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SAND: an AND-RX Feistel lightweight block cipher supporting S-box-based security evaluations

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Abstract

We revisit designing AND-RX block ciphers, that is, the designs assembled with the most fundamental binary operations—AND, Rotation and XOR operations and do not rely on existing units. Likely, the most popular representative is the NSA cipher SIMON, which remains one of the most efficient designs, but suffers from difficulty in security evaluation. As our main contribution, we propose SAND, a new family of lightweight AND-RX block ciphers. To overcome the difficulty regarding security evaluation, SAND follows a novel design approach, the core idea of which is to restrain the AND-RX operations to be within nibbles. By this, SAND admits an equivalent representation based on a \(4\times 8\) synthetic S-box (SSb). This enables the use of classical S-box-based security evaluation approaches. Consequently, for all versions of SAND, (a) we evaluated security bounds with respect to differential and linear attacks, and in both single-key and related-key scenarios; (b) we also evaluated security against impossible differential and zero-correlation linear attacks. This better understanding of the security enables the use of a relatively simple key schedule, which makes the ASIC round-based hardware implementation of SAND to be one of the state-of-art Feistel lightweight ciphers. As to software performance, due to the natural bitslice structure, SAND reaches the same level of performance as SIMON and is among the most software-efficient block ciphers.

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Notes

  1. For more details, we refer to the main page https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/Lightweight_Cryptography, maintained by the CryptoLUX research group.

  2. The diffusion test codes are available at https://github.com/sand-bar/SAND-Diffusion-Test.

  3. The valid means that the entry of corresponding differential propagation pair is non-zero in DDT. Similarly, for the linear introduced later, it means that the entry of corresponding linear propagation mask pair is non-zero in LAT.

  4. We provide our source codes in https://github.com/sand-bar/SAND-Trail-Search to serve more details of these searching models, which is based on [2, 38, 66].

  5. Informally speaking, a secure shared gate satisfied the properties of correctness, non-completeness and uniformity [56, 57].

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Acknowledgements

This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 62032014), the National Key Research and Development Program of China (Grant No. 2018YFA0704702), the Major Basic Research Project of Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province, China (Grant No. ZR202010220025). Ling Sun is partly supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 62002201). Chun Guo is partly supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 62002202). Weijia Wang is partly supported by the Program of Qilu Young Scholars (Grant No. 61580082063088) of Shandong University, National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 62002204).

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Correspondence to Meiqin Wang.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Test vectors

/* SAND-64/128 */

K: 0F 1F 2F 3F 4F 5F 6F 7F 8F 9F AF BF CF DF EF FF

P: 0F 1F 2F 3F 4F 5F 6F 7F

C: 4D E9 0F 3B 2B 5E 70 6B

/* SAND-128/128 */

K: 1F 1E 1D 1C 1B 1A 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10

P: FF EF DF CF BF AF 9F 8F 7F 6F 5F 4F 3F 2F 1F 0F

C: F1 FB E8 65 BE CE 10 F8 2A 34 C6 C9 9D 6A 73 03

Appendix B: SAND reference implementations

1.1 B.1 SAND -64/128 C reference code from Bitslice view

figure a
figure b

1.2 B.2 SAND -128/128 C reference code from Bitslice view

figure c
figure d

1.3 B.3 SAND -64/128 C reference code from SSb view

figure e
figure f

1.4 B.4 SAND -128/128 C reference code from SSb view

figure g
figure h

Appendix C: DDT of SSb

For simplicity, we only present the DDT of SSb in this section. More details of SSb could be found in https://github.com/sand-bar/SAND-Synthetic-Sbox.

Table 14 DDT of SSb (4-bit input and 8-bit output)

Appendix D: 7-round optimal differential and linear characteristics for SAND-64/128

We give the following 7-round optimal differential and linear characteristics for SAND-64/128 as examples.

Table 15 7-round optimal differential characteristic with probability \(2 ^ {-24}\)
Table 16 7-round optimal linear characteristic with correlation \(2 ^ {-12}\)

Appendix E: Experiments of differential and linear properties for 7-round trails

In order to give a verification for the model under the S-box transformation and also an evaluation of clustering effect, we consider the differential and linear hull effect and distributions under random keys of the example trails presented in Appendix D. Although, these experiments are still limited with regard to the number of rounds and the number of trails, we just want to show the differential and linear properties (differential and linear hull effect, the probability distributions over random keys) of SAND block cipher to some extent.

1.1 Clustering trails by solver

For the optimal 7-round differential trail listed in Table 15, we fix the input and output differences in the search program and enumerate the number of trails within this differential by the SAT solver [65]. The clustering result indicates that the differential effect for this 7-round differential is not significant. Similarly, we also study the linear hull effect of the 7-round linear trail listed in Table 16, which is not notable.

Fig. 16
figure 16

Cumulative distributions of number of right pairs over 10000 random keys (blue) and expected normal distribution (red)

Fig. 17
figure 17

Cumulative distributions of absolute linear bias over 10,000 random keys (blue) and expected normal distribution (red)

1.2 Distribution tests over random sampling keys

To perform the probability distribution tests of the above trails over random sampling keys, we start by randomly selecting 10000 keys. Then, with each selected key, we encrypt \(2 ^ {30}\) blocks and count the corresponding number of right pairs for differential (resp., the absolute linear bias for linear). The results are compared to the expected normal distributions for differential and linear from [62], as shown in Figs. 16 and 17 respectively, which indicates a nice match between the experimental distributions and the expected.

Appendix F: Threshold implementation of the SAND cipher

In this section, we show that the threshold implementation of SAND cipher can take advantage of its Toffoli gates-based structure.

The concept of threshold implementation is to randomly encode each secret-dependent bit (say, x) into several shares (say, \(x_1, \ldots , x_n\)) such that \(x = x_1 \oplus \ldots \oplus x_n\), and accordingly perform the cryptographic algorithms in the shared form (rather than the raw secret). In the rest of this section, unless otherwise noted, we consider the most efficient first-order secure case, where the number of shares is 3. As any cryptographic algorithm can be represented by a composition of XOR and AND gates, the shared form implementation can be achieved by transforming each gate into their shared correspondence. The shared XOR gate can be trivially constructed by XORing pairs of input shares separately. However, the construction of shared AND gate is non-trivial. Previous work [57] has shown that it is impossible to construct a secure AND gateFootnote 5 with 3 shares without introducing any randomness.

A Toffoli gate is a composite gate that takes 3 input bits (say, x, y and z) and outputs \(z = x \oplus y z\). Although a single AND gate is not quite friendly to the threshold implementation, a secure shared Toffoli gate can be constructed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned}&z_1 = x_2 \oplus y_2z_2 \oplus y_2z_3 \oplus y_3z_2\\&z_2 = x_3 \oplus y_3z_3 \oplus y_3z_1 \oplus y_1z_3\\&z_3 = x_2 \oplus y_2z_2 \oplus y_2z_3 \oplus y_3z_2 \end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$
(1)

This structure contributes to an efficient threshold implementation of the SAND cipher.

Fig. 18
figure 18

Threshold implementation of the SAND round function

Figure 18 shows the threshold implementation of the SAND round function, where all the shared linear gates (XOR, and rotation and \(P_n\)) are performed on each share separately and TI Toffoli gate can be calculated by Eq. 1. Note that each of \(G_0\) and \(G_1\) includes two Toffoli gates that need to be separated by a register to prevent the Glitches. Thus, the calculation of the round function requires two cycles.

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Chen, S., Fan, Y., Sun, L. et al. SAND: an AND-RX Feistel lightweight block cipher supporting S-box-based security evaluations. Des. Codes Cryptogr. 90, 155–198 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10623-021-00970-9

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