Abstract
This paper examines the role of the target-based responsibility system for building upright Party style and clean government in combating corruption in local China. It argues that the effectiveness of the target-based responsibility system in corruption control is compromised by a number of implementation hurdles in practice. Based on a close examination of one county, Shaanxi Province in the northwest China, this study shows that low measurability of the targets, the conflict between anti-corruption work and other evaluation targets, and the impact of patronage politics account for the implementation failure of the target-based responsibility system. The fundamental problem lies in that under China’s unified cadre personnel management system, political will can interfere with the handling of corruption on a case-by-case basis, no matter what kind of anti-corruption mechanism is employed. Under this context, the adoption of the target-based responsibility system in fighting corruption results in nothing more than “pouring old wine into new bottles.”
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In 1998, the procuratorates filed 35,084 cases of dereliction of duty, bribe-taking, graft, and embezzlement. In 1999, the number increased to 38,382, a 9.4% increase. In 2001, the number rose again, to 83,685, a 118% increase over the 1999 figure. See Work Report of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001. Available at: http://www.spp.gov.cn/site2006/region/00018.html. Retrieved date: 25 August 2007.
Work Report of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 [16].
For example, in the performance contract signed between the Forestry Bureau and the County Government in 1991, Party style and anti-corruption work were measured by the extent to which officials had resolutely prevented abuses of power, adhered to the “four modernization” standards in making personnel decisions, effectively supervised the wood trade, kept and carried forward the tradition of hard working and plain living, and not used wood for private gain [28].
Interview in Zhouzhi County, Xi’an City, of a section-level leading cadre in the agricultural bureau, August 2007.
Interviews in Zhouzhi County, Xi’an City, of section-level leading cadres on the discipline inspection commission, August 2007.
These targets were specifically designed to fight against corruption that might directly result from the officials’ dereliction of duty, such as the illegal use by leading cadres of public funds for feasts, travel, and high-cost entertainment; the misuse of public power for private gains in the state-owned enterprise reforms; and the inappropriate allocation of budget funds.
These targets were stipulated to build upright Party style and clean government work in economic affairs, such as improving the laws and regulations on bidding and tendering for key construction projects, improving the county’s investment environment, and monitoring the regulations against extravagance and waste.
Article 44 of the Constitution of the CCP stipulates: “The discipline inspection commissions at all levels shall frequently provide education for Party members on their duty to observe Party discipline and adopt decisions for the upholding of Party discipline.” The efforts by Chinese authorities to reinforce the integrity of cadres’ thinking through moral education is also evident in other documents: in 1979 the Fifth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee passed Several Principles on Intra-Party Political Life, which asserted that adhering to the Party’s political lines and ideology was the most fundamental principle of a cadre’s political life. In 1990, the CDIC promulgated The Opinion on Strengthening Building of Party Style and Clean Government, which stressed the importance of moral education in anti-corruption work. In 1994 the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, together with the Supervision Department, produced The Outline on Party Style and Anti-corruption Education Work, which stipulated that anti-corruption agencies at all levels must take moral education as a main task in fighting corruption.
[15]. Concrete opinions on task division of implementing the system of preventing corruption by education, institution building and supervision. Internal document.
Dong Lei. Building the warning and admonishing defense line, and improving the supervision prevention mechanism. Discipline Inspection and Supervision in China, 2 December 2003.
Shaanxi Provincial Discipline Inspection Commission and Shaanxi Supervision Department (2003). Strengthening the supervision mechanism, and actively exploring the building of warning and admonishing defense line on fighting corruption. Internal report.
Wei Jianxing (12 January 2000). Strengthen the faith, strengthen the magnitude, and deepen the building of Party style and fight against corruption. (Report at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission). Avalable at: http://big5.china.com.cn/ch-fanfu/jucuo/jucuo1-9.htm. Retrieved date: 30 August 2007.
Interview with a section-level leading cadre in the Finance Bureau of Zhouzhi County, Xi’an City, August 2007.
Interview with a deputy section-level cadre in the Local Tax Bureau of Zhouzhi County, Xi’an City, August 2007.
[14]. The Report on the Fulfillment of the Target-based Responsibility System on Construction of Party Style and Clean Government in Pingliang City in 2005. Available at: http://www.pingliang.gov.cn/PingLiangWebSite/suborganization/document_information_detail.jsp?orgId=16&i_DocId=1558&styleCSS=1&tag=WJZL. Retrieved date: 5 August 2007.
While some localities, such as Yanta District of Xi’an City also made anti-corruption work a target that negates all others, it is not a widespread phenomenon in Shaanxi local governments.
The Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China, 16 March 2006, http://www.xinhuanet.com; Retrieved date: 2 September 2007.
The Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of Shaanxi Province, 22 Jan 2006, http://www.shaanxi.gov.cn; The Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of Xi’an Municipal, 19 Feb 2006, http://www.xa.gov.cn. Retrieved date: 2 September 2007.
The Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of Zhouzhi County, 16 March 2006, http://www.zhouzhi.gov.cn/Html/zzgk/fzgh/115gh/index.htm. Retrieved date: 3 September 2007.
Source: http://forum.xinhuanet.com/detail.jsp?id=36274987&agMode=1. Retrieved date: 29 August 2007.
Source: http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/6243004.html. Retrieved date: 3 September 2007.
It was reported that from October 1993 o February 2002, Ma De took advantage of his position to seek gains for others after receiving bribes. However, his corrupt behavior did not stop his career advancement. During this period of time, he was promoted from the Party Secretary to the Suihua City, Heilongjiang Province, to the prefectural commissioner of Suihua area, then to the deputy mayor of Mudanjiang City, Heilongjiang Province. Ma’s case indicated that corrupt cadres could still be promoted to higher positions if the Party Organization Department decided to do so. Source http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/English/doc/2005-07/28/content-464300.htm. Retrieved date: 10 September 2007.
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Chan, H.S., Gao, J. Old wine in new bottles: a county-level case study of anti-corruption reform in the People’s Republic of China. Crime Law Soc Change 49, 97–117 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-007-9096-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-007-9096-y