1 Introduction

The Arctic is one of the key regions in relation to global climate change, experiencing radical transformations in environmental governance as well as challenges in terms of its ecological protection.Footnote 1 The region is witnessing a number of irreversible climatical shifts, such as melting permafrost, rising sea levels, contamination of the Global Ocean, and changes in biodiversity and in the lives of indigenous people (see Lavelle 2022; Orttung ed. 2017; Hanaček and Martinez-Alier 2022; Martínez-Alier with Hanaček 2023). The Arctic is a home to several EU states (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, and Greenland), the US, Canada, and Russia (the later with the largest landmass in the Arctic). Martínez-Alier with Hanaček point out that the “environment of the Arctic is changing because of climate change (ice melting, methane released from the tundra) and, related to this, increasing controversial investments in oil and gas extraction, copper, nickel, iron ore and coal mining, aquaculture and hydroelectricity, and even wind energy” (2023, p. 132). Not only the Arctic is attractive for exploitation of natural resources but also for potential commercial routes (Liu 2017). These economic, military, security, and commercial benefits distract some of the actors (e.g., businesses, some policy-makers) away from sustainable development in the Arctic.Footnote 2

Arguably, the Arctic is a global hot spot in climate change where international cooperation (scientific, environmental, diplomatic, etc.) should be a priority to overcome existing ecological challenges. The topic collection (TC) targets the existing challenges and ongoing changes in the Arctic from cross-disciplinary perspectives, bringing insights from economics, history, anthropology, international relations, political science, and philosophy, buttressed by deep knowledge of area-studies on the part of contributors.

The “environmental governance” approach seems to be the most suitable for analysis of the complexities, co-existence, and contradictions of institutions, policies, actors, and socio-economic, security, biological, and ecological processes in the Arctic. A focus on governance encompasses analysis of the values, principles, laws, norms, practices, and policies on the management of environmental challenges. The Arctic contains a selection of heterogeneous actors, many of whom have contradictory rules, norms, and priorities. The actors involved in regional governance include cross-border geographic regions, international organizations (e.g., well-known actors like the EU, EBRD, NATO, and the Arctic Council (AC), but also less studied ones such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)), business and NGOs, indigenous people, epistemic groups, and local communities.

Analysis of the Arctic through the lens of environmental governance aspires to bring about new insights into the complexity of existing challenges and their potential solutions. To this end, the current article proceeds as follows. The next section delves into the concept of “regional environmental governance” (REG) and “Arctic Environmental Governance” (AEG). It then places the eight articles in this TC in the context of the scientific debate on the Arctic and highlights their individual contributions to the debate. It concludes with an overview of the major challenges and a research agenda.

2 Regional environmental governance and the Arctic

A number of studies have highlighted the importance of historical and institutional legacies, scientific knowledge, alignments, and coalitions, as well as the engagement of non-state actors in climate governance (Allan et al. 2023; Held and Roger 2018). Regional governance is understood here as a process involving multiple actors across multiple levels– global, national, subnational, regional, and local (Börzel 2016; p. 53). With a focus on heterogeneous actors and processes, the studies of regional governance are interdisciplinary in nature. Governance is analyzed in terms of economics, political science, history, sociology, legal studies, and anthropology. The governance approach is well suited to understanding environmental challenges and their solutions, which involve all types of actors and actions, from institutional governmental ones (national, international, or global) to local population and public behavior (environmental movements, protests, mobilization around environmental conflicts, etc.). With the increasing use of social media, this informal non-institutional component in environmental governance is becoming more substantial and influential, interacting with and/or contradicting formal institutions (Ambrosio et al. 2022; Hendriks et al. 2016; Hodges and Stocking 2016). Moreover, formal institutions (even those aimed at environmental protection) are slow to change and there is always some time-lag between the emergence of a challenge and the implementation of policies aimed at solving it (Underland 2010). In contrast, informal social networks are dynamic and efficient in mobilizing society should it be needed (especially in the context of environmental conflicts and prevention of environmental damages). Thus, studies on environmental governance started investigating the power of social media and its potential effects in terms of the efficiency of governance, among other issues (Hall et al. 2022; Hendriks et al. 2016; Hodges and Stocking 2016).

The political regimes of nation-states are closely connected to environmental governance (see Mavisakalyan et al. 2023 in this TC; Nazarov and Obydenkova 2022). Traditionally, democracies are known for vivid and dynamic civil society, transparency of information, freedom of information, and independent mass media and social media, among other factors. Democracy allows people to be well informed about environmental issues, leading to an active public attitude toward environmental protection (e.g., protests, movements, valuable electoral choices). Therefore, it is not surprising there is growing attentions to the analysis policy discourse, news, social and mass media in the studies on environmental governance (Gehrke 2014; Dubuisson 2022; Kochtcheeva 2022; Mišić and Obydenkova 2022; Korppoo 2022). Therefore, it is not a coincidence that regional environmental governance (REG) has been widely studied since the 1980s and 1990s, the decades described as “the golden years of regional environmental governance” (Haas 2016; p. 438) and the period of Post-Communist democratization.

Among the triggers of REG, public demand is a key variable for governmental response to environmental disasters (Haas 2016; p. 438). Public demand can only result from public awareness and the latter can appear as a consequence of access to information and transparency, that is, as an outcome of inclusiveness in global social networks and international institutions. Public demand emerges only under the conditions of freedom of mass media and freedom of public access to information (e.g., about environmental pollution). Collective action, civil society, epistemic communities, NGOs, public awareness, and public demand for governmental action have been crucial drivers in REG in general and in the Arctic in particular. All of these factors are missing in a non-democratic polity. Manipulated mass media and digital control prevent the wider public at national (and international) level from learning about unfolding environmental catastrophes such as, for example, oil spills into the rivers and seas, forest fires, deforestation, or air pollution. Those events are usually only visible for local communities (Demchuk et al. 2022). In a non-democratic context, there is a lack of accountability of local, regional, and national politicians to the people (supported by electoral fraud, corruption, and clientelism, among other factors). Thus, governance and political regimes are closely interlinked in their implications for sustainable development.

The next section will look into the actors most relevant to the AEG context, and will consider some of the theoretical and empirical challenges concerning heterogenous political contexts and regimes.

3 Actors of the AEG: contributions and debate

Environmental regional governance encompasses studies of nation-states and their respective formal regional international organizations (RIOs), in addition to formal and informal actors and processes (NGOs, environmental movements, social groups, international and national institutions, etc.). The large specter of environmental challenges and heterogeneity of actors (from RIOs to indigenous people and epistemic communities) in the Arctic requires this encompassing approach accommodated only within the governance focus. Eight articles in this TC focus on different aspects and actors involved in the AEG: RIOs, Arctic states, non-Arctic states, subnational regions, cross-border regions, epistemic communities, and indigenous people. Table 1 below summarizes the actors, values, and challenges discussed in this TC.

Table 1 Complexities of AEG: Actors and Challenges
Full size table

Contributions to this TC analyze various AEG actors and the challenges they face (e.g., indigenous groups, civil society, the cross-border natural park (Pasvik-Inari Trilateral Park) composed of regions in Finland, Norway, and Russia, etc.), regional organizations (e.g., the AC and the EAEU), nation-states (with a focus on the role of non-Arctic state involved in AEG), and subnational, municipal, and local regions (those located in the Arctic states, such as Norway, Russia, or Finland). The following pages provide an overview of the main insights of these studies according to three types of actor: RIOs, nation-states, and indigenous people.

3.1 Regional international organizations (RIOs)

Some of the most significant players in the AEG are RIOs composed of Arctic states (that is, states with landmass in the Arctic). However, some member-states and observer-states in these regional organizations might be non-Arctic states (e.g., Kazakhstan in the EAEU, China as observer in the AC, non-Arctic member-states of the EU). Hence, the role of actors in the Arctic is, by design, inclusive geographically as some regional organizations include non-Arctic actors (albeit actors capable of influencing the AEG to some extent through the organization). These organizations can contribute to pushing the environmental agenda in the Arctic, can balance and limit the pursuit of economic benefits in the region, as well as provide additional international forums and accountability on the part of the Arctic states vis-a-vis non-Arctic ones. For example, the EAEU includes only one Arctic state– Russia– but some of the non-Arctic member-states (e.g., Kazakhstan) are heavily affected by climate change and global warming (Dubuisson 2022; Poberezhskaya and Bychkova 2022).). Kazakhstan, along with other member-states, is interested in pushing the environmental agenda within the EAEU and contributing to the future of the Arctic.

Among various RIOs acting in the Arctic, the AC stands out as one of the most influential ones. Contributions to this TC look into the AC at the edge of geopolitical shifts in 2022 (Filimonova et al. 2023; Mavisakalyan et al. 2023; Stepanov et al. 2023). However, the main focus of existing studies has traditionally been on the AC’s member-states (Borozna 2024; Kochtcheeva 2022; Stepanov and Makarov 2022). This TC takes a step forward in re-considering other actors connected to the AC, such as observers like China and NGOs (Filimonova et al. 2023; Wang 2023). Compared to studies of the member-states of the AC, the role of observers, their motivations, intentions, and impacts remained less addressed. To compensate for this gap, one of the articles focuses specifically on the logic of acceptance and rejection of applications for the status of observer-states in the AC (Filimonova et al. 2023). It considers the case of China, as one of the newest observers in the AC, and the case of acceptance of NGOs as observers in the AC. The role of NGOs is highly important in environmental governance and in the Arctic. It is indicative that the number of NGOs accepted as observers to the AC increased from six in 1998 to 26 in 2019 (see Filimonova et al. 2023). On the other hand, the acceptance of China as a new observer to the AC also became the subject of debates. Filimonova with colleagues (2023) argue that acceptance of new observers in the AC depends on a number of factors, such as national capabilities, environmental concerns, the level of development of science and technology, search for a certain international status, and ongoing international environmental processes, in additional to other factors discussed in previous studies (e.g., geopolitical and economic interests).

Apart from the AC, which is the major regional international organization, there are a number of other regional organizations encompassing both Arctic and non-Arctic states. Given Russia is an Arctic state (with the largest landmass in the Arctic), all RIOs where Russia is a member-state or even a founder (leading state) have implications for the Arctic and play a role in AEG. Among such RIOs are the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), Eurasian Bank (EB), CIS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). These actors have been described as representing authoritarian regionalism (also referred to as non-democratic regional organizations (NDROs).Footnote 3 Studies of the sustainable development agenda of NDROs are nascent as this topic has only recently received academic attention (e.g., Hartwell 2022; 2023; Agostinis and Urdinez 2022).Footnote 4

Indeed, the role of all these international actors has not yet received sufficient attention in the studies of the Arctic. But they are important. These organizations are interconnected with other regional or non-regional international organizations and institutions (e.g., with the EU, EBRD, AC, UN, World Bank, or even NATO).Footnote 5 Depending on the geopolitical situation (that is, before 2022), the geographic overlap and interconnectivity of these organizations used to pave a way to improving inclusiveness in governance and diffusion of values of sustainable development as well as democratic diffusion (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Lankina 2016b, Simmons et al. 2006; Lavelle 2022).

In sum, the AC is definitely not the only RIO acting in the Arctic and influencing the environmental governance in this region. Yet these RIOs and their implications for the Arctic have barely been addressed in the studies of the Arctic. This TC fills this gap and expands the focus from Arctic states to the role of non-Arctic states (e.g., China) and to the role of under-studied regional international organizations (e.g., the EAEU) in the Arctic. Thus, in this TC, Hartwell analyzes the limitations and opportunities of the EAEU’s role in the Arctic’s environmental governance. The study also discusses the development of environmental values and policies within the EDB, underscoring the ongoing internal disputes within the Russia-led RIO. Overall, regional organizations (where Russia is a member-state) may well limit and monitor Russia’s priorities for economic and geopolitical benefits in the Arctic and beyond. Any RIO, and the EAEU in particular, may advance environmental goals within the organization and, thus, modify or balance the economic pursuits of one member-state.Footnote 6

3.2 Nation-states

The second group of actors in AEG is composed of nation-states. In this TC, Mavisakalyan et al. (2023) examine the role of the political regimes of the states (including Arctic states) in the implementation of environmental policies in the context of the Arctic region. Through the analysis of quantitative data available through the multi-dimensional index of environmental regulations in the OECD, the authors evaluate the level of democracy in the stringency of environmental policies employed by national-states in their analysis. They re-consider the nexus of democracy and environmental policy-making in and beyond the Arctic. Their overall finding implies that states with higher levels of freedom (that is, with higher levels of democracy) are associated with better environmental policies and protection compared to non-democracies. These findings support the insights of existing literature on the role of political regimes in environmental politics and sustainable development (Salahodjaev and Isaeva 2022; Poberezhskaya and Bychkova 2022).

Some studies in this TC take the Arctic states as case-studies. They delve into various dimensions of environmental governance in Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Russia at national but also at subnational and transnational levels (e.g., Pasvik-Inari Trilateral Park located across three Arctic states, or the case of Norrbotton– a region in northern Sweden). For example, Stepanov, Makarov, and Makarova (2023) examine climate change in the Russian Arctic. The article places emphasis on the economic importance of the region for the development of Russia. It employs a country-specific approach (exclusive approach) and calls for balancing environmental and economic goals in the region. The study focuses on dealing with the consequences of climate change. It calls attention to the importance for Russia of exploitation of new opportunities emerging in the aftermath of melting permafrost, the management of risks, and minimizing uncertainty, also in line with other studies on climate change policies in Russia beyond the Arctic (e.g., Stepanov and Makarov 2022). The study covers such important priorities as green growth, economic diversification, and the development of renewable energy, while accounting for indigenous people, local knowledge, and regional diversity.

The article points to exclusive role of the Arctic for Russia. It emphasizes economic importance of the region and Russia´s economic dependence on natural resources in the Arctic. The study mentions indigenous people a few times but does not specify the ways indigenous people must be integrated in policy-making in the Arctic. Mentioning indigenous people signals some acknowledgment of their existence and importance. The discourse of indigenous people and its importance in the Arctic was one of the key goals of the AC, which has been somewhat successful in promoting the values and norms of governance and an inclusive approach to governance (that is, taking into account the interests and priorities of all actors involved including the indigenous people (Lavelle 2022; Borozna 2024; Vladimirova 2024). Unfortunately, this perspective seems to have been fading away. Once Russia ‘broke free’ from membership in the AC, it has not been subject to the institutional mechanisms of accountability to the international community and institutions in regard to its actions in the Arctic, or to the institutional limits that were previously in place. Currently, indigenous people in Russia are more vulnerable than ever before (Vladimirova 2023, 2024; Martínez-Alier with Hanaček (2023).

Russia’s role in the AC was given significant attention in the literature even before the radical geopolitical shifts in 2022 triggered by the invasion into Ukraine. Since February 2022, the AC’s activities and functioning have been frozen. The AC used to limit institutionally (at least to some extent) Russia’s Arctic agenda, balancing its priorities of economic benefits (exploitation of natural resources) by imposing some values, norms, and policies against climate change. This trend used to spread well beyond exclusively Arctic governance confronting so-called “climate skepticism” of Russian political elite (e.g., Ashe and Poberezhskaya 2022). Such issues as the rights of the indigenous population have now lost meaning for Russian policy-makers at both subnational and national level.Footnote 7 Post-2022 studies on the changing role of Russia in the Arctic and Eurasia are still catching up with the analysis of radical geopolitical, military, and economic changes and their implications for sustainability (Schram Stokke 2024; Borozna 2024; Doose et al. 2023; Obydenkova 2022c, d; in this TC see Stepanov et al. 2023; Vladimirova 2023; Doose et al. 2023).

Studies on Russia and other Arctic states are abundant compared to literature dedicated to the role of non-Arctic states, such as China. We know relatively little about China’s involvement in the Arctic. This TC presents insights from Chinese perspectives on the Arctic, analyzing China’s goals, aspirations, and strategies in the region for the period 1990–2020 (Wang 2023). In contrast to the study on Russia’s role in the Arctic as exclusive, the study on China emphasizes the importance of an inclusive approach to AEG, referring to it as collaborative governance. It also points out the importance of not politicizing China’s involvement. The article argues for the positive impact of Chinese policies on the environment through, for example, the Yellow River Station established in 2003 by the Polar Research Institute of China in Norway. The Station focuses on a number of scientific studies of permafrost, research on the atmosphere, and monitoring of glaciers, among other scientific tasks.Footnote 8

Wang (2023) highlights the importance of global environmental values, which, by definition, imply an inclusive approach and joint international collaboration in search of solutions to challenges posed by climate change (addressing both its causes and consequences). The central argument is that the Arctic is a crucial place for global climate change and, thus, affects not only exclusively Arctic states but the planet as a whole. Thus, climate-related challenges emerging in the Arctic require global international efforts and joint international scientific collaboration. Wang (2023) points to the positive impact of China’s involvement in the Arctic on increasing its environmental policy stringency.

3.3 Indigenous people and transborder regions

A few contributions to this TC address the nexus of indigenous people and regions from various perspectives: national (e.g., a subnational region within one state, Sweden) and cross-national (a region across three states), as well as normative approaches (Garbis et al. 2023; Vladimirova 2023; Wood-Donnelly 2023). Subnational regions and indigenous people are important actors in Arctic governance. Yet, depending on the political regime of a state, the status, impact, and the role of indigenous peoples on governance changes. Within democracies, indigenous peoples appeal to international institutions. For example, Martínez-Alier with Hanaček (2023, p. 132) states that “Pastoralists and other Indigenous peoples try to use international legislation (such as the International Labour Organization Convention 169, ratified by only some states) to protect their livelihoods”. However, in the case of non-democracies and in the context of political isolation of a state, international legislation has little meaning, if any.

In this TC, a few contributions investigate indigenous people and the challenges they face in the Arctic. Garbis, McCarthy, and Orttung (2023) examine the region of Norrbotten in Sweden. The article investigates links, coalitions, and conflicts among all actors involved in regional governance in Norrbotten, including government, industries, and indigenous people (Sámis).

Sámis are spread across the borders of four countries– Finland, Russia (Kola Peninsula), Sweden, and Norway. The article focuses on the case of Sweden exclusively and provides insights into the role of indigenous people in this specific (democratic) state, which is convenient to contrast with indigenous people located in Russia (as detailed in the next contribution by Vladimirova). Garbis, McCarthy, and Orttung (2023) focus on the challenges of the “green transition” (the pursuit of a low-carbon society) in Sweden, where the Norrbotten region plays a significant role due to its natural resources. According to an OECD report, Norrbotten’s economic development depends on the mining that constitutes around 90% of the iron production of Europe (OECD 2021).Footnote 9 The region witnessed a conflict between the development of extractive industries and indigenous people’s preferences for the land use, focused on reindeer herding, fishing, and sheep herding. These activities and lifestyle of Sámis are inevitably affected by mining and extractive industries, and addressed as the main focus by contributors to this TC. Importantly, the needs and rights of Sámis have long been a main focus of scholars, scientists, and policy-makers in Sweden (unlike in case of indigenous people in Russia, where their local needs and conflicts are invisible, and do not reach a wider public– be that national or international– due to simple ignorance of the matter on the part of regional and national policy-makers). In contrast, in Sweden, where there is freedom of access to information, circulation of information, transparency, and independent mass media, the public is well aware of the possible challenges facing indigenous people, whose rights are constantly discussed at all levels. Conrad (2000) indicates that Sámis are recognized as an international political force, with developed networks of cooperation with other groups of indigenous people across borders, acting as a full-fledged social and political actor contributing to environmental governance in the democratic part of the Arctic. Garbis, McCarthy, and Orttung (2023) continue calling attention to the importance of the rights and traditions of Sámis during the pursuit of the green economy in northern Sweden. The article underscores the need for better integration of the preferences and knowledge of Sámis into decision-making, and for adjusting governmental and industrial policies toward an inclusive model of environmental governance in Sweden. The place of indigenous people and their rights in Sweden are in sharp contrast to the situation in Russia. One of the contributions to this TC contributes to this topic by contrasting indigenous people in Russia with groups in Finland and Norway, through the analysis of the transborder Pasvik-Inari Trilateral Park (Vladimirova 2023).

Transnational regions and the indigenous people who live in them (encompassing subnational land across the borders of different states) represent a more complicated case-study. Vladimirova presents valuable insights into the phenomenon of indigenous communities living in Pasvik-Inari Trilateral Park– a transborder region encompassing Finland, Russia, and Norway. The study analyzes institutional cooperation within the Park and untangles the challenges faced by indigenous people living there, such as reindeer trespassing across state borders, as well as land use and nature conservation across the three states sharing the Park after 2022. Specifically, the study underscores the importance of an inclusive model in the management of the Park, where the interests and traditions of indigenous people are acknowledged at national level in Finland and Norway. It contrasts these cases with the undermining of the rights and interests of indigenous people in the areas of the Park owned by Russia (Pasvik Zapovednik). How are these different approaches within the Park to indigenous people explained? Vladimirova foregrounds, among other issues, the role of so-called historical legacies.

Historical legacies can be interpreted from a wide range of perspectives. In studies of Russia, historical legacies are usually associated with both public behavior and the perception of people by those in power (Beissinger and Kotkin eds. 2014; Libman and Obydenkova 2024; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017) but also there are parallels with agricultural history of the Soviet Union that are found in modern Russia.Footnote 10 For example, post-Soviet states undermine human rights, ignore public opinion (especially in small local communities), and consider their population as irrelevant at best. As a result of this perspective, corruption thrives at all levels of power, there is a disregard for public option (e.g., faking electoral results), control over mass media, pro-state propaganda, and massive disinformation (Beissinger and Kotkin eds. 2014; Gel′man and Obydenkova 2024). These aspects developed throughout the period of the Soviet Union and survive in the 2020s. For example, some studies revealed facts about the development of the nuclear chain in the Russian Arctic during the period of the Soviet Union, and disrespect to the rights of indigenous people (Hanaček and Martinez-Alier 2022; Martínez-Alier with Hanaček 2023).

Studies on historical legacies connecting Tsarist Russia to Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia, as well as studies on the legacies of Communism in the 21st century, have traced the survival of certain social patterns of behavior, attitudes, and perceptions (Lankina et al. 2016a; Beissinger and Kotkin eds. 2014, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017; Libman and Obydenkova 2023). The attitude of political and business elites to people can be viewed (at least partially) through historical legacies. The phenomenon of serfdom in Russia came to its end only in the second half of the 19th century (Hellie 1982; Stanziani 2010; Moon 1999). However, data from the 2023 Global Slavery Index indicates that almost 2 million people in modern Russia are informally slaves or serfs (see Walk Free Foundation 2023). Indigenous people are traditionally among the groups most discriminated against in Russia.

These different perspectives on legacies, indigenous people in the Arctic, their role and rights across borders, highlight the importance of values, norms, and scientific diplomacy in REG– the topics analyzed by Corine Wood-Donnelly (2023) (in some way, rounding up the main ideas and challenges described in most of the other contributions). This last study in the TC looks at the nexus between environmental protection and resources management, emphasizing the augmenting role of the recognition of indigenous people in democracies. Universally accepted norms and rules of international cooperation that all actors develop (states, indigenous people, regions, industries) benefit environmental governance. The study also analyzes the impact of scientific diplomacy on the Arctic’s environmental governance and the importance of co-production of knowledge on the region that unites the insights from indigenous people, nation-states, the AC, and transnational scientific communities. The article identifies limitations in addressing such challenges as pollution, challenges to biodiversity, and ozone depletion in the Arctic. It highlights the importance of the science-based diplomacy associated with international cooperation in general and with the AC in particular, as well as inclusiveness in decision-making and the involvement of all the actors in search of solutions to climate change.

4 Conclusion

Contributions to this TC offer various insights into the modern challenges facing Arctic environmental governance. The articles cover a number of overlapping issues, such as the importance of inclusiveness in environmental governance, the role of historical experience in international environmental cooperation, modern political challenges, and post-2022 transformations in the Arctic, as well as their tentative solutions. Findings of the articles in this TC contribute to further development of at least three aspects in climate governance literature: historical legacies, indigenous people, and international diffusion.

4.1 Historical legacies in climate governance

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered a number of geopolitical, social, and economic shifts in the world, but especially in Eurasia and the Arctic. This new geopolitical reality could be called “Cold War 2”. Emerging post-2022 studies on the AEG are still catching up on these radical changes and their consequences for climate change in the region and globally. Scholars point to historical experience in international scientific climate collaboration over the Cold War period (Doose et al. 2023; Beuerle 2023; Viktor et al. 1998; Vladimirova 2024; Obydenkova 2024; Borozna 2024). Doose, Poberezhskaya, and Beuerle, for example, state that, even during the 20th century Cold War, “amidst high political tensions and economic restrictions when climatologists had to adapt, they were still able to contribute to climate knowledge and international dialogue” (2023, p.47).

The historical legacies of Communism have been analyzed in multiple ways but mainly in terms of their implications for domestic policies, institutions, and society (e.g., as affecting corruption, control of mass media, propaganda, modern art, and even cinematography; see Beissinger and Kotkin eds. 2014; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017; Gel´man and Obydenkova 2024). Yet these historical legacies are still to be re-conceptualized in the field of international politics and global governance of climate change. Some historical lessons on international environmental cooperation can be found in the 20th century, the period of the divided world (Oldfield 2018; Doose 2022).Footnote 11 A number of studies examine how international scientific and environmental collaboration was developing over this uneasy period of the Cold War (Doose 2022; Viktor et al. 1998; Vladimirova 2024). Doose, Poberezhskaya, and Beuerle point out that “it is important to continue engaging with Russia for the success of global efforts in climate mitigation and adaptation” (2023, p. 47). In line with these studies, there is growing attention being paid to international environmental scientific collaboration in a newly divided world in the 21st century (e.g., Vladimirova 2023; 2024; Borozna 2024; Wang and Ma 2024; Doose 2022).

4.2 Indigenous people and international institutions

While speaking of the importance of “inclusiveness”, studies also examine the protection of lifestyles and, most recently, the survival of indigenous people in the Arctic (especially those in the Russian Arctic) (Hanaček et al. 2022). The life and wellbeing of indigenous people depends on reindeer husbandry, the state of herds, and their access to pasture– all factors challenged by dependence on the extractive industries in recent decades (a century if we count the period under Communism). Even prior to 2022, non-democratic states were the site of socio-environmental conflicts involving indigenous people in the Arctic, with conflict settlement in favor of governmental and entrepreneurial actors at the cost of local populations (Hanaček et al. 2022). The situation of indigenous people in the Arctic was complicated further by the new geopolitical situation in the post-2022 world (Vladimirova 2024). Some studies have detailed the cross-border networks of indigenous people (e.g., the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the Saami Council, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), and the Aleut International Association (AIA); see Martínez-Alier with Hanaček 2023). The ICC, RAIPON, and the AIA are three of six permanent participants in the AC, where indigenous people can appeal to international legislations and search for support outside of their own respective states. With Russia’s membership in the AC paused, it is safe to assume that indigenous communities in the Russian Arctic are more vulnerable than ever before.Footnote 12 With radically diminishing freedom of speech and information, most of the independent mass media, international organizations, climate-focused and environmental NGOs have either left Russia or been registered as “foreign agents” or “undesirable organizations” (Davydova 2024; Tysiachniouk 2024a, b; Franceschelli 2024). In contrast, the needs of indigenous people located in such states as, for example, the US, Canada, and Finland have been taken into consideration in some ways and the changes triggered by 2022 are on the agenda of national and regional governments as well as organizations (Rodrigues 2024; Tysiachniouk et al. 2024a, b).

4.3 International diffusion in climate governance

International institutions are among the most efficient leverage points of global climate governance. Studies have highlighted participation in international organization as favorable for diffusion of values (e.g., values such as democracy, human rights, sustainable development, and the protection of ecology and biodiversity).Footnote 13 Long-run irreversible changes to the climate are taking place in the Arctic region, including melting permafrost, loss of biodiversity, and contamination of the Arctic and the Global Ocean. Exploitation of natural resources, military drills, and testing of weapons in the region have increased significantly since Russia no longer participates in the AC.Footnote 14 Membership of international organizations and forums (e.g., the AC and Climate Clubs) used to place institutional limits on member-states as well as serving as a tool for the diffusion of environmental values and principles of sustainability.

However, despite the post-2022 strictures on Russia’s membership in so-called clubs of democracies (such as the AC), new modes of international climate governance are being established. Most recent studies call attention to “a non-Western climate bloc that would define its own, “sovereign” climate priorities” between Russia and the Global South, especially including India, China, and Central Asia (Davydova 2024; p. 12). It remains to be seen if these new international initiatives on climate governance are rhetorical and symbolic or have real policy implications. Given the increasing role of China in Russia’s economy and politics, the climate stance of China may also play a role in maintaining climate issues on the agenda of the current Russian government. China demonstrates its stance on sustainable development via membership or via observer-status in multiple international organizations or forums, investing in renewable energy in Central Asia and actively participating in the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM), Climate Vulnerable Forum, and the AC, among others (Agostinis and Urdinez 2022; Tosun and Shyrokykh 2022; Tosun and Mišić 2022; Davydova 2024; Wang 2023; Wang and Ma 2024). Tosun and Shyrokykh (2022), for example, demonstrate the efficiency of China’s involvement and its leadership in the CEM, as compared to the passive role of Russia in the same organization. They conclude that “China makes a better strategic use of the CEM in terms of gathering information and developing networks with other member-states as well as private actors in order to implement measures for overcoming the challenges of clean energy transition” (2022, p. 847). Thus, there is some recent evidence pointing to possible diffusion and support for environmentalism and the climate agenda through ongoing growing engagement with China and the Global South. As a very recent trend, this has to remain on the agenda for future studies of climate governance.