Abstract
This paper takes the ‘policy failure’ in establishing a global carbon price for efficient emissions reduction as a starting point and analyzes to what extent technology policies can be a reasonable second-best approach. From a supply-side perspective, carbon capture and storage (CCS) policies differ substantially from renewable energy policies: they increase fossil resource demand and simultaneously lower emissions. We analyze CCS and renewable energy policies in a numerical dynamic general equilibrium model for settings of imperfect or missing carbon prices. We find that in contrast to renewable energy policies, CCS policies are not always capable of reducing emissions in the long run. If feasible, CCS policies can carry lower social costs compared to renewable energy policies, in particular when second-best policies are only employed temporally. In case fossil resources are abundant and renewable energy costs low, renewable energy policies perform better. Our results indicate that a pure CCS policy or a pure renewable energy policy carry their own specific risks of missing the environmental target. A smart combination of both, however, can be a robust and low-cost temporary second-best policy.
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Notes
This corresponds to the suggestion of Victor (2011) that support for policies is greatest if costs are widely spread or hidden and benefits are concentrated and explicit. By contrast, the benefits of carbon pricing are far more spread out (in fact, across the globe and into the future) and can involve costs that are concentrated on a few sectors and companies that are well-organized.
We use the term second-best as follows: An optimal second-best policy is a policy that maximizes social welfare given that the policy space is constrained.
There is an important trade-off between technological resolution and numerical feasibility within our model framework: Integration of further technologies makes it more likely that corner solutions occur, i.e. that one technology is not used in the market equilibrium. This, however, is incompatible with the non-linear optimization solver who requires a continuously differentiable set of constraints.
We consider the simplifying case of exponential leakage. A possible alternative is found in Zwaan and Gerlagh (2009), who develop a two-layer leakage model where leakage rates are non-constant.
In Kalkuhl et al. (2012a) we analyze how spillovers or risk-premiums can lead to costly lock-ins into intertemporally inefficient low-carbon technologies. In order to concentrate on the efficiency cost of second-best policies for imperfect carbon pricing, we abstract from these additional market failures in the renewable energy sector.
In this paper, there are no additional market failures beyond the mitigation target. Therefore, it is sufficient for the government to choose \(\tau _R\) appropriately. No additional technology policies are needed.
Besides geological storage, there is also the possibility to store carbon in the oceans or in solid carbonates after accelerated mineral carbonation. The storage capacity of the oceans is practically unlimited. However, there are high uncertainties about the impacts for marine ecosystems and the permanency of storage. Mineral carbonation offers also a practically infinity large sink. However, both costs and land consumption from mining and disposal are high (IPCC 2005, Ch.6–7).
In principle, this may just be a failure of the numerical solver and a solution (although difficult to find) may exist nevertheless. Due to our stepwise reduction of \(\vartheta \) in 1 % intervals and the use of successful solutions as starting point for the next calculation, we judge it very unlikely that a feasible solution, particularly one that is similar to the last successful solution, exists.
See Kalkuhl et al. (2013) for a detailed discussion of this aspect of renewable energy subsidies.
In this setting, subsidy policies will be instantaneously replaced by the carbon tax at \(t=T^*\). When high levels of subsidies have been maintained for decades, the regulator may arguably face some resistance to cutting back subsidies. We have explored this by limiting the subsidy phase-out to 4 % per year. Since the difference in results was negligible, we only show results without such constraints.
The implementation we used is the freely available liveMAGICC at http://live.magicc.org. We focused on the renewable policy and the CCS policy under imperfect carbon pricing with \(\vartheta =20\,\%\) as the time profile of these two policies differ most.
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Acknowledgments
We wish to thank Nico Bauer, Christian Flachsland, Michael Jakob, Brigitte Knopf, Gunnar Luderer, Robert Marschinski, Eva Schmid and Sarah Winands for useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Elmar Kriegler provided data on resource extraction costs which helped generating Fig. 9b. We thank Reyer Gerlagh for sharing his experiences with us regarding numerical issues related to the DEMETER model. We acknowledge funding by the ‘Pakt für Forschung und Innovation’ of the Leibniz-Society, Germany.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: First-Order Conditions of the CCS Sector
Maximizing the associated Lagrangian with \(\lambda _X\) as co-state variable for \(X\), we obtain as dynamic first-order conditions:
Appendix 2: Parameters
Population \(L\) grows exogenously from \(L_0\) to \(L_{max}\) according to \(L_t = L_0 (1 - q_t) + q_t L^{max} \) with \(q_t = 1 - \exp (- ft)\). Labor productivity \(A_Y\) grows exogenously at the variable rate \([1-g_0 \exp (-\zeta t)]^{-1}-1\) implying for \(g_0=0.026\) and \(\zeta =0.006\) an initial growth rate of 2.7 % which decreases to 1.5 % in 2100 (Table 2).
Appendix 3: Sensitivity Analysis
See Table 3.
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Kalkuhl, M., Edenhofer, O. & Lessmann, K. The Role of Carbon Capture and Sequestration Policies for Climate Change Mitigation. Environ Resource Econ 60, 55–80 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-013-9757-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-013-9757-5