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The coca diplomacy as the end of the war on drugs. The impact of international cooperation on the crime policy of the Plurinational state of Bolivia

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Abstract

This study analyses the way social problems evolve, and could be overcome by policy decisions, taking Bolivia as a case study. The international cooperation that began with the Single Convention of 1961 opened the door to the militarization of Bolivian crime policy, inspired by the “war on drugs” US paradigm. Foreign intervention weakened Bolivian institutions, creating an opportunity for social movements in defence of the coca leaf in rural areas. Policy change started in 2006 after Evo Morales’ election as President. A new policy paradigm was adopted and the “coca diplomacy” was deployed allowing the government to avoid the repressive foundation of international law and, at the same time, to nourish a new national narrative. The latest step on the “nationalisation” of crime policy was the criminal law adopted at the end of 2017 and abrogated a month later showing the limits of the impact of the “coca sí, cocaína no” paradigm.

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Notes

  1. “Bolivia launches coca leaf diplomatic offensive”, 21st January 2011, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news//world-latin-america-12222395. Accessed 26 June 2018.

  2. Law Nr. 1004, Código del Sistema Penal published the 20.12.2017. Available at: http://www.derechoteca.com/gacetabolivia/ley-no-1005-del-15-de-diciembre-de-2017/

  3. See Article 107, 215 of Law 1005.

  4. See Article 107 párr.2 Law 1005.

  5. It determined that article 46 to 79 of Law 1008 were repealed. The rules also prove that the Bolivian government did not progress in decriminalizing the possession or consumption of other substances or drugs, such as marijuana. Instead the act declares, for example, the growing of marijuana plants as illegal foreseeing a sanction of six month to three years. See Article 216 of Law 1005.

  6. Luis Arce Gómez was captured and deported to the United States in 1989. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison, and was released on November 23rd 2007. “Condenado Arce Gómez por tráfico de cocaína”, El Tiempo, January 10th 1991, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-7883 Accessed 26 June 2018; “Un ex ministro boliviano cumple condena por genocidio”, El País, July 9th 2009, http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2009/07/09/actualidad/1247090415_850215.html Accessed 26 June 2018.

  7. As indicated by the Final Act of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, p. 4: https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/1988_CONVENTION/1988Convention_S.pdf. Accessed 26 June 2018.

  8. In this regard, Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni [46] criticizes the “proliferation of verbs” that occurred in Latin American drug legislation containing an “unusual extent of punishability”, typical of “authoritarian criminal law”.

  9. Abbott ([52]: 104) discusses the political cost of the operation for Bolivian authorities: “Blast Furnace was not without political cost to the government of Bolivia. President Victor Paz Estenssoro received heavy criticism within his own country for having allowed foreign military forces to impose on sovereign Bolivian soil and to conduct “military operations” against Bolivian citizens. Other criticism came from the Organization of American States, Cuba, and other Latin countries. The combined pressure on the Bolivian President was so intense that there was serious concern in the United States that the government of Bolivia might topple as a result”.

  10. “Opción cero, el plan Marshall del gobierno” (Option Zero, the Government’s Marshall Plan), Inter Press Services-Agencia de Noticias, 9th November 1994. http://www.ipsnoticias.net/1994/11/drogasbolivia-opcion-cero-el-plan-marshall-del-gobierno/. Accessed 26 June 2018.

  11. Stefanoni describes how after Morales was arrested, the march arrived at La Paz through “secret paths” and with the support of rural populations, chanting slogans such as “bullet, gun, the march it will go on” and “through bombs, through gas, we will get to La Paz” ([53]: 21).

  12. See El Diario “La hoja intocable” (The Untouchable Leaf), June 21st 2015: http://www.eldiario.net/noticias/2015/2015_06/nt150621/politica.php?n=44&-la-hoja-intocable. Accessed 26 June 2018.

  13. See the official government communication: “Morales rinde homenaje a 20 años de la marcha “Por la Vida y la Soberanía Nacional” protagonizada por mujeres” (Morales pays homage to the twentieth anniversary of the march “For Life and National Sovereignty” led by woman), Ministerio de la Comunicación del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, November 18th 2014: http://www.comunicacion.gob.bo/?q=20151218/20167. Accessed 26 June 2018.

  14. Bolivian sociologist Fernando Salazar [51] believes that for the FTC, the formation of a coca growers’ syndicate was “bad, criminal, as a complementary aim to eradication was the end of syndicalism […] That is where the inhuman attitude of repression comes from, that is against all rural directors of coca production, as they are seen as causing drug trafficking and violence against the country”.

  15. Contreras later became spokesman for the first government of Evo Morales. See news article “Álex Contreras Baspineiro: De vuelta al periodismo”, La Razón, 7th July 2013. http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?_url=/suplementos/animal_politico/Alex-Contreras-Baspineiro-vuelta-periodismo_0_1864613561.html. Accessed 26 June 2018.

  16. See news article “Un muerto y 19 heridos en el Trópico de Cochabamba” (A Death and 19 Wounded in the Tropic of Cochabamba), América Latina en Movimiento, 29th September 2004. http://www.alainet.org/active/6836. Accessed 26 June 2018.

  17. CONALTID only mentions figures from 2002 and earlier: “according to data from the Assembly for Human Rights, between 1998 and 2002, in the Tropic of Cochabamba, repression caused the deaths of 33 cocaleros (children orphaned and families destitute), 567 injured, 693 arrested, 27 police and military losses, 135 police and military injured” ([47]: 20).

  18. According to Article 384 of the Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia: “The State protects the originary and ancestral coca as cultural patrimony, as a renewable natural resource of the biodiversity of Bolivia, and as a factor of social unity; in its natural state it is not a narcotic. The reevaluation, production, sale and industrialisation of coca will be governed by law”.

  19. Art. 72 of Supreme Decree N° 28,631 of the 8th of March 2006. After the new Constitution was passed in 2009, the jurisdiction of the Vice-Ministry for Coca and Integral Development was regulated by art. 113 of the Supreme Decree 29,894 of the 7th of February 2009.

  20. CICAD & OEA [65] expressed this “concern” regarding the “Strategy for the Fight Against Drug Trafficking and the Revaluation of the Coca Leaf 2007–2010”, which “contains aspects that concern CICAD regarding Bolivia’s commitment to and compliance with the international conventions that place strict controls on the sale of coca leaf derivatives” ([65]; [66]: 5).

  21. As the United States Department of State points out [67]: 12): “Bolivian government policies and actions are not in line with international drug control standards. Such policies include Bolivia’s promotion of the idea that coca leaf can be used generally for commercial products, as well as its de facto allowance of 20,000 ha of legal cultivation, 8.000 ha over the 12.000 ha limit set by the country’s own law and roughly 6.000 more than the European Union determined was needed for Bolivia’s consumption needs”.

  22. Law 906, of the 8th October 2017, derogated articles 1 to 31 of the Law 1008.

  23. See news article “Evo Morales acusa a la DEA de “robar” 50% de cocaína incautada” (Evo Morales Accuses DEA of “Robbing” 50% of Seized Cocaine), teleSUR, June 28th 2016: http://www.telesurtv.net/news/Evo-Morales-acusa-a-la-DEA-de-robar-50-de-cocaina-incautada-20160628-0002.html.Accessed 26 June 2018. Morales told the media that “claiming that with the departure of the DEA coca cultivation, cocaine production will increase, is false; really the DEA directly or indirectly protected drug trafficking”, cited by the Vice Ministry of Social Defense and Controlled Substances [68].

  24. See news article “Evo expulsa a USAID de Bolivia tras acusarla de injerencia política” (Evo Expels USAID, Accusing them of Political Interference), La Razón, 2nd May 2013: http://www.la-razon.com/economia/Evo-Usaid-Bolivia-injerencia-politica_0_1825617424.html. Accessed 26 June 2018.

  25. The United States Department of State [67] indicates that representatives of the Bolivian government continued to request technical assistance: “Formal U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Bolivia ended on December 31, 2013. However, the United States recognizes that the drug trade is a global problem and, due to its recognized technical expertise, continues to receive requests for assistance from representatives of the Government of Bolivia and international organizations operating in Bolivia”.

  26. Law Project N° 0392/2011–2012. Available at: http://www.boliviaexterior.com/seccion/2-economia/noticia/4570-Sancionan-Ley-que-busca-sacar-el-masticado-de-coca-de-la-lista-de-estupefacientes Accessed 26 June 2018. For international discussions, see the International Drug Policy Consortium [70].

  27. The text of the reservation can be found at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-18&chapter=6&clang=_en#EndDec. Accessed 26 June 2018.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universidad Autónoma de Chile, Santiago, Chile

    Jörg Alfred Stippel

  2. Universidad de la Frontera, Temuco, Chile

    Juan E. Serrano-Moreno

  3. Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Empresariales, UFRO, Uruguay, 1720, Temuco, Chile

    Juan E. Serrano-Moreno

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Jörg Alfred Stippel & Juan Enrique Serrano Moreno 21st May 2019

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Stippel, J.A., Serrano-Moreno, J.E. The coca diplomacy as the end of the war on drugs. The impact of international cooperation on the crime policy of the Plurinational state of Bolivia. Crime Law Soc Change 74, 361–380 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-020-09891-5

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