Abstract
We develop a two-country general equilibrium model of foreign technology transfers tied to environmental clean-up and border tax adjustments in the presence of transboundary pollution. Pollution is generated in the aid recipient as a by-product in the production of a ‘dirty’ good, which it consumes, as well as exports to the donor country. In contrast to the literature which typically treats aid as a monetary transfer, we assume that foreign aid consists of a transfer of environmental technology that lowers the cost of public clean-up. We also consider a border tax adjustment (BTA) as a secondary policy instrument used in order to internalize the residual transboundary externality. We study the environmental and welfare outcomes of the technology transfer and the BTA as well as the interaction between the two policy instruments. We derive conditions under which the additional presence of a BTA may lead to a lower transfer and less public pollution abatement in the recipient, with counter-productive consequences for both the environment and welfare. Contrary to intuition, we find that the green technology transfer and the border tax adjustment are not always complements.
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Notes
E.g. Articles 2 and 12 of the Stockholm Declaration urge developed countries to increase international technical and financial assistance available for environmental protection in developing countries (Roberts et al. 2009). In order to implement chapter 33 of Agenda 21, the sustainable development plan crafted in preparation for the Rio summit, developed countries pledged $141.9 billion to help their developing counterparts tackle global as well as local environmental issues (UNCED 1992). At the Copenhagen climate summit in December 2009, participants also agreed to establish a $100 billion a year ‘green climate fund’ to support projects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing countries related to climate change mitigation (UNFCCC 2009).
From OECD’s International Development Statistics, Development Assistance Committee (DAC). See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm, accessed May 14, 2010.
The welfare effects of various forms of foreign assistance have been studied extensively. Foreign aid can be unconditional or conditional (tied), and the existing literature differentiates between several different types of the latter form of assistance. Procurement tying—aid conditional on government purchases—is analyzed for instance in Kemp and Kojima (1985), Schweinberger (1990) and Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995). Policy tying—aid conditional on the implementation of certain policies—is assumed in Lahiri (1997). Project tying—aid destined to finance certain projects—is considered in Schweinberger and Woodland (2008) and Chao and Yu (1999).
See Schweinberger and Woodland (2008), pp. 322–323.
Concrete examples of such projects are particularly numerous in Germany, which generally considers the transfer of technical know-how as a key component of its bilateral development assistance activities. One of the more prominent such ventures is the Profitable Environmental Management Project (PREMA), which has assisted many small and medium-sized companies in developing countries in their efforts to improve their environmental performance. The federally owned German Organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) has also provided technical environmental assistance to many developing countries to facilitate the implementation of Rio commitments, the convention on biological diversity (CBD), the convention to combat desertification (CCD), the Montreal protocol, etc. See http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/germany/eco.htm, accessed August 11, 2010. Also see Schweinberger and Woodland (2008), p. 310 for some additional examples.
As an illustration, Hassler (2002) cites the case of the Swedish environmental assistance granted to other Baltic states such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Declaratively aimed at addressing general environmental issues of high importance for those countries, the Swedish green aid was disproportionately geared towards transboundary problems such as wastewater treatment, reduction of emissions from point sources and nuclear safety.
It is widely accepted that OECD countries as a whole are net importers of embodied CO\(_{2}\) emissions, while developing countries as a whole are net exporters (e.g. Peters and Hertwich 2008).
Throughout the paper, superscripts denote variable names and subscripts denote partial derivatives. For comparability, much of our notation throughout follows that of Chao and Yu (1999).
One possibility is that the developing recipient sets its emission tax at a lower level than the developed donor since they weigh the different components of their welfare functions differently: while the donor has a higher marginal willingness to pay for abatement than the recipient, the reverse is true for the marginal utility of income.
When \(\theta =0\) pollution is strictly local, and when \(0<\theta \le 1\) we are dealing with regional/global pollution.
We thank the editor for this point.
This assumption is in line with other papers such as Eyland and Zaccour (2012), who assume that the level of the BTA—for CO\(_{2}\) in their case—is proportional to the difference between the carbon tax rates of two trading countries.
For model simplicity, public abatement is not an explicit option for the donor. First, polluters in the donor are already internalizing all self-produced pollution. Secondly, public clean-up of transboundary pollution is indirect and would be difficult to implement (e.g. acid rain).
When \(\alpha =0\), the BTA is absorbed by the donor and it does not affect the recipient export price (i.e. donor is ‘very small’), and when \(\alpha =1\) the BTA is entirely absorbed by the recipient and it does not affect the donor import price (i.e. donor is ‘very large’).
More details about the properties of \(c^{g}\Big ( w\left( p,t\right) , A\Big )\) are given in Appendix .
For more details about the properties of \(R\left( p,t,g\right) \), see Appendix .
Note that we can also have \(R_{tg}<0\) if the reverse holds.
One can also have \(E_{pz}\le 0\) (\(E_{pz}^{*}\le 0\)) if good \(x\) and pollution are substitutes.
Note that this assumption implies that \(C_{A}(=-R_{gA})\) is constant.
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We are grateful to James Amegashie, Hassan Benchekroun, Joel Bruneau, Joan Canton, Ujjayant Chakravorty, Martin Farnham, Pierre Lasserre, Andrew Leach, Justin Leroux, Ngo Van Long, Carol McAusland, and two anonymous referees for insightful comments and suggestions. We also thank participants at the 2010 CEA conference, the 2010 CREE workshop, the 2011 Montreal Natural Resources and Environmental Economics workshop, as well as seminar participants from the Economics departments at the University of Alberta and Brock University, for valuable comments. We take responsibility for all remaining errors.
Appendices
Appendix 1
1.1 Properties of the Public Abatement Cost Function \(c^{g}\Big ( w\left( p,t\right) , A\Big )\)
Following Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995), the \(c^{g}\Big ( w\left( p,t\right) , A\Big )\) function is concave, and homogeneous of degree one in \(w\), i.e: (i) \(c_{w}^{g}w=c^{g}\) ; (ii) \(c_{ww}^{g}w=0\).
1.2 Properties of the Revenue Function \(R\left( p,t,g\right) \)
Following Abe (1992) and Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995), and using the properties of the \(c^{g}\Big ( w\left( p,t\right) , A\Big )\) function as well as our assumption that the production of good \(x\) and public abatement of pollution compete for the same factors of production, the \(R\left( p,t,g\right) \) function has the following properties: (i) \(R_{p}=x\) ; (ii) \(R_{t}=-z\) ; (iii) \(R_{g}=-c^{g}\) ; (iv) \(R_{pp}>0\) ; (v) \(R_{pt}<0\) ; (vi) \(R_{pg}=-c_{p}^{g}< 0\); (vii) \(R_{tg}=-c_{t}^{g}> 0\); (viii) \(R_{gg}=0\).
Appendix 2
1.1 Derivation of Expression (12)
Totally differentiating (11), and assuming that third derivatives of the revenue and expenditure functions are zero,Footnote 22 we get:
Substituting (2), (9), and (11) into (18), we get the following expression:
Given that \(R_{t}+tR_{tt}+gc_{t}^{g}=0\) and \(tR_{tp}+gc_{p}^{g}=0\) from (1), and after some simplifications, (20) is also equivalent to
From (20) and given that \(t\) and \(p\) are independent on \(\tau \), we can derive the following expression of the effect of a change in \(\tau \) on \(A\):
Substituting (11) in the numerator (\(N^{A}\)) and denominator (\(D^{A}\)) of the above expression, and given that \(c^{g}+tR_{tg}-gR_{gg}=0\) from (1), we get expression (12) after factoring \(N^{A}\) for \(\alpha \).
Appendix 3
Proof of Proposition 1
To appraise the effect of the BTA on \(A\), it is necessary to determine the signs of the numerator and the denominator, i.e. the signs of \(N^A\) and \(D^A\). From (13), we can show that \(N^A=\) \(\alpha -\overline{\alpha ^A }\), with
From our assumptions, we know that \(R_{tg}>0,\, c_{A}<0\), \(E_{zu^{*}}>0,\, R_{tp}<0,\, E_{p}^{*}-R_{p}^{*}>0\), \(E_{pp}^{*}<0\), \(R_{pp}^{*}>0\), \(E_{zz}^{*}>0\), and \(E_{zp}^{*}\geqslant 0\). When \(\tau E_{pu^{*}}^{*}>1\) and \( \theta >\overline{\theta }\) with \(\overline{\theta }=\frac{\tau E_{pu^{*}}^{*}-1}{gE_{zu^{*}}^{*}R_{tg}}\), it directly follows that \(\overline{\alpha ^A }>0\). Therefore, it is straightforward to show that \(N^A\gtrless 0\) when \(\alpha \gtrless \overline{\alpha ^A }\). It also follows from our assumptions that \(D^A\gtrless 0\) if \(\left| c_{A}^{g}\right| \lessgtr \overline{c}\), with \(\overline{c}=\frac{ 3\left( c^{g}+tR_{tg}\right) }{\theta ^{2}g^{2}\left( R_{tg}+1\right) ^{2}E_{zz}^{*}}\).
\(\square \)
Proof of Lemma 1
From (15), we can show that \(N^{e}=\) \(\alpha -\overline{\alpha ^{e}}\), with
Under the assumptions highlighted in Lemma 1, it straightforward to see that \(\overline{\alpha ^{e}}>0\) when \(\tau E_{pu^{*}}^{*}>1\) and \(\theta >\overline{\theta }\), with \(\overline{\theta }=\frac{\tau E_{pu^{*}}^{*}-1}{gE_{zu^{*}}^{*}R_{tg}}\). Therefore, we have \(N^{e}\gtrless 0\) when \(\alpha \gtrless \overline{\alpha ^{e}}\). Under the same assumptions as in the proof of Proposition 1, it also directly follows that \( D^{e}\gtrless 0\) if \(\left| c_{A}^{g}\right| \gtrless \overline{c}\) with \(\overline{c}= \frac{ 3\left( c^{g}+tR_{tg}\right) }{\theta ^{2}g^{2}\left( R_{tg}+1\right) ^{2}E_{zz}^{*}}\).\(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 2
From (14), it is straightforward to see that we always have \(\frac{de}{d\tau }<0\) if \(\frac{dA}{d\tau }>0\). The table below combines the conditions that determine the signs of \(\frac{de}{d\tau }\), \(\frac{dA}{d\tau }\) and \(\frac{dg}{d\tau }\) when \(\frac{dA}{d\tau }<0\) and \(\frac{dg}{d\tau }<0\), as summarized in Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 respectively.
\(\tau E_{pu^{*}}^{*}>1;\, \theta >\overline{\theta };\, \alpha >\overline{\alpha }\); and \(\left| c_{A}^{g}\right| >\overline{c}\) | \(\tau E_{pu^{*}}^{*}>1;\, \theta >\overline{\theta };\, \alpha <\overline{\alpha }\); and \(\left| c_{A}^{g}\right| <\overline{c}\) |
---|---|
\(\frac{dA}{d\tau }<0\) and \(\frac{dg}{d\tau }<0\) | \(\frac{dA}{d\tau }<0\) and \(\frac{dg}{d\tau }<0\) |
\(\overline{\alpha ^{e}}>\overline{\alpha }\) | \(\overline{\alpha ^{e}}< \overline{\alpha }\) |
\(\overline{\alpha ^{e}}>\alpha >\overline{\alpha }\) or \(\alpha >\overline{ \alpha ^{e}}>\overline{\alpha }\) | \(\alpha <\overline{\alpha ^{e}}<\overline{ \alpha }\) or \(\overline{\alpha ^{e}}<\alpha <\overline{\alpha }\) |
\(\overline{\alpha ^{e}}>\alpha \) or \(\alpha >\overline{\alpha ^{e}}\) | \( \alpha <\overline{\alpha ^{e}}\) or \(\overline{\alpha ^{e}}<\alpha \) |
\(\frac{de}{d\tau }<0\) or \(\frac{de}{d\tau }>0\) | \(\frac{de}{d\tau }>0\) or \( \frac{de}{d\tau }<0\) |
From this table, we can directly show that \(\frac{de}{d\tau }> 0\) if \(\alpha >\overline{\alpha ^{e}}>\overline{\alpha }\) or \(\alpha <\overline{\alpha ^{e}}<\overline{\alpha }\), and that \(\frac{de}{d\tau }< 0\) if \(\overline{\alpha ^{e}}>\alpha >\overline{\alpha }\) or \(\overline{\alpha ^{e}}<\alpha <\overline{\alpha }\). \(\square \)
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Nimubona, AD., Rus, H.A. Green Technology Transfers and Border Tax Adjustments. Environ Resource Econ 62, 189–206 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-014-9821-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-014-9821-9
Keywords
- Green aid
- Technology transfer
- Border tax adjustments
- Abatement
- Transboundary pollution
- Environment
- International trade