have
where
Next, the equation \(\Pi ^x_{r_x}=0\) from (26) can be written as
Appendix 3: Comparative Statics of the Nash Equilibrium
Differentiation of \(\rho ^N_b = \frac{a_b (1-\beta ) \bar{e}^{\beta } (1-\kappa )}{2}\) yields
Differentiation of
yields
where
Differentiating
we obtain
Finally, differentiation of
leads to
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Eichner, T., Pethig, R. Lobbying for and Against Subsidizing Green Energy. Environ Resource Econ 62, 925–947 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-014-9852-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-014-9852-2