Abstract
We examine 17 preferential ballot voting methods using three criteria: (1) mathematical properties, (2) game-theoretic considerations, and (3) practical real-world outcomes. The challenge of comparing and contrasting the real-world outcomes of different voting methods is the sheer number of possible elections that can exist. We combat this challenge by introducing a new way of visualizing outcomes in what we dub a “DNA sequence” for each voting method.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
“Later no Harm” describes the case when endorsing candidates other than one’s favorite will not hurt one’s favorite candidate later in the election; “Favorite Betrayal” is the practice of voting for a candidate other than one’s favorite because the latter is perceived to not have a realistic chance of winning.
The “Domination Paradox” is the case when the majority-preferred candidate is nevertheless less passionately preferred by that majority than is a minority candidate by their supporters.
References
Brams, S. J., & Nagel, J. H. (1991). Approval voting in practice. Public Choice, 71(1), 1–17.
Duverger, M. (1959). Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state. Metheun & Co. Ltd.
Green-Armytage, J., Nicolaus, T. T., & Cosman, R. (2016). Statistical evaluation of voting rules. Social choice and welfare, 46(1), 183–212.
Nicolaus TT., & Plassmann, F. (2010) The structure of the election-generating universe.
Nicolaus Tideman, T. (1987). Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 4(3), 185–206.
Schulze, M. (2003). A new monotonic and clone-independent single-winner election method. Voting matters, 17(1), 9–19.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Contributions
HLB and ABA wrote the main manuscript text and both authors reviewed the manuscript.
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
The authors declare no competing interests
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Aazami, A.B., Bray, H.L. Classification of preferential ballot voting methods. Const Polit Econ 34, 510–523 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09384-8
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09384-8