Abstract
This article argues that the widely accepted principle of universal suffrage actually implies endowing children with voting power. The fact that children lack political maturity does not necessarily lead us to the conclusion that they should not have the right to vote. Parents, at least in principle, can act as their electoral custodians. The idea of letting parents vote on behalf of their children, however, raises one important question: are parents in fact able to make a genuine voting decision for their children, independently from their own decision, or will children’s suffrage just lead to a multiplication of parental choices?
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Notes
In this text, we refer to a number of German articles. This is because in 2003 and 2004, a notable discussion took place in Germany concerning the implementation of a children’s votes system at federal level. In 2003, a group of 47 MPs from all political parties present in the National Parliament suggested such a reform (Arndt-Brauer et al. 2003). The main arguments were that children’s votes, to be exercised by the parents, would strengthen the position of families, which currently are (financially) discriminated against in the political system (ibid.). The proposal was voted down in 2004 by an all-party majority which argued that children’s right to vote would de facto mean a plural vote for their parents, which is incompatible with the German electoral system of equal voting power and hence with the basic principles of democracy (Das Parlament 2004).
Only if people had (a) identical interests or were (b) perfect altruists, it would not matter how large the electorate is: a simple fraction of the total population would do. Case (a) is more a philosophical figure used e.g. by Rousseau (1762/1988) or in Rawls’s (1971) Veil of Ignorance. It produces interesting insights, but no-one would agree that this is an adequate model describing how people decide in an election. Concerning case (b), Mueller (2003) finds evidence for a certain degree of “ethical voting preferences” at the ballot box. Still, people are driven largely by pure self-interest. So overall, the ideal of pure “republican representation” of more homogeneous interests appears incompatible with modern pluralistic societies.
As is well-known, Vanberg developed his ideas on constitutional economics and citizens’ cooperation in numerous articles, see e.g. Vanberg (2011). We refer to this specific text written in German, because there Vanberg clarifies his ideas on “intergenerational justice” most precisely, which are specifically related to the ideas of the right to vote for children.
As such, one can imagine endowing fetuses with the right to vote. But as soon as one suggests voting rights for an unborn child, he or she must tackle the question of from what point on do we speak of human life, where the possible range starts at conception and ends at actual birth. One solution could be that fetuses receive the right to vote once they are too old to be legally aborted according to national legislation. But this is a separate discussion calling for political decision of its own.
At a presentation of this paper during the 2011 European Public Choice Society’s conference on April 28, 2011, Roger Congleton objected to the argument according to which children must have the right to vote in a democratic society. For him, there is a stark difference between historical suffrage extension to include slaves, women, ethnic groups etc. into the electorate and the inclusion of children. Congleton highlights that e.g. for women and blacks, societal consensus changed towards considering them full citizens just like anyone else. Consequently, they had to be endowed with basic civil rights like the one to vote. For children, the case is different according to Congleton: they are immature, hence cannot be included in the same way as slaves or women via a new definition of the ‘citizenry’. Such a ‘simple’ extension would not heal the problem of immaturity; therefore it is legitimate to limit their rights. At this point, we would rather follow Vanberg’s viewpoint expressed at the very same conference: children are citizens as well, hence must be entitled with full citizens’ rights.
In principle, the proxy approach could also be used to give mentally impaired adults a say in elections. The respective legal custodian would then have to cast a vote on behalf of the mentally disabled ward. In this case, very similar problems arise as for very young children, especially how far a custodian is able to decide on behalf of the represented person (see Lopez-Guerra 2012). Consequently, the theoretical and empirical investigation of voting rights for minors may also contribute to the discussion of proxy votes for mentally impaired.
Recently, several children challenged Germany’s voting age limit at the Constitutional Court, forming exactly such a minors’ emancipation group (Der Spiegel 2014).
For the case of a child not being a citizen because its parents are not citizens either, first the problem of integrating non-citizens must be solved. If a society grants voting rights to non-citizens, the “voting rights for children” would imply that also non-citizen children receive the right to vote, respectively execute by their parents. Despite that this case might occur in principle, we do not that such problems are an argument against voting rights for children who are citizens of a country. As argued in Sect. 2.4, the non-representation of one marginalized group does not legitimize the ongoing marginalization of another group by depriving its members of a basic right.
Munn even argues that political decision making is less complex than understanding criminal acts. This view seems a bit extreme to us, but we agree with him when he says that, as such, political issues are not too complex to grasp for the under-aged. Being held responsible for a criminal act at age 10 implies that the actor has an understanding of why the act was wrong. This means that if a child commits a crime, then they are expected to understand a somewhat complex line of moral argumentation and are considered rational enough to make a reflected decision on whether to act illegally or not. Indeed, as Munn argues, there is enough evidence from child psychology to support this practice. Lopez-Guerra (2012) argues similarly.
Drawing from psychological findings, Munn expects the shift to becoming a responsible citizen to occur at around the age of 11–13 (thus arguing for the automatic right to vote at age 14), since this is the crucial period of individual development—not the rather late age of 18 (ibid., p. 155).
In order to prevent abuse (see Sect. 4.1), one might even consider that for each voting decision, a parent has to re-enter the ballot booth. If this proves too complicated, the alternative is that a parent casts one vote for herself, and then, half a vote per child, each one on a separate ballot slip.
Following Tremmel (2009), one can consider these tools as able to address both problems of temporal and intertemporal intergenerational justice: For example, public debt does have an effect on the living conditions of the currently young, as well as on future individuals, at least within a certain time frame.
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We are very thankful for comments from Roger Congleton and anonymous referees who helped us to substantially improve this article.
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Wolf, S., Goldschmidt, N. & Petersen, T. Votes on behalf of children: a legitimate way of giving them a voice in politics?. Const Polit Econ 26, 356–374 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-015-9190-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-015-9190-6