Abstract
A variety of factors influence decisions to mobilize formal social control. With few exceptions, studies considering the effects of legal (e.g., case specific) and extra legal (e.g., offender and victim characteristics) variables have concentrated on sentencing under criminal law, an outcome subject to sample selection bias given that the majority of cases never reach this stage. Analyses of earlier decision points (e.g., victim calls for service, police use of force, and arrest), have focused on street crime and single jurisdictions. A neglected research context is the organizational victim’s response to employee fraud. Using a sample of 663 fraud cases, this study applies Black’s (The behavior of law, San Diego, Academic, 1976) theory of law to victim organizations’ decisions to mobilize formal social control. Results demonstrate that extralegal characteristics weigh heavily on decisions to initiate both criminal and civil outcomes. Specifically, offenders’ education and age decreased the odds of criminal legal mobilization. Mobilization of criminal law was also more likely by government agencies. Implications for Black’s theory and directions for further research are discussed.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
According to Black, ([14], p. 22) offense-specific characteristics (e.g., seriousness) are subjective evaluations, not facts, and therefore “cannot be measured without a standard of value.” Alternatively, Gottfredson and Hindelang’s position ([46], p. 339) is that financial loss and type of offense represent objective characteristics of a crime.
The same data [125] show that the highest rates of referrals and prosecutions in the past two decades occurred during the first year of the Clinton Administration (1993). Some have argued that changes in Federal level investigative priorities following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have diverted attention and resources away from white-collar crime [109].
The ACFE is a professional organization of over 30,000 members that provides educational training and conducts research on fraud. The ACFE administers an exam that members must pass to earn the Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) designation. Additionally, there are minimum academic and professional requirements set by the ACFE Board of Regents, including a Bachelor’s degree and at least two years of professional experience in areas such as accounting, auditing, criminology or sociology, fraud investigation, loss prevention, or law. Members must abide by ACFE bylaws and the ACFE Code of Professional Ethics. ACFE frequently conducts surveys of its membership.
CPE credit contributes to the current status of a CFE’s professional license. Typical opportunities for credit include attendance at workshops or training seminars sponsored by ACFE.
Conversely, it is possible that this restriction resulted in an oversampling of insignificant cases. According to Klepper et al. ([74], p. 63), one potential problem is that some features of a case that may affect its processing cannot be observed by the researcher. Although selection bias may occur at multiple stages of the criminal justice system, it is least likely at the first stage examined here [74].
For cases in which civil suits were filed, a case was considered finished when a judgment was rendered. Criminal cases were considered finished at the sentencing stage (e.g., conviction, acquittal, plea bargain). Approximately 25% of cases included more than one offender. Respondents were asked to provide information on the one offender deemed to be primarily responsible for the offense. The attribution of responsibility itself is a normative process, and represents a key component of social control within organizations [103].
Data were provided to the researcher in the fall of 2002. Due to confidentiality issues associated with participants’ identities, narrative data were not made available. A limited amount of qualitative data (e.g., CFE responses to open-ended questions) was provided for supplementary analyses.
Despite conceptual disagreement over defining white-collar crime, Clinard and Quinney’s [23] distinction between corporate crime and occupational crime as the two subtypes of white-collar crime is generally accepted among criminologists. The cases included in the current study fit within Clinard and Quinney’s conceptualization of white-collar crime. Asset misappropriation, which described the majority of cases, clearly reflects the occupational crime subtype, while the categories of corruption and fraudulent statements might arguably be described as either corporate crime or occupational crime. Although investigators considered organizations to be the primary victims of all offenses, it is possible that some organizations benefited from specific offenses (e.g., overstating revenue) and others outside the organization (e.g., shareholders) may have been secondary victims. It is important to note here that individual offenders, not organizations, were identified as the “responsible parties.” This distinction has been accepted in previous studies of “hybrid crime” in the Savings and Loan industry [20].
Specifically, the survey asked respondents whether the perpetrator was “reported to law enforcement authorities.” The specific authority to which the referral was made was not identified, and likely varied given the jurisdiction. For those who were not referred, a follow up question asked whether the perpetrator “was sued in civil court.” Questions about subsequent decision stages of case processing (e.g., arrests, charges, convictions) were also included in the original survey, but are beyond the scope of the present study’s focus on early stage legal decision-making by organizational victims.
The decision to code this variable as interval, rather than continuous, was made by ACFE research staff in the survey design stage. Although less precise than a continuous variable, it improves upon studies that have operationalized organizational size as a dummy variable ([73], p. 1000).
In a study predicting another outcome (e.g., offending) examining the independent effects of each unique control mechanism might be preferred. The decision to combine these measures into a summary index was theoretically driven by Black’s contention that the level of available social control influences legal mobilization.
Although equivalent to running a series of binary logits, Long ([81], p. 51) suggests that the multinomial logistic regression model is superior because “...all of the logits are estimated simultaneously, which enforces the logical relationships among parameters and uses the data more efficiently.”
This term was created by multiplying age, gender, and education. The distribution of this three-way interaction ranged from 0 (all females) to 240 (oldest, highest educated males), with a mean of 37.45 and standard deviation of 47.75.
It is possible that additional non-legal remedies (e.g., insurance) were utilized by this subset of victims. Future studies can improve upon this research by measuring access to alternative sources of social control.
References
Albonetti, C. A. (1999). The avoidance of punishment: A legal–bureaucratic model of suspended sentences in federal white-collar crime cases prior to the federal sentencing guidelines. Social Forces, 78, 303–329.
Albonetti, C. A. (1998). Direct and indirect effects of case complexity, guilty pleas, and offender characteristics on sentencing for offenders convicted of a white-collar offense prior to sentencing guidelines. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 14, 353–378.
Albrecht, W. S. (2003). Fraud examination. Mason, OH: Thompson-Southwestern.
Avakame, E. F., Fyfe, J. J., & McCoy, C. (1999). “Did you call the police? What did they do?” An empirical assessment of Black’s theory of mobilization of law. Justice Quarterly, 16, 765–792.
Bardach, E., & Kagan, R. (1982). Going by the book: The problem of regulatory unreasonableness. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Belknap, J. (2007). The invisible woman: Gender, crime, and justice (3rd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thompson Learning.
Benson, M. L., Cullen, F. T., & Maakestad, W. (1990). Local prosecutors and corporate crime. Crime & Delinquency, 36, 356–372.
Benson, M. L., Maakestad, W., Cullen, F. T., & Geis, G. (1988). District attorneys and corporate crime: Surveying the prosecutorial gatekeepers. Criminology, 26, 505–518.
Benson, M. L., & Moore, E. (1992). Are white-collar and common offenders the same? An empirical and theoretical critique of a recently proposed general theory of crime. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 29, 252–272.
Benson, M. L., & Walker, E. (1988). Sentencing the white-collar offender. American Sociological Review, 53, 294–302.
Berk, R. R. (1983). An introduction to sample selection bias in sociological data. American Sociological Review, 48, 386–398.
Black, D. J. (1998). The social structure of right and wrong (Revised edition). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Black, D. J. (1983). Crime as social control. American Sociological Review, 48, 34–45.
Black, D. J. (1979). Common sense in the sociology of law. American Sociological Review, 44, 18–27.
Black, D. J. (1976). The behavior of law. San Diego: Academic.
Black, D. J. (1973). The mobilization of law. Journal of Legal Studies, 2, 125–149.
Braithwaite, J., & Fisse, B. (1987). Self-regulation and the control of corporate crime. In C. Shearing, & P. C. Stenning (Eds.), Private policing. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Bureau of Economic Analysis. (2003). Profile of the economy. Treasury Bulletin, 3–7. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006). National unemployment rates, 1940–2006. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor.
Calavita, K., & Pontell, H. N. (1994). The state and white-collar crime: Saving the savings and loans. Law and Society Review, 28, 297–324.
Campbell, J., & Lindberg, L. (1990). Property rights and the organization of economic activity by the state. American Sociological Review, 55, 3–14.
Clarke, M. (1990). Business crime: Its nature and control. New York, NY: St. Martin’s.
Clinard, M. B., & Quinney, R. (1967). Criminal behavior systems: A typology. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.
Cooney, M. (2002). Still paying the price of heterodoxy: The behavior of law a quarter-century on. Contemporary Sociology, 31, 658–661.
Copes, H., Kerley, K., Mason, K. A., & Van Wyck, J. (2001). Reporting behavior of fraud victims and Black’s theory of the Behavior of Law. Justice Quarterly, 28, 343–363.
Cressey, D. R. (1953). Other people’s money: A study in the social psychology of embezzlement. Glencoe, IL: Free.
Cullen, F. T., Link, B. G., & Polanzi, C. W. (1982). The seriousness of crime revisited: Have attitudes toward white-collar crime changed? Criminology, 20, 83–102.
Cullen, F. T., & Maters, R. A. (1983). Public support for punishing white-collar crime: Blaming the victim revisited? Journal of Criminal Justice, 11, 481–494.
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1986). A behavioral theory of the firm (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Daly, K. (1989). Gender and varieties of white-collar crime. Criminology, 27, 769–793.
Diamond, S. S. (1995). The challenges of socio-legal research on decision-making: Psychological successes and failures. Journal of Law and Society, 22, 78–84.
Dixon, J. (1995). The organizational context of criminal sentencing. American Journal of Sociology, 100, 1157–1198.
Dobbin, F., & Sutton, J. R. (1998). The strength of a weak state: The rights revolution and the rise of human resources management decisions. American Journal of Sociology, 104, 441–476.
Doyle, D. P., & Luckenbill, D. F. (1991). Mobilizing law in response to collective problems: A test of Black’s theory of law. Law & Society Review, 25, 103–116.
Edelman, L. B., & Suchman, M. C. (1999). When the ‘haves’ hold court: Speculations on the organizational internalization of law. Law & Society Review, 33, 941–991.
Edelman, L. B., & Suchman, M. C. (1997). The legal environments of organizations. Annual Review of Sociology, 23, 479–515.
Engen, R. L., & Gainey, R. R. (2000). Modeling the effects of legally relevant and extralegal factors under sentencing guidelines: The rules have changed. Criminology, 38, 1207–1225.
Eitle, D. J. (2000). Regulatory justice: A re-examination of the influence of class position on the punishment of white-collar crime. Justice Quarterly, 17, 809–839.
Epp, C. R. (1999). The two motifs of why the ‘haves’ come out ahead and its heirs. Law & Society Review, 33, 1089–1098.
Epp, C. R. (1990). Connecting litigation levels and legal mobilization: Explaining interstate variation in employment civil rights litigation. Law & Society Review, 24, 145–163.
Felson, R. B., Messner, S. F., Hoskin, A. W., & Deane, G. (2002). Reasons for reporting and not reporting domestic violence to the police. Criminology, 40, 617–648.
Friedrichs, D. O. (2004). Trusted criminals (2nd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Fuller, S. R., Edelman, L. B., & Matusik, S. F. (2000). Legal readings: Employee interpretation and mobilization of law. Academy of Management Review, 25, 200–216.
Galanter, M. (1974). Why the ‘haves’ come out ahead: Speculations on the limits of legal change. Law & Society Review, 9, 95–160.
Gottfredson, M. R., & Gottfredson, D. M. (1988). Decision-making in criminal justice: Toward a rational exercise of discretion (2nd ed.). New York: Plenum.
Gottfredson, M. R., & Hindelang, M. (1980). Trite but true: Response to Braithwaite and Biles. American Sociological Review, 45, 338–340.
Greenberg, G. (1993). Stealing in the name of justice: Informational and interpersonal moderators of theft reactions to underpayment inequity. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 54, 81–103.
Greenberg, G. (1990). Employee theft as a reaction to underpayment inequity: The hidden costs of pay cuts. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 561–568.
Grossman, J. B., Macaulay, S., & Kritzer, H. M. (1999). Do the haves still come out ahead? Law & Society Review, 33, 803–810.
Hagan, J. (1974). Extralegal attributes and criminal sentencing: An assessment of a sociological viewpoint. Law & Society Review, 8, 357–383.
Hagan, J., & Nagel, I. H. (1982). White-collar crime, white-collar time: The sentencing of white-collar offenders in the Southern district of New York. American Criminal Law Review, 20, 258–289.
Hagan, J., & Palloni, A. (1986). ‘Club fed’ and the sentences of white-collar offenders before and after Watergate. Criminology, 24, 603–621.
Hagan, J., & Parker, P. (1985). White-collar crime and punishment: The class structure and legal sanctioning of securities violations. American Sociological Review, 50, 302–316.
Hamilton, W. (2002). Corporate scandals bring calls for jail. Los Angeles Times, 9 July, sec. C, p.1.
Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica, 47, 153–162.
Hembroff, L. (1987). The seriousness of acts and social context: A test of Black’s theory of the behavior of law. American Journal of Sociology, 93, 322–347.
Herman, M. L. (2001). Broken promises, shattered trust: Preventing and responding to fraud and misuse of assets in a non-profit organization. Washington, D.C.: Non-Profit Risk Management Center.
Hickman, L. J., & Simpson, S. S. (2003). Fair treatment or preferred outcome? The impact of police behavior on victim reports of domestic violence incidents. Law & Society Review, 37, 607–634.
Hindelang, M., & Gottfredson, M. R. (1976). The victim’s decision not to invoke the criminal justice process. In W. McDonald (Ed.), Criminal justice and the victim (pp. 57–78). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hoelter, H. J. (2002). Harsh sentences for white-collar criminals a waste of resources. Miami Sun-Sentinel, 29 September, sec. F, p. 1.
Hollinger, R. C., & Clark, J. P. (1983). Deterrence in the workplace: Perceived certainty, perceived severity, and employee theft. Social Forces, 62, 398–418.
Hollinger, R. C., & Clark, J. P. (1982). Formal and informal social controls of employee deviance. Sociological Quarterly, 23, 333–343.
Holtfreter, K. (2005). Is occupational fraud ‘typical’ white-collar crime? A comparison of individual and organizational characteristics. Journal of Criminal Justice, 33, 353–365.
Holtfreter, K. (2004). Fraud in U.S. organizations: An examination of control mechanisms. Journal of Financial Crime, 12, 88–95.
Holtfreter, K., Piquero, N. L., & Piquero, A. R. (2008). And justice for all? Investigators’ perceptions of punishment for fraud perpetrators. Crime, Law & Social Change, 49, 397–412.
Holtfreter, K., Reisig, M. D., & Blomberg, T. G. (2006). Consumer fraud victimization in Florida: An empirical study. St. Thomas University Law Review, 18, 761–789.
Holtfreter, K., Reisig, M. D., & Pratt, T. C. (2008). Low self-control, routine activities, and fraud victimization. Criminology, 46, 189–220.
Holtfreter, K., VanSlyke, S., & Blomberg, T. G. (2005). Sociolegal change in consumer fraud: From victim–offender interactions to global networks. Crime, Law & Social Change, 44, 251–275.
Holtfreter, K., VanSlyke, S., Bratton, J., & Gertz, M. (2008). Public perceptions of white-collar crime and punishment. Journal of Criminal Justice, 36, 50–60.
Jesilow, P., Klempner, E., & Chiao, V. (1992). Reporting consumer and major fraud: A survey of complainants. In K. Schlegel, & D. Weisburd (Eds.), White-collar crime reconsidered (pp. 149–168). Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
Karpoff, J. M., Lee, D. S., & Martin, G. S. (2006). The cost to firms of cooking the books. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=652121 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.652121.
Katz, J. (1979). Legality and equality: Plea bargaining in the prosecution of white-collar and common crimes. Law & Society Review, 13, 431–459.
Kinsey, K. A., & Stalans, L. J. (1999). Which haves come out ahead and why? Cultural capital and legal mobilization in frontline law enforcement. Law & Society Review, 33, 993–1023.
Klepper, S., Nagin, D., & Tierney, L. (1983). Discrimination in the criminal justice system: A critical appraisal of the literature. In A. Blumstein, et al. (Ed.), Research in sentencing: The search for reform (vol. II, (pp. 55–128)). Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Koons-Witt, B. A. (2002). The effect of gender on the decision to incarcerate before and after the introduction of sentencing guidelines. Criminology, 40, 297–328.
Kruttschnitt, C. (1982). Respectable women and the law. The Sociological Quarterly, 23, 221–234.
Kruttschnitt, C. (1980). Social status and sentences of female offenders. Law & Society Review, 15, 247–265.
Lawrence, P. R., & Lorsch, J. W. (1967). Organizations and environment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lempert, R. O. (1976). Mobilizing private law: An introductory essay. Law & Society Review, 11, 173–189.
Levi, M. (1987). Regulating fraud: White-collar crime and the criminal process. London, UK: Routledge.
Long, J. S. (1997). Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Makkai, T., & Braithwaite, J. (1994). The dialectics of corporate deterrence. Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, 31, 347–389.
Mann, K., Wheeler, S., & Sarat, A. (1980). Sentencing the white-collar offender. American Criminal Law Review, 17, 479–500.
March, J. G. (1994). A primer on decision-making: How decisions happen. New York, NY: Free.
Mason, K., & Benson, M. L. (1996). The effect of social support on fraud victims’ reporting behavior: A research note. Justice Quarterly, 13, 511–524.
Mastrofski, S. D., Reisig, M. D., & McCluskey, J. D. (2002). Police disrespect toward the public: An encounter-based analysis. Criminology, 40, 519–552.
Mastrofski, S. D., Snipes, J. B., Parks, R. B., & Maxwell, C. D. (2000). The helping hand of the law: Police control of citizens on request. Criminology, 38, 307–342.
McLean, B., & Elkind, P. (2003). The smartest guys in the room: The amazing rise and scandalous fall of Enron. New York, NY: Penguin.
Miethe, T. D., & Moore, C. A. (1986). Racial differences in criminal processing: The consequences of model selection on conclusions about differential treatment. The Sociological Quarterly, 15, 217–237.
Mooney, L. (1986). The behavior of law in a private legal system. Social Forces, 64, 408–418.
Morahan, J. (2004). Fraud hits small firms for 100 m € each year. Irish Examiner, 3 July, sec. A, p. 1.
Myers, M. (1980). Predicting the behavior of law: A test of two models. Law & Society Review, 14, 835–857.
O’Donnell, J., & Willing, R. (2003). Prison time gets harder for white-collar crooks. USA Today, 12 May, sec. B, p. 1.
Passas, N. (2001). False accounts: Why do company statements often offer a true and fair view of reality? European Journal of Criminal Policy & Research, 9, 117–135.
Paternoster, R., & Simpson, S. S. (1996). Sanction threats and appeals to morality: Testing a rational choice model of corporate crime. Law & Society Review, 30, 549–584.
Peterson, J. (2004). White-collar prison terms under debate. Los Angeles Times, 11 July, sec. C, p. 1.
Reisig, M. D. (1998). Rates of disorder in higher-custody state prisons: A comparative analysis of managerial practices. Crime & Delinquency, 44, 229–244.
Reisig, M. D., & Holtfreter, K. (2007). Fraud victimization and confidence in Florida’s legal authorities. Journal of Financial Crime, 14, 113–126.
Reisig, M. D., McCluskey, J. D., Mastrofski, S. D., & Terrill, W. (2004). Suspect disrespect toward the police. Justice Quarterly, 21, 241–268.
Reiss Jr., A. J. (1984). Selecting strategies of social control over organizational life. In K. Hawkins, & J. M. Thomas (Eds.), Enforcing regulation (pp. 23–36). Boston, MA: Kluwer-Nijhoff.
Report to the Nation. (2006). Austin, TX: Association of Certified Fraud Examiners.
Robin, G. R. (1970). The corporate and judicial disposition of employee thieves. In E. O. Smigel, & H. L. Ross (Eds.), Crimes against bureaucracy. New York, NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
Sanders, J., Yuasa, T., & Hamilton, V. L. (1998). The institutionalization of sanctions for wrongdoing inside organizations: Public judgments in Japan, Russia, and the United States. Law & Society Review, 32, 871–930.
Sarbanes–Oxley Act. (2002). Public Law 107-204, 116 Statute 745.
Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in administration. New York, NY: Harper and Row.
Shapira, Z. (1995). Risk taking: A managerial perspective. New York, NY: Russell Sage.
Shapiro, S. P. (1990). Collaring the crime, not the criminal: Reconsidering the concept of white-collar crime. American Sociological Review, 55, 346–365.
Shapiro, S. P. (1985). The road not taken: The elusive path to criminal prosecution for white-collar offenders. Law & Society Review, 19, 179–217.
Shover, N., & Hochstetler, A. (2006). Choosing white-collar crime. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Simon, H. (1976). Administrative behavior: A study of decision-making processes in administrative organization (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Free.
Simpson, S. S. (2002). Corporate crime, law and social control. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Simpson, S. S., & Piquero, N. L. (2002). Low self-control, organizational theory, and corporate crime. Law & Society Review, 36, 509–547.
Spohn, C., & Holleran, D. (2000). The imprisonment penalty paid by young, unemployed black and Hispanic male offenders. Criminology, 38, 281–306.
Spohn, C., & Spears, J. (1996). The effect of offender and victim characteristics on sexual assault case processing decisions. Justice Quarterly, 13, 649–679.
Stone, C. D. (1975). Where the law ends: The social control of corporate behavior. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Steffensmeier, D., & Demuth, S. (2006). Does gender modify the effects of race-ethnicity on criminal sanctioning? Sentences for male and female white, black, and Hispanic defendants. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 22, 241–261.
Steffensmeier, D., & Demuth, S. (2000). Ethnicity and judges’ sentencing decisions: Hispanic–Black–White comparisons. Criminology, 39, 145–178.
Steffensmeier, D., Ulmer, J., & Kramer, J. (1998). The interaction of race, gender, and age in criminal sentencing: The punishment costs of being young, black, and male. Criminology, 36, 763–798.
Suchman, M. C., & Edelman, L. B. (1997). Legal rational myths: The new institutionalism and the law and society tradition. Law & Social Inquiry, 21, 903–941.
Sutherland, E. H. (1949). White-collar crime. New York, NY: Dryden.
Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organizations in action. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Tillman, R., Calavita, K., & Pontell, H. N. (1997). Criminalizing white-collar misconduct: Determinants of prosecution in savings and loan fraud cases. Crime, Law & Social Change, 26, 53–76.
Titus, R. M., Heinzelman, F., & Boyle, J. M. (1995). Victimization of persons by fraud. Crime & Delinquency, 41, 54–72.
Tonry, M., & Reiss, A. J. (1993). Beyond the law: Crime in complex organizations. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. (2003). U.S. Federal white-collar crime referrals for prosecution and prosecutions, 1987–2003 per 100 million. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University.
Traub, S. H. (1996). Battling employee crime: A review of corporate strategies and programs. Crime & Delinquency, 42, 244–256.
Tyler, T. (1990). Why people obey the law. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Uggen, C., & Kruttschnitt, C. (1998). Crime in the breaking: Gender differences in desistance. Law & Society Review, 32, 339–366.
Vaughan, D. (2002). Criminology and the sociology of organizations: Analogy, comparative social organization, and general theory. Crime, Law & Social Change, 37, 117–136.
Vaughan, D. (2001). Sensational cases, flawed theories. In H. N. Pontell, & D. Shichor (Eds.), Contemporary issues in crime and criminal justice: Essays in honor of Gilbert Geis (pp. 45–66). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Vaughan, D. (1998). Rational choice, situated action, and the social control of organizations. Law & Society Review, 32, 23–61.
Vaughan, D., & Carlo, G. (1975). The appliance repairman: A study of victim responsiveness and fraud. Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, 12, 153–161.
Walsh, J. P., & Seward, J. K. (1990). On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control mechanisms. Academy of Management Review, 15, 421–458.
Weber, M. (1946). From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. Translated, edited and introduction by H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.
Weisburd, D., Waring, E., & Chayet, E. (1995). Specific deterrence in a sample of offenders convicted of white-collar crimes. Crime & Delinquency, 36, 342–355.
Weisburd, D., Waring, E., & Chayet, E. (1990). White-collar crime and criminal careers: Some preliminary findings. Criminology, 33, 587–598.
Weisburd, D., Waring, E., & Wheeler, S. (1990). Class, status, and the punishment of white-collar criminals. Law & Social Inquiry, 15, 223–243.
Welsh, S., Dawson, M., & Nierobisz, A. (2002). Legal factors, extralegal factors, or changes in the law? Using criminal justice research to understand the resolution of sexual harassment complaints. Social Problems, 49, 605–623.
Wheeler, S., & Rothman, M. L. (1982). The organization as weapon in white-collar crime. Michigan Law Review, 80, 1403–1426.
Wheeler, S., Weisburd, N., & Bode, N. (1982). Sentencing the white-collar offender: Rhetoric and reality. American Sociological Review, 47, 641–659.
Yeager, P. C. (1987). Structural bias in regulatory law enforcement: The case of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Social Problems, 34, 330–344.
Zatz, M. S. (1987). The changing forms of racial/ethnic biases in sentencing. Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, 24, 69–92.
Zemans, F. K. (1983). Legal mobilization: The neglected role of the law in the political system. American Political Science Review, 77, 690–703.
Zemans, F. K. (1982). Framework for analysis of legal mobilization: A decision-making model. Law & Social Inquiry, 7, 989–1071.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Mike Reisig, Dan Mears, Travis Pratt, and Merry Morash for their comments on previous drafts.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix
Appendix
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Holtfreter, K. The effects of legal and extra-legal characteristics on organizational victim decision-making. Crime Law Soc Change 50, 307–330 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-008-9139-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-008-9139-z