Abstract
The field of social psychology explores how a person behaves within the context of other people. The social context can play a substantive role in non-market allocation decisions given peoples choices and values extend beyond the classic market-based exchange institution. Herein we explore how social psychology has affected one aspect of environmental economics: preference elicitation through survey work. We discuss social representation, social isolation, framing through cheap talk, and commitment theory through an oath.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Aadland D, Caplan A, Phillips O (2007) A bayesian examination of information and uncertainty in contingent valuation. J Risk Uncertain 35(2): 149–178
Aadland D, Caplan AJ (2006) Cheap talk reconsidered: new evidence from cvm. J Econ Behav Organ 60(4): 562–578
Ajzen I, Brown TC, Carvajal F (2004) Explaining the discrepancy between intentions and actions: the case of hypothetical bias in contingent valuation. Personal Soc Psychol Bull 30(9): 1108–1120
Albarracìn D, Gillette JC, Earl AN, Glasman LR, Durantini MR, Ho M-H (2005) A test of major assumptions about behavior change: A comprehensive look at the effects of passive and active hiv-prevention interventions since the beginning of the epidemic. Psychol Bull 131(6): 856–897
Allport G (1968) The person in psychology: selected essays. Beacon Press, Boston
Alpizar F, Carlsson F, Johansson-Stenman O (2008) Anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity: evidence from voluntary contributions to a national park in costa rica. J Public Econ 92(5–6): 1047–1060
Ami D, Aprahamian F, Chanel O, Luchini S (2009) A test of cheap talk in different hypothetical contexts: the case of air pollution. GREQAM WP 09 (09)
Arrow K (1987) Rationality of self and others in an economic system. In: Rational choice. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Arrow K, Solow R, Portney PR, Leamer EE, Radner R, Schuman H (1993) Report of the noaa panel on contingent valuation. Federal Reg 58(10): 4601–4614
Batson D (1998) Altruism and prosocial behavior. In: Gilbert D, Fiske S, Lindzey G (eds) Handbook of social psychology, vol 2. McGraw Hill, New York, pp 282–316
Bjornstad D, Cummings R, Osborne L (1997) A learning design for reducing hypothetical bias in the contingent valuation method. Environ Resour Econ 10(3): 207–221
Blamey RK, Bennett JW, Morrison MD (1999) Yea-saying in contingent valuation surveys. Land Econ 75(1): 126–141
Blumenschein K, Blomquist GC, Johannesson M, Horn N, Freeman P (2008) Eliciting willingness to pay without bias: evidence from a field experiment. Econ J 118(525): 114–137
Bohm P (1972) Estimating demand for public goods: an experiment. Eur Econ Rev 3(2): 111–130
Bowles S (1998) Endogenous preferences: the cultural consequences of markets and other economic institutions. J Econ Lit 36(1): 75–111
Bowles S (2002) Individual interactions, group conflicts, and the evolution of preferences. In: Durlauf S, Young P (eds) Social dynamics. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 155–190
Brown TC, Ajzen I, Hrubes D (2003) Further tests of entreaties to avoid hypothetical bias in referendum contingent valuation. J Environ Econ Manage 46(2): 353–361
Burger JM (1999) The foot-in-the-door compliance procedure: a multiple-process analysis and review. Personal Soc Psychol Rev 3(4): 303–325
Carlsson F, Martinsson P (2006) Do experience and cheap talk influence willingness to pay in an open-ended contingent valuation survey? Göteborg University, Department of Economics WP (190)
Carson R, Groves T, List J, Machina M (2002) Probabilistic influence and supplemental benefits: a field test of the two key assumptions underlying stated preferences. Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of California at San Diego
Carson R, Groves T, Machina M (2000) Incentive and informational properties of preference questions. Working Paper, University of California at San Diego
Champ PA, Bishop RC, Brown TC, McCollum DW (1997) Using donation mechanisms to value nonuse benefits from public goods. J Environ Econ Manage 33(2): 151–162
Charness G, Dufwenberg M (2006) Promises and partnership. Econometrica 74(6): 1579–1601
Cherry T, Shogren J (2008) Self-interest, sympathy and the origins of endowments. Econ Lett 101(1): 69–72
Congdon W, Kling J, Mullainathan S (2009) Behavioral economics and tax policy. NBER Working paper N.15328, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Cummings RG, Harrison GW, Osborne LL (1995) Can the bias of contingent valuation be reduced? Evidence from the laboratory. University of South Carolina, Economics Working Paper (B-95-03)
Cummings RG, Taylor LO (1998) Does realism matter in contingent valuation surveys?. Land Econ 74(2): 203–215
Cummings RG, Taylor LO (1999) Unbiased value estimates for environmental goods: a cheap talk design for the contingent valuation method. Am Econ Rev 89(3): 649–665
Dawes R, Smith T (1985) Attitude and opinion measurement. In: Lindsey G, Aronsson E (eds) Handbook of social psychology, vol 1. Random House, New-York, pp 509–566
Diamond PA, Hausman JA (1994) Contingent valuation: is some number better than no number?. J Econ Perspect 8(4): 45–64
Durantini MR, Albarracìn D, Mitchell AL, Earl AN, Gillette JC (2006) Conceptualizing the influence of social agents of behavior change: A meta-analysis of the effectiveness of hiv-prevention interventionists for different groups. Psychol Bull 132(2): 212–248
Ellingsen T, Johannesson M (2004) Promises, threats and fairness. Econ J 114(495): 397–420
Epley N, Mak D, Idson L (2006) Bonus or rebate? The impact of income framing on spending and saving. J Behav Decis Making 19(3): 213–227
Farr R, Moscovici S (1984) Social representations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Flachaire E, Hollard G (2008) Individual sensitivity to framing effects. J Econ Behav Organ 67(1): 296–307
Flachaire E, Hollard G, Luchini S (2007) Heterogeneous anchoring in dichotomous choice valuation framework. Louvain Econ Rev 73(4): 369–384
Fox JA, Shogren JF, Hayes DJ, Kliebenstein JB (1998) Cvm-x: calibrating contingent values with experimental auction markets. Am J Agric Econ 80(3): 455–465
Freeman AMI (2003) The measurements of environmental and resource values: theory and methods. Resources for the Future Press, Washington
Frey BS, Oberholzer-Gee F (1997) The cost of price incentives: an empirical analysis of motivation crowding- out. Am Econ Rev 87(4): 746–755
Greenberg BG, Abul-Ela A-LA, Simmons WR, Horvitz DG (1969) The unrelated question randomized response model: theoretical framework. J Am Stat Assoc 64(326): 520–539
Greiner B (2004) An online recruitment system for economic experiments. In: Kremer K, Macho V (eds) Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003. GWDG Bericht 63, Ges. für Wiss. Datenverarbeitung, Göttingen, pp 79–93
Grether D (1980) Bayes rule as a descriptive model: the representativeness heuristic. Q J Econ 95(3): 537–557
Harrison GW, Harstad RM, Rutström E.E. (2004) Experimental methods and elicitation of values. Exp Econ 7(2): 123–140
Hatcher A, Jaffry S, Thébaud O, Bennett E (2000) Normative and social influences affecting compliance with fishery regulations. Land Econ 76(3): 448–461
Herriges J, Shogren J (1996) Starting point bias in dichotomous choice valuation with follow-up questioning. J Environ Econ Manage 30: 112–131
Hollard G, Luchini S (1999) Théorie du choix social et representation: analyse d’une enquête sur le tourisme vert en camargue. GREQAM WP 99 (06)
Jacquemet N, Joule R-V, Luchini S, Shogren J (2009a) Earned wealth, engaged bidders? Evidence from a second price auction. Econ Lett 105(1): 36–38
Jacquemet N, Joule R-V, Luchini S, Shogren J (2009b) Eliciting preferences under oath. CES Working paper 09(43)
Jacquemet N, James A, Luchini S, Shogren J (2010) Referenda under oath. GREQAM WP 10(15)
Jacquemet N, Joule R-V, Luchini S, Shogren J (2011). Do people always pay less than they say? Testbed laboratory experiments with iv and hg values. J Public Econ Theory 44 (forthcoming)
James A, Kim A, Brodie A, Shogren J (2009) Social isolation & stated preferences: comment. Working Paper
Joule R, Beauvois J (1998) La soumission librement consentie. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris
Joule R, Beauvois J (2002) Petit traité de manipulation à l’usage des honnêtes gens. Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, France (Grenoble)
Joule R, Bernard F, Halimi-Falkowicz S (2008) Promoting ecocitizenship: in favor of binding communication. Int Sci J Alternat Energy Ecol 6(62): 214–218
Joule R-V, Girandola F, Bernard F (2007) How can people be induced to willingly change their behavior? The path from persuasive communication to binding communication. Soc Personal Psychol Compass 1(1): 493–505
Kagel J (1995) Auctions: a survey of experimental research. In: Kagel J, Roth A (eds) Handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 501–585
Katzev R, Wang T (1994) Can commitment change behavior? A case study of environmental actions. J Soc Behav Personal 9: 13–26
Kiesler C, Sakumura J (1966) A test of a model for commitment. J Personal Soc Psychol 3(3): 349–353
Kollock P (1998) Social dilemmas: anatomy of cooperation. Annu Rev Sociol 24: 183–214
Kotchen MJ, Reiling SD (1999) Do reminders of substitutes and budget constraints influence contingent valuation estimates? Another comment. Land Econ 75(3): 478–482
Kulik J, Carlino P (1987) The effect of verbal commitment and treatment choice on medication compliance in a pediatric setting. J Behav Med 10(4): 367–376
List JA (2001) Do explicit warnings eliminate the hypothetical bias in elicitation procedures? Evidence from field auctions for sportscards. Am Econ Rev 91(5): 1498–1507
List JA, Berrens RP, Bohara AK, Kerkvliet J (2004) Examining the role of social isolation on stated preferences. Am Econ Rev 94(3): 741–752
List JA, Gallet CA (2001) What experimental protocol influence disparities between actual and hypothetical stated values?. Environ Resour Econ 20(3): 241–254
Loomis J, Gonzalez-Caban A, Gregory R (1994) Do reminders of substitutes and budget constraints influence contingent valuation estimates?. Land Econ 70(4): 499–506
Luchini S (2000) Preferences Elicitation in Non-Market Environments: Application to Environmental Assets. Ph.D. thesis, Université de la Méditerranée, GREQAM, Marseille
Lusk J, Shogren J (2007) Experimental auctions: methods and applications in economic and marketing research. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Lusk JL (2003) Effects of cheap talk on consumer willingness-to-pay for golden rice. Am J Agric Econ 85(4): 840–856
Morrison M, Brown T (2009) Testing the effectiveness of certainty scales, cheap talk, and dissonance-minimization in reducing hypothetical bias in contingent valuation studies. Environ Resour Econ 44(3): 307–326
Moscovici S (1961) La psychoanalyse, son image et son public. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris
Mozumder P, Berrens RP (2007) Investigating hypothetical bias: induced-value tests of the referendum voting mechanism with uncertainty. Appl Econ Lett 14(10): 705–709
Murphy JJ, Allen PG, Stevens TH, Weatherhead D (2005a) A meta-analysis of hypothetical bias in stated preference valuation. Environmental and Resource Economics 30: 313–325
Murphy JJ, Stevens T, Weatherhead D (2005b) Is cheap talk effective at eliminating hypothetical bias in a provision point mechanism. Environ Resour Econ 30(3): 327–343
Neill HR, Cummings RG, Ganderton PT, Harrison GW, McGuckin T (1994) Hypothetical surveys and real economic commitments. Land Econ 70(2): 145–154
Pallack M, Cook D, Sullivan J (1980) Commitment and energy conservation. In: Bickman L (eds) Applied social psychology annual. Sage, Beverly Hills, pp 235–253
Peterson A, Kealey K, Mann S, Marek P, Sarason I (2000) Hutchinson smoking prevention project: long-term randomized trial in school-based tobacco use prevention—results on smoking. J Natl Cancer Inst 92: 1979–1999
Poe GL, Clark JE, Rondeau D, Schulze WD (2002) Provision point mechanisms and field validity tests of contingent valuation. Environ Resour Econ 23(1): 105–131
Rutström EE (1998) Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design. Int J Game Theory 27(3): 427–441
Schelling T (1960) The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Smith V (2003) Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics. Am Econ Rev 93: 465–508
Soetevent AR (2005) Anonymity in giving in a natural context—a field experiment in 30 churches. J Public Econ 89(11–12): 2301–2323
Spash CL, Biel A (2002) Social psychology and economics in environmental research. J Econ Psychol 23(5): 551–555
Sugden R (2005) Coping with preference anomalies in cost-benefit analysis: a market-simulation approach. Environ Resour Econ 32(1): 129–150
Thøgersen J (2008) Social norms and cooperation in real-life social dilemmas. J Econ Psychol 29(4): 458–472
Vatn A (2009) Cooperative behavior and institutions. J Soc Econ 38(1): 188–196
Vickrey W (1961) Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J Finance 16(1): 8–37
Vossler CA, Evans MF (2009) Bridging the gap between the field and the lab: environmental goods, policy maker input, and consequentiality. J Environ Econ Manage 58(3): 338–345
Vugt MV (2009) Averting the tragedy of the commons: using social psychological science to protect the environment. Curr Direct Psychol Sci 18(3): 169–173
Wang T, Katsev R (1990) Groupe commitment and resource conservation: two field experiments on promoting recycling. J Appl Soc Psychol 20: 265–275
Whitehead JC, Blomquist GC (1995) Do reminders of substitutes and budget constraints influence contingent valuation estimates? Comment. Land Econ 71(4): 541–543
Whitehead JC, Blomquist GC (1999) Do reminders of substitutes and budget constraints influence contingent valuation estimates? Reply to another comment. Land Econ 75(3): 483–484
Yoeli E (2008) Does social approval stimulate prosocial behavior? Evidence from a field experiment in the residential electricity market. Working Paper
Zeiliger R (2000) A presentation of regate, internet based software for experimental economics. http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/zeiliger/regate/RegateIntro.ppt, GATE
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
This paper is a revised version of CES Working Paper no 2010-16. We wish to thank Romain Zeiliger and Maxim Frolov for their assistance in developing the software. Logistical help from the Paris School of Economics and funding from PACA Regional Council under project PsySoc was greatly appreciated.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Jacquemet, N., James, A.G., Luchini, S. et al. Social Psychology and Environmental Economics: A New Look at ex ante Corrections of Biased Preference Evaluation. Environ Resource Econ 48, 413–433 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-010-9448-4
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-010-9448-4