Abstract
Obtaining a loan is an individual’s private business and such a right should be free from interference. However, if Government officers obtain a loan from undesirable persons, they may be lured into committing an act which they would not otherwise have done but for the favours having been shown by the lenders. Section 3 of Hong Kong’s Prevention of Bribery Ordinance attempts to limit such behaviour of Government officers. Since the power of this provision is draconian, it may possibly violate human rights. This paper attempts to use a Social Censure perspective to explain why this provision was put in place in the 1970s and why it was not repealed in the 1990s in line with the rise of human rights standards in Hong Kong. It argues that the then British colonial government used a high-hand legal code to fight against corruption in the civil service to win its legitimacy in face of the rise of Red China in the 1970s. A review of twenty-one Section 3 cases suggests that most of the loans were not distributed for mere friendship but involved a wide range of culpability. Thus the coercion generated by Section 3 was approved by the masses, resulting in the reinforcement of a draconian but efficient legal provision in the service of the colonial administration.
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Notes
See, [5].
T. Wing Lo, see [18].
See p.498 in [23]. Rajagopal analyzes why a joint discourse of human rights and corruption is possible. He states, “The first such similarity that I see between corruption and human rights discourses concerns their relationship with development. A second similarity between these two discourses is in their attitudes towards the role of the state. A third similarity between the corruption and human rights discourses is with respect to their attitude towards culture” (p. 501-502).
See note 6.
N. Jayawickrama, see [32].
P. Langseth, see [22].
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/jwxy/200707090046.asp and New Beijing News, 10 October 2005.
Kin-man Chan, see [39].
They include spouse (concubine), any person with whom the Government officer is living in a regular union as if man and wife; fiancée; parent, step-parent, lawful guardian; spouse’s parent, spouse’s step parent, spouse’s lawful guardian; grandparent, great-grandparent; child, ward of court; spouse’s child, spouse’s ward of court; grandchild; child’s spouse; brother, sister; spouse’s brother and sister; half-brother and sister; step-brother and sister; brother’s and sister’s spouse; brother’s and sister’s child; parent’s brother and sister; parent’s brother’s and sister’s spouse; parent’s brother’s and sister’s child.
In the 1990s, the permissible amounts were only $2,000 and $1,000 respectively on any one occasion and had to be repaid within 14 days.
Pursuant to paragraph 11 of the unpublished Civil Service Branch Circular (No.17/92), ‘official dealings’ is defined as (i) normal routine contact with a Government Department in making use of the services offered by that department is not ‘official dealing’, i.e. medical consultation with Government official, tax payment to Inland Revenue Department and emergency call to Fire Services for reporting fire and ambulance service; (ii) the solicitation or acceptance from a close personal friend in good faith and in circumstances where there was no knowledge of and no reasonable opportunity of having knowledge of any official dealings is permitted.
Details can be found from an unpublished Consultative Document (No. 44/85) completed by Anthony Chan of the Corruption Prevention Department of the ICAC (1985). In the 1980s, opinions in relation to the Notice were expressed by different government departments in the form of ‘queries, comments and suggestions’. Some suggested that Government officers should be allowed to accept advantages from their subordinates since there were circumstances where a senior officer could unwittingly commit a ‘technical’ offence, such as payment of petty expenses by the junior while on official duty and the senior forgot to make immediate repayment afterwards. There was a general feeling among Government officers that obtaining special permission from the approving authorities for such a minimal amount was troublesome and therefore the Notice should be amended with general permission being given in prescribed circumstances. These comments had been taken into consideration but were found to be invalid. With respect to relaxing the permissible figure of loan, it was found that legitimate credit facility could be easily obtained through licensed financial institutions. In relation to accepting advantages from subordinates, it was considered to be inappropriate as this could lead to significant opportunities for corruption.
[44]. Particularism requires a person to treat “insiders” with special favours even at the expense of fidelity to the “outsiders”.
Rance Lee, see [44].
It is interpreted as the conformity to indigenous Chinese folk norm.
Heidenheimer made a differentiation between ‘black’ (most people condemn it), ‘grey’ (some people condemn it) and ‘white’ corruption (tolerated by most people). See [46].
T. Wing Lo, see [18].
Gramsci viewed the crisis of hegemony as a crisis of authority or a crisis of the state. See [47].
The Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance (Cap. 204), the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Cap. 201) and the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Ordinance (Cap. 288), Laws of Hong Kong.
See R. v. CHAN Chin-hung (1979) and R. v. WONG Joe-yiu (1979).
See the judgement of Criminal Appeal No. 213, 219-222, 232-238 of 1976.
Ibid., p.9.
For the convicted defendants, a magistrate could exercise his discretion, in accordance with Section 36 of Magistrates Ordinance, Cap.227, Laws of Hong Kong, to order that the conviction be unrecorded. In this case, the defendants would very likely lose their jobs as well as pension if the convictions were recorded.
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Acknowledgement
The authors gratefully acknowledge their profound debt to Tina Rochelle and Guoping Jiang for the assistance they provided in preparing this paper.
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Lo, T.W., Ngan, P. Restricting loans of money to Hong Kong civil servants: social censure or violation of human rights?. Crime Law Soc Change 52, 385–403 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-009-9189-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-009-9189-x