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Federalism and exit costs

A comment on: C. Mantzavinos, federalism and individual liberty

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Fig. 1

Notes

  1. See for this discussion Hausman and McPherson (1993, pp. 693ff.).

  2. Even though Mantzavinos (2010) argues in the dimension of rights, his actual concept is in terms of benefits, which is necessary in order to compare it with his concept of costs later on in the manuscript.

  3. Because the m individuals are assumed to be uniformly distributed on the political scale between ‘0’ and ‘1’, we can restrict ourselves to rational numbers. For every rational number k/m the increase from m to m + 1 will lead to an increase of the utility loss, because of

    \( {\frac{k}{m + 1}} < \frac{k}{m} < {\frac{k + 1}{m + 1}} \).

  4. When discussing problems of mobility (Sect. 8), Mantzavinos ( 2010 ) takes only adjustment costs into account but not the full costs of changing location.

References

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Correspondence to Gebhard Kirchgässner.

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Kirchgässner, G., Schelker, M. Federalism and exit costs. Const Polit Econ 22, 191–197 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-010-9100-x

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