Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Integrity, culture, and scale: an empirical test of the big bad police agency

  • Published:
Crime, Law and Social Change Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Building on Klockars et. al. (2000) analysis of survey data on police agency integrity, this analysis develops an economic model of police corruption within police agencies. Empirical estimates of the economic model are consistent with Klockars et. al. (2000) in that there is no evidence to support the traditional theory that police agency corruption is attributable to the “individual bad-apple.” Independent of other factors, the present analysis shows that police culture fosters corruption. Furthermore, the present analysis shows that incentive structures within police agencies increase the problem of corruption as the scale of police agency operation increases. Policies that would promote higher levels of integrity are considered.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Anonymous (2006). To Prevent Corruption, Focus on ‘Culture of Integrity. Criminal Justice Newsletter. Hackensack: January 3, 4.

  2. Bac, M. (1998). The scope, timing, and type of corruption. International Review of Law and Economics, 18, 101–120. doi:10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00060-4.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Bayley, D. H., & Shearing, C. D. (1996). The future of policing. Law & Society Review, 30(3), 585–606.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Benson, B. L. (1988). An Institutional Explanation for Corruption of Criminal Justice Officials. The Cato Journal, 139–163. Spring/Summer

  5. Bose, G. (2004). Bureaucratic delays and bribe-taking. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 54, 313–320. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00088-X.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Crank, J. P. (2003). Book review of “Organizational structure in american police agencies: context, complexity & control,” by Edward R. Maguire. American Journal of Sociology, 109(2), 550–551.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Darrough, M. N., & Heineke, J. M. (1978). The Multi-Output Translog Production Cost Function: The Case of Law Enforcement Agencies. In J. M. Heineki (Ed.), Economic Models of Criminal Behavior. Amsterdam: North Holland.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Eigen, P. (1997). Measuring and combating corruption. Journal of Policy Reform, (5/4), 187–201 2002.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Fiorentini, G., & Peltzman, S. (Eds.). The economics of organized crime. Cambridge University Press.

  10. Gendar, A. & William, S. (2008). NYPD narcotics probe has compromised more than 150 Brooklyn criminal cases, Daily News, January 23.

  11. Grasmick, H. G., & George, J. B. (1980). The deterrent effect of perceived severity of punishment. Social forces, 59(2), 471–491.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Guy, C., Bennison, D., & Clark, R. (2005). Scale economies and superstore retailing: New evidence from the U.K. Journal of Retailing & Consumer Services, 12(2), 73–81.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Ivkovic, S. K. (2003). To surve and collect: Measuring police corruption. The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 93(:2–3), 593–649.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Johnson, T. A., Cox, R. W., & III, (2005). Police ethics: Organizational implications. Public Integrity, 7(1), 67–80 2004.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Kaplan, D. E. (2000). A Case Study in Policing for Profit. U.S. News & World Report, 22–24.

  16. Kementa, J. (1986). Elements of econometrics (2nd ed.). United States: Macmillan Publishing Company.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Klockars, C. B. (1984). Blue lies and police placebos. American Behavioral Scientist, 27(4), 529–544.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Klockars, C. B. (1997). Police corruption in thirty agencies in the United States, (Computer file). ICPSR version. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Justice (producer), 1997. Ann arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for political and social research (distributor), 1999.

  19. Klockars, C. B., Ivkovich, S. K., Harver, W. E., & Haberfeld, M. R. (2000) The measurement of police integrity. National Institute of Justice (NCJ 181465), May.

  20. Leibenstein, H. (1966). Allocative efficiency and x-efficiency. The American Economic Review, 56, 392–415.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Luo, Y. (2005). An organizational perspective of corruption. Management and Organization Review, 1(1), 119–154.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. Maguire, E. R., & Structure, O. (2003). In American police agencies: Context, Complexity, and Control. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

    Google Scholar 

  23. March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organization. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Marché, G. E. (1992). Aggregation biases and economies of scale in the Metropolitan Police agency production function. Review of Social Economy, 2(2), 215 – 233.

    Google Scholar 

  25. Marché, G. E. (2004). And, Injustice for some: Corrupt exchange and the risk-averse official. American Review of Political Economy, 2, 77–98.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Marjit, S., & Shi, H. (1998). On controlling crime with corrupt officials. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 34, 163–172. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00040-1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  27. McAuliffe, R. E., Cooper, C. L., & Argyris, C. (1997). “Diseconomies of scale” in Blackwell encyclopedic dictionary of managerial economics. Blackwell Publishing Limited.

  28. McGlue, J. (2002). Police corruption not just the bent on the beat. The Australian 4

  29. Morgan, B., Morgan, F., Foster, V., & Kolbert, J. (2000). Promoting the moral and conceptual development of law enforcement Trainees: A deliberate psychological educational approach. Journal of Moral Education, 29(2), 203–218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  30. O’Shea, T. C., & Nicholls, K. (2003). Police crime analysis: A survey of US police departments with 100 or more sworn personnel. Police Practice and Research, 4(3), 233–250.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  31. della Porta, D., & Vannucci, A. (1999). Corrupt exchanges: Actors, resources, and mechanisms of political corruption. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

    Google Scholar 

  32. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government: Causes, consequences, and reform. Cambridge University Press.

  33. Economist. (2000). Storming the rampart. Economist, 357(8199), 32–35.

  34. U.S. Department of Justice. (1997). Police integrity: Public service with honor (A Partnership between the National Institute of Justice and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services), Gaffigan, Stephen J. and Phyllis P. McDonald, project managers, NCJ 163811.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Rogers State University, 1701 W Will Rogers Blvd, Claremore, OK, 74017, USA

    Gary E. Marché

Authors
  1. Gary E. Marché
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Gary E. Marché.

Appendices

Appendix A. Eleven corruption case scenarios:

  1. Case 1.

    [BUSINESS] A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.

  2. Case 2.

    [MEALS] A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him.

  3. Case 3.

    [SPEED] A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.

  4. Case 4.

    [HOLIDAYS] A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.

  5. Case 5.

    [BURGLARY] A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch, worth about two days pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen during the burglary.

  6. Case 6.

    [AUTO] A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the owners of the cars damaged in accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives a payment of 5% of the repair bill from the shop owner.

  7. Case 7.

    [SUPERVISOR] A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune-up his supervisor’s personal car. Evaluate the SUPERVISOR’S behavior.

  8. Case 8.

    [ALCOHOL] At 2 A.M. a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense he transports the driver to his home.

  9. Case 9.

    [BAR] A police officer finds a bar on his beat which is still serving drinks a half hour past its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a couple of free drinks from the owner.

  10. Case 10.

    [BRUTALITY] Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting.

  11. Case 11.

    [WALLET] A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains the amount of money equivalent to a full-day’s pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property, but keeps the money for himself.

Appendix B. Aggregated dummy variable logit estimates

Table 4 Case 1: BUSINESS (n = 3151 total observations)
Full size table
Table 5 Case 2: MEALS (n = 3168 total observations)
Full size table
Table 6 Case 3: SPEED (n = 3166 total observations)
Full size table
Table 7 Case 4: HOLIDAYS (n = 3160 total observations)
Full size table
Table 8 Case 5: BURGLARY (n = 3155 total observations)
Full size table
Table 9 Case 6: AUTO (n = 3173 total observations)
Full size table
Table 10 Case 7: SUPERVISOR (n = 3168 total observations)
Full size table
Table 11 Case 8: ALCOHOL (n = 3148 total observations)
Full size table
Table 12 Case 9: BAR (n = 3166 total observations)
Full size table
Table 13 Case 10: BRUTALITY (n = 3159 total observations)
Full size table
Table 14 Case 11: WALLET (n = 3174 total observations)
Full size table

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Marché, G.E. Integrity, culture, and scale: an empirical test of the big bad police agency. Crime Law Soc Change 51, 463–486 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-008-9184-7

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-008-9184-7

Keywords

Search

Navigation