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Informal accountability, credible actions, and democratization in Taiwan

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Abstract

How does informal government accountability relate to democratization? In this paper, we use multiple methodologies to show the relation between informal government accountability and democratization in Taiwan. Three results are relevant: First, a game-theoretic model reveals that both informal government accountability and formal democratization are pursued when economic conditions are weak to improve support for the government and extract political concessions for citizens. In particular, the game-theoretic model depicts informal accountability and democratization as outcomes from strategic interaction between the government and citizens where the timing of their preferences and credibility motivate the outcomes. Second, the descriptive studies and statistical analyses corroborate that informal government accountability and democratization occur when economic performance is weak; they also show that informal government accountability is precursory to the democratization process in Taiwan. Third, the evidence supports that informal government accountability leads to formal democratization when political tenure is jeopardized if the constituency-base is not expanded. The findings provide for a predictive model of political development that specifies how informal government accountability feasibly leads to democratization in Taiwan.

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Notes

  1. Data for this project will be made available at a public archive. Data availability constrains the start and end dates. For instance, the Freedom House index begins in 1973.

  2. In particular, the tipping phenomena points out that players often choose on the basis of how many others have groups are already made similar choices. See Moore (1995).

  3. Studies show that even authoritarian governments rely on support from non-government constituencies. See Ames (1987), and Bates (1981) for discussions.

  4. The conclusion that better payoffs are achieved through groups that unite is derived from game forms such as prisoner’s dilemma, battle of the sexes, the stag hunt and pure coordination. See Osborne (2004), and also elaborations in Calvert (1995) and Weingast (1997).

  5. See Weingast (1997) and Calvert (1995) for the effects of shirking and free-ridership.

  6. Those who support scaled-indices contend that democratization is a progression through a process that is best captured on a scale; however, a growing literature shows that even scaled-indices are single summary indicators that are ultimately “blunt” and not rigorous. See Persson and Tabellini 2006: 1.

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Acknowledgments

A previous version of this paper was presented at the conference, “Taiwan, China and Democratization in East Asia: An International Symposium,” September 29–September 30, 2007, at the Missouri State University. The author gratefully acknowledges comments and suggestions from Alan Hamlin, Dennis Hickey, the anonymous reviewers and participants at the conference. The responsibility for all errors remains with the author.

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Correspondence to O. Fiona Yap.

Appendix 1

Appendix 1

See Table 2.

Table 2 Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables

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Yap, O.F. Informal accountability, credible actions, and democratization in Taiwan. Const Polit Econ 22, 103–121 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-010-9098-0

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