Riker and Federalism

Abstract

Forty years since its publication, William Riker’s Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (1964) remains one of the most influential volumes on the politics of federalism. However, in assessing Riker’s federal theory, scholars tend to focus on the specific hypotheses, the famous claim that the “military threat” constitutes a necessary condition for federal success, and upon rejecting the validity of that claim, by association, quickly dismiss the general theoretical argument. But Riker’s federal theory does much more for our understanding of federalism as a form of government than simply connect, rightly or not, federal success with the presence of a military threat. In the paper I argue that the most innovative feature of Riker’s analysis, defining for his contribution to the field and accountable for the emergence of new and original insights was the successful application for the first time of the principle of methodological individualism to institutional and constitutional analysis. Riker’s theory of federalism, when viewed in the context of his intellectual contribution to the studies of democratic institutions, is, indeed, the original point of departure. In the paper, I review Riker’s theory of federalism as embedded in and an integral part of his broader theory of democratic institutions, in order to highlight some of its merits that remained underappreciated until current research has generated the conceptual framework consistent with Riker’s insights. Second, I draw some implications from Riker’s theory for the contemporary challenges of federal constitutional design.