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Social context of crime control: a time-series analysis of the Korean case, 1973–2002

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Abstract

Regardless of recent attempts to explain crime control in relation to its social structural conditions, few studies have assessed the economic, organizational, and political context of crime control simultaneously. This study integrated these three contexts into a single project to test the relevance of social structural explanations on major crime control practices over the past three decades in South Korea. By using a variety of official statistics, time-series regressions were used. The level of crime consistently explained most variation in the arrest rates for all four categories of crimes. Prosecutions also seemed to be closely responsive to the level of crime. However, the link between crime and incarceration rates was not found for all categories of crimes. This finding indicates that levels of incarceration could be determined by external factors such as the economic conditions, organizational capacity, and political climates. In addition, economic conditions, which were measured by the unemployment rate, appeared to have a strong relationship to all crime control practices; it was positively and statistically significant for arrest, prosecution and incarceration rates. Political repression was inversely related to all three practices. However, organizational capacity only seemed to affect incarceration rates. Failure or inconsistencies of some of the social contexts in explaining crime control practice in South Korea can be assessed in both methodological and substantive grounds. This underscores the need to develop more solid theoretical arguments and empirical measures for their roles in crime control.

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Notes

  1. Chiricos [15, p.195] explains that a possibility for these discrepancies may be less aggregation bias at the lower levels of aggregation because national level data may cancel out substantial sources of regional variations necessary to assess the relationship. The linkage between economic condition and crime control also varied with the type of crimes. This apparent lack of consistency inevitably leads one to wonder why it is so.

  2. “A punitive vocabulary of motives” [45] and “discourse of moral panics” [5, 16] were said to mediate the process under which economic changes are linked to the production of more punitive crime control.

  3. First, crime rates cannot explain the number of cases dismissed or dropped in the process. For example, the prosecutor’s caseload is not the same as the police’s or the court’s. Each stage has a different number of cases requiring action. Second, crime rates do not incorporate the capacity of each sub-system. They implicitly presume that each sub-unit has the same resources. Police caseload is a function of the number of officers assigned to the crime control unit. Likewise, the prosecutor caseload is affected by the capacity of the prosecutorial system.

  4. They expect that in one year after a presidential election, incarcerations should increase as law and order initiations proposed in the presidential campaign come into effect. Included in the analysis were the liberal or conservative characteristics of government, the year of presidential elections, and the percentage of people who identify themselves as Republicans.

  5. Marion [43] traced criminal justice policies across several U.S. administrations since President Kennedy. Despite some overlap, the tendency has been that crime control policies under Democratic administrations sought to ease the social conditions conducive to crime and focused more on rehabilitation and treatment than on retribution and punishment. On the other hand, when Republicans stepped into office the rhetoric of tougher crime control became dominant, resulting in more funding for law enforcement, the addition of more crime control personnel, and more punitive legal reforms. This tendency seems to also characterize crime control policy in England. Conservative governments created a more punitive rhetoric, increased expenditures for crime control, and imposed more severe punishments on criminals [6].

  6. See [13, 36, 37] for unemployment rate. See [13, 25, 33, 39, 4749, 60] for economic inequality. Also see [75] for both unemployment rate and economic inequality.

  7. The Analytical Report on Crime is the most comprehensive compilation of data on the commission of crime, police activity, and the dispositions of public prosecutors.

  8. Workload measures include criminal offenses and offenders that were subject to the Penal Code and offenses that were regulated by various special laws that also required criminal proceedings.

  9. This source contains information about year-round events within the judiciary and its organizational structure, as well as statistics of criminal and civil trials. Unlike quarterly data on crimes, arrests and prosecutions, statistics on convictions and incarcerations exist in the form of annual data.

  10. Included among property crimes are larceny-theft, stolen property, fraud, embezzlement, breach of trust, and destruction of property. The first violent crime category includes homicide, robbery, arson, rape, assault, bodily harm, intimidation and kidnapping, and illegal confinement as prescribed in the Criminal Code. In line with offenses that violate special laws, the second violent crime category consists of violations of the Act concerning Punishment for Violent Acts, etc. (APVA crime). The APVA crime can be defined as ‘minor’ violence in the sense that it does not include serious violent crimes such as homicide, robbery and rape. The APVA crime largely regulates the use of physical violence (simple assault and bodily harm) or threats to use violence (intimidation, extortion and illegal confinement). This offense, along with the crime of larceny-theft, is the most frequently committed crime in South Korea. Preliminary analysis revealed that there are considerable differences between violent crimes listed under the Criminal Code and APVA crimes. For this reason, the two categories were analyzed separately.

  11. The total number of prosecutions is the sum of the cases for which public prosecutors recommend summary and formal trial proceedings.

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Joo, HJ., Yoon, OK. Social context of crime control: a time-series analysis of the Korean case, 1973–2002. Crime Law Soc Change 50, 375–394 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-008-9102-z

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