Abstract
This paper investigates whether trading volume and price distortion can be explained by the investor’s bounded rationality. Assuming that agents are bounded by their information access and processing, what are the consequences on market dynamics? We expose the result of simulations in an ABM that considers the liquidity as an endogenous characteristic of the market and allows to design investors as bounded rational. In a call auction market, where two risky assets are exchanged, traders are defined as a mix between fundamentalist and trend-follower outlook. Each one differs as to behaviour, order-placement strategy, mood, knowledge, risk-aversion and investment horizon. We place agents in a context of evolving fundamental values and order placement strategy; they perceive the fundamental but they also have some heterogeneous belief perseverance; and they adapt their orders to the market depth so as to maximise their execution probability and their profit. By adding bounded rationality in their information processing, we show that (1) usual features as trend-follower outlook and heterogeneous investment horizon are important features to generate excess volatility of asset prices and market inefficiency; (2) the learning fundamental value stabilises the market price and the trading volume; (3) the order-placement strategy increases trading volume, but reduces market efficiency and stability; (4) the agent’s mood prevents illiquid market and weakly increases the market volatility as classical noise trader agents; (5) the impatience to sell of traders is always present in the market: the market sell orders are always more numerous than the market buy orders.
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Notes
The investment horizon is rounded to the nearest integer, \(\tau ^i \in \mathbb {N}^*\).
See “Appendix” for more details (“Demand Function” section).
Same amount of observable orders as in Yamamoto (2011). Be aware that each real-life stock exchange has its own degree of transparency.
95% confidence interval.
This stylised fact was identified by Chiarella et al.’s and Yamamoto’s models and explained by the interaction between fundamentalist and chartist analysts.
In the case of perfect knowledge, we assume that traders are perfectly informed: the estimated fundamental value is equal to the true one, see Eq. (5). Thus, by assumptions the learning spread is null.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Demand Function
Each trader has its own demand function and decides the amount of wealth she would like to invest in the risky assets. The residual wealth is invested in a bond with zero interest rate. To facilitate reading of the appendix, we drop the agent superscript i from all variables.
The demand function is defined as a constant absolute risk-aversion class, where \(\alpha \) is the risk aversion coefficient of the trader, and \(W_t\) the trader wealth at time t. The wealth is given by a cash amount \(C_t\) and the quantity of the risky assets \(z^j_t\) held times their spot prices \(p^j_t\).
The wealth at time \(t+\tau \) (assuming the order is executed at a price \(p^j\) before \(t+\tau \)) is given by:
where \(r_{t+\tau }=p_{t+\tau }/p_t-1\) is the return from t to \(t+\tau \). As a zero order approximation, the agent’s expectations on future returns are taken to be Gaussian where future return is assumed to be \(r_{t+\tau }=p_{t+\tau }/p_t-1\simeq ln(p_{t+\tau }/p_t)\). Based on her knowledge, the trader tries to maximise at time t her forward utility (\(U_{t+\tau }\)):
Because the utility is exponential and the returns are assumed to be Gaussian, the utility may be expressed as:
where the risk of investment is assigned its variance. The expected wealth and the variance are:
Equation (21) could be rewritten as:
Differentiating the expected utility function (24) with respect to \(s_t^j\) gives:
Setting the expression to zero we determine the optimal amount of stocks (\(S_t^*=\pi (p)\)) that the agent wishes to hold in her portfolio for a given price level p.
Notice that in Eq. (26), the parameters are time- and agent-dependent. If we assume the assets to be independent (\(\sigma [r_1;r_2]=0\)) and replace the variance notation \(\sigma ^2[x]\) by \(Var_x\), it corresponds to Eqs. (9) and (10).
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Lespagnol, V., Rouchier, J. Trading Volume and Price Distortion: An Agent-Based Model with Heterogenous Knowledge of Fundamentals. Comput Econ 51, 991–1020 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-017-9655-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-017-9655-y