In this section, we discuss the obstacles to more robust and widespread state-level climate policy. We examine four obstacle categories: (1) governance and institutions, (2) media and public opinion, (3) industry and interest group opposition, and (4) divided pro-climate coalitions.
Governance and institutions
Political party governance and institutional arrangements in state government are important obstacles to climate policy action, particularly as environmental issues have become more politically polarized over time (Daniels et al. 2012). Democratic control of state governments facilitates climate policy adoption while Republican leadership acts as a veto point for climate legislation, often necessitating a Democrat trifecta to achieve bill passage (Bromley-Trujillo et al. 2016; Coley & Hess 2012; Trachtman 2020). There is also evidence to suggest a “counter-partisan response” at the state level (Miras and Rouse 2021); that is, when one party controls the federal government, the opposing party may become emboldened to act at the state-level (Bromley-Trujillo and Holman 2020).
State institutional configurations such as legislative professionalism and administrative capacity also play an important role. Legislative professionalism, which refers to variation in time in session, salary, and staff in state legislatures (Squire 2007), can play a meaningful role in the quality and quantity of policy adopted by state governments. For climate change, it is particularly important because this issue is technical and complex. Professionalized legislatures tend to be more adept at crafting innovative legislation around complex issues, while refuting anti-climate “model legislation” from groups like the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a conservative-business alliance known for providing anti-climate legislation for state legislators to formally introduce (Hertel-Fernandez 2014; Jansa et al. 2019).
Research also shows that the organization of the executive branch has an important effect on policy outcomes (Karapin 2016; Raymond 2016). To illustrate, Carlson (2017) demonstrates that administrative/regulatory capacity has been key to California’s climate policy innovation. Meckling and Nahm (2018) argue that when state legislatures delegate significant policymaking authority to executive branch agencies, the latter tend to be relatively depoliticized and less susceptible to powerful interest groups. However, the success of administrative delegation is contingent on administrative capacity (Meckling and Nahm 2018).
Another important institutional consideration is the formal powers afforded to majority party leaders and committee chairs in legislative bodies (e.g., Anzia and Jackman 2013; Anderson et al. 2016). Formal powers are in part a product of other institutional arrangements, such as the presence or absence of term limits (Carey et al. 2006; Mooney 2012; Shay 2020). Basseches (2019) shows that the concentration of institutional power in the hands of majority party leadership, even when the majority party is Democratic, facilitates access and influence for business actors while limiting it for environmental groups.
Media and public opinion
Media coverage and public opinion around climate change also present obstacles to robust climate policy in the case where public concern is low (Bromley-Trujillo and Poe 2020; Bromley-Trujillo et al. 2019) and when media coverage frequency and content fail to raise the issues’ salience (Boykoff et al. 2021).
Media representations are powerful conduits of climate science and policy (mis)information. Moreover, media coverage of climate change, which is heavily driven by elite cues, is likely to shape public attitudes (Carmichael and Brulle 2016). Research on media portrayals of science-based issues shows that quantity and content of media coverage influences state-level agenda-setting (Bromley-Trujillo and Karch 2019). As such, when coverage presents climate science as uncertain, or fails to engage the views of different subgroups (Howarth and Black 2015), that coverage can shift climate change off of public and governmental agendas (Boykoff et al. 2021).
Public opinion also emerges as a barrier to climate action through influence on state legislative agendas (Bromley-Trujillo et al. 2019) and broader public discourse. Despite the scientific consensus on climate change (IPCC 2014), public attitudes are highly polarized (Guber 2013; McCright and Dunlap 2011). Variation in climate attitudes tends to fall in four primary areas: public understanding and awareness, the existence of climate change, issue salience, and public policy (Egan and Mullin 2017). On understanding and awareness, a 2020 Yale survey showed that only a slight majority (55%) of the public believes that “most scientists think global warming is happening,” which does not reflect the current scientific consensus (Leiserowitz et al. 2020; Egan and Mullin 2017). Furthermore, while a large majority of the public (72%) say climate change is happening, only a smaller majority (57%) indicate that it is human-caused (Marlon et al. 2020).
With respect to issue salience (i.e., the level of importance placed on climate change), U.S. residents have historically seen climate change as a low governmental priority (McCarthy 2016), especially compared to the populaces of other countries (Egan and Mullin 2017). Attitudes toward specific climate policies are mixed, and sensitive to question wording. Support tends to be high for renewable energy investment and broad climate policy pronouncements (Bowman et al. 2016; Stoutenborough et al. 2014), but lower for more complex policies and for those imposing costs (Stokes and Warshaw 2017).
Partisan differences are also significant barriers to climate policy action. Republicans are more likely to believe that climate change does not exist, is the result of natural processes, or is too costly to address (Hornsey et al. 2016). Additionally, factors shown to influence climate attitudes (e.g., extreme weather experience and scientific knowledge) are moderated by partisanship (Shao et al. 2017). Direct experience with extreme weather is perceived differently by Republicans, Independents, and Democrats, with Republicans typically understating the seriousness of their experiences, and Independents most sharply swinging with recent weather (Hamilton 2011; Hamilton and Stampone 2013; Shao et al. 2017; Myers et al. 2012).
Industry and interest group opposition
A third source of climate policy obstacles are interest groups, including fossil fuel and business lobbies, electric utilities, and a broad conservative countermovement.
Fossil fuel lobbying, corporate political activity, and corporate-state relations
U.S. federalism delegates immense authority to states when it comes to climate and energy policy, and state efforts have expanded in the face of federal inaction (Karapin 2020; Thomson 2014; Rabe 2011). This creates new opportunities for corporations and their lobbyists to influence climate policy. Initially, the increased authority of states prompted researchers to anticipate a “race to the top” with some states setting higher environmental standards (Fiorino 2006). However, subsequent research showed that the political economy of the environment often generates a “race to the bottom,” with some states competing for fossil fuel companies to develop their energy resources (Rabe 2007, 2013; Davis 2012; Cook 2017). Furthermore, after states become dependent on employment and tax revenues from the fossil fuel companies, they tend to make concessions to them. Wingfield and Marcus (2007) show that many of the states most dependent on fossil fuel industries have among the weakest environmental policies (e.g., Wyoming, Alabama, North Dakota, West Virginia, Louisiana).
The political alignment of subnational states and the fossil fuel sector is also motivated by economic co-dependence between state governments and the fossil fuel sector, resulting in states’ protecting business interests in order to advance the states’ economic growth and development agendas. However, this strategy can create conflict with neighboring states where air quality is adversely affected by high-polluting states. To mediate this conflict between states, the Obama Administration enacted the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule to limit the drift of airborne pollution across state borders. This policy quickly became a contested terrain between states and the federal government over jurisdiction, and it was resolved by the federal government making concessions to high-polluting states (Prechel 2012). Economic co-dependence also results in other actions by states that benefit the fossil fuel industry. To illustrate, several Republican lawmakers in Texas recently proposed legislation that threatened to divest the state’s more than $100 billion in retirement funds from banks and asset managers that boycott the fossil fuel sector (Douglas 2021).
Further, relaxed antitrust enforcement at the federal level has permitted the emergence of giant fossil fuel corporations (e.g., ExxonMobil, Koch Industries), which have virtually unlimited capital to spend on lobbying, political contributions, and media campaigns to oppose climate legislation. To illustrate, the Koch Brothers spent some of their $80 billion in wealth on an extensive media campaign to discredit scientific research on environmental pollution (Mayer 2017). Furthermore, during the 2019–2020 federal election cycle, the Koch Brothers’ Super PAC, Americans for Prosperity Action, spent more than $47.7 million on federal elections in disclosed contributions compared to less than $41.5 million for all contributions by the largest 20 environmental organizations (Open Secrets 2020a, 2020b). Moreover, historically, Americans for Prosperity Action has spent much more on undisclosed contributions (i.e., dark money), which reached $407 million during the 2012 federal election (Fang 2014).
Some of the most active anti-climate policy trade groups include state chapters of the American Petroleum Institute, the Oil Heat Institute, and associations of manufacturers and state Chambers of Commerce. Trade organizations are often dominated by a few of the largest firms, which have key positions on boards of directors, experts to serve on policy-drafting committees, and influence over hiring in state governments. Interviews with Chamber of Commerce representatives and observations of testimony show substantial variation in major industry group positions, though they generally resist new taxes or regulations (Culhane et al. 2021).
Despite their massive resources, fossil fuel corporations and trade groups do not have the expertise to address every environmental issue. Thus, many are members of the neoliberal policy organization, ALEC, which is committed to small government and unregulated markets. ALEC is dominated by the largest corporations because it charges high membership dues in exchange for model legislation that it distributes to state lawmakers. ALEC also operates as a networking mechanism that facilitates connections between corporations with shared interests (Prechel 2021a). For example, Koch Industries created a political coalition with the former Enron Corp. and succeeded in enacting model legislation in twenty-four U.S. states (Hertel-Fernandez 2019).
Utilities
Given that electricity accounts for more than a quarter of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions (U.S. EPA 2018), electric utilities are critical actors in state-level climate policymaking (Prechel 2012; Basseches 2020; Isser 2015; Stokes 2020). The U.S. electric sector is complex, with variation across states in the degree to which utilities are private corporations (known as “investor-owned utilities”) or customer-owned utilities, which can either be government-owned or electricity cooperatives (Greenberg & McKendry 2021). However, most U.S. residents receive electricity from investor-owned utilities (IOUs) rather than from public or cooperative organizations (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2017). States vary in the degree to which they undertook efforts to break up vertically integrated utilities and introduce retail competition beginning in the late 1990s (Borenstein and Bushnell 2015), and this variation led to differences in how these actors came to view climate policy proposals (Basseches 2020).
The technical complexities of utilities’ operations and regulations make the policy area less accessible to many observers, but the scholarship that attends to IOUs' political activities shows them to be among the most politically powerful actors in state-level climate policymaking (e.g., Basseches 2020; Culhane et al. 2021; Stokes 2020). The sources of their influence include monopoly control of electricity distribution, unparalleled technical expertise, their lobbying force, and flexible corporate organization (Basseches 2020). The latter has facilitated mergers and acquisitions that have allowed utility parent companies to operate across state lines, despite being mainly regulated at the state level (Hempling 2020; Prechel 2021a, b).
Despite their political power, the degree to which utilities undermine climate policy is unclear. The primary concern of IOUs is to maximize shareholder profits, but because of the manner in which they are regulated, state-level climate and renewable electricity laws do not necessarily contradict this goal (Basseches 2020). In fact, Basseches (2020) finds IOUs have been instrumental actors in supporting ambitious RPS policies in states such as California, Massachusetts, and Oregon. However, other utilities have historically obstructed or slowed climate policy progress, often mobilizing quietly to achieve these objectives. Whether they serve as proponents or obstructionists depends on their fuel mix, the individual state-level policy regime and the particular policy at hand; for example, utilities tend to uniformly oppose solar net metering policies because they threaten their monopoly control of the electric grid (Stokes 2020). As Romankiewicz et al. (2021) find, the largest utilities set renewable portfolio goals but then fail to make the investment decisions necessary to achieve them. They also find that the preexisting portfolios of utilities (prior to the adoption of climate policy) is typically the strongest predictor of future investment decisions.
An important debate has emerged about whether IOUs versus public- or customer-owned utilities are preferable for advancing climate policy (Brown & Hess 2016; Homsy 2020; Heiman & Soloman 2004). From the standpoint of “energy democracy” (Greenberg & McKendry 2021), public power is clearly preferable. However, when it comes to renewable portfolios, public power’s track record is less clear (Romankiewicz et al. 2021). Although more research is needed to further specify conditions for utilities’ support of effective climate policies, it is clear that utilities are a powerful source of obstruction in many cases. For example, at the enforcement and implementation stages, utilities often dominate public utility/service commission rulings (e.g., Stokes 2020).
Conservative countermovement
Many of the aforementioned industry groups have also been central players in a broad countermovement that opposes the scientific community and the climate movement’s push for action (Brulle 2020; Dunlap and McCright 2010; 2015). This countermovement has been a significant contributor to climate policy obstruction (McCright and Dunlap 2003). Climate change narratives have frequently been coopted by the fossil fuel sector, conservative politicians and think tanks, media, and interest groups. All of these actors comprise a climate denial movement that, at times, coordinates their efforts.
The beginnings of the climate denial movement emerged in response to the environmental movement’s success in passing major legislation such as the Clean Air Act in the 1960s-1970s. Soon after, the Reagan administration took direct aim at environmental regulations under a neoliberal mantra of free markets. These actions in turn prompted a swift backlash from the environmental movement (Brulle 2020). Those opposed to environmental regulations learned an important lesson from this backlash; rather than directly attacking environmental programs, efforts should instead focus on undermining the science that supports such policies (Jacques et al. 2008; Michaels 2008). The conservative countermovement has constructed three primary narratives about climate change: (1) that it does not exist, (2) that if it does exist, it is not anthropogenic, and is possibly even desirable, and (3) that any efforts to mitigate climate change would harm the economy (Dunlap and McCright 2010).
The climate denial movement is financially supported by the fossil fuel industry and other conservative businesses and foundations (McCright and Dunlap 2003). These funds flow to conservative think tanks that elevate contrarian scientists casting doubt on the veracity of anthropogenic climate change. Parts of the movement organize campaigns to create uncertainty around climate modeling, methodology, and the integrity of scientists themselves (Hess 2014). One of the first such climate denial think tanks was the George C. Marshall Institute (Oreskes and Conway 2008). Others include the Cato Institute, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Heartland Institute. Conservative think tanks and foundations brand themselves as an alternative universe of scientists outside of academia. They publish policy briefs, books, and analyses that question the credibility of climate science (McCright and Dunlap 2015).
Although the scientists associated with these think tanks often lack relevant credentials, their findings are amplified by Republican politicians (Dunlap and Jacques 2013). Contrarian scientists are disproportionately vocal and present at congressional hearings. Republican politicians typically refer to climate change as a hoax and have invoked cold weather and “Climategate” to signal that the science is corrupt (Jacques et al. 2008).
Think tank reports are also amplified by conservative media including radio hosts (Wolcott 2007), the Wall Street Journal, Fox News, and columnists such as George Will (Boykoff 2013; McCright et al. 2016). Media coverage on climate change, in turn, likely influences elected officials (Bromley-Trujillo and Karch 2019) and also polarizes public and elite attitudes (Leiserowitz et al. 2020; Tesler 2018).
Although scholarship often focuses on the climate denial movement’s influence on national politics, the movement is closely linked to efforts to sway state-level politics. The climate denial movement aligns with the State Policy Network, Americans for Prosperity, and ALEC, which often work in concert to stall state-level policy (Hertel-Fernandez 2014, 2019). Conservative foundations (Brulle 2014; Farrell 2019) as well as personnel links (Farrell 2016) connect these organizations in a centralized network.
Divided pro-climate policy coalitions
One obstacle to subnational climate policy that is perhaps less well recognized is the fragmentation of pro-climate policy coalitions. One source of fragmentation is divisions among the different alternative or renewable energy industries, which must operate in a political arena dominated by powerful fossil fuel incumbents (Kelsey and Meckling 2018). For example, a study of lobbying and testimony in Massachusetts found that more concentrated renewable energy industries were better able to engage in paid lobbying than dispersed ones (Culhane et al. 2021). Relatedly, Si and Stephens (2021) find disparate participation among solar developers and installers surrounding efforts to target solar installation among low-income households in Massachusetts. The solar industry is more fragmented in small installation firms, whereas the wind industry has higher capital barriers to entry and is consequently concentrated in a few, large firms. Solar firms are further divided between rooftop residential developers and those installing utility-scale projects, and between in-state and out-of-state firms (Stokes 2020).
In addition to divisions based on concentration, size, and capacity to influence politics/policy, the renewable energy industries also tend to restrict their participation to issues that affect them most directly. For example, studies in Massachusetts and Rhode Island revealed that solar, wind, and other renewable firms did not show up to testify for legislation (e.g., carbon pricing) that did not target benefits to their economic sector. By contrast, environmentalists testified in large numbers in favor of the full range of climate bills. The picture that emerges is a fragmented renewables sector, with firms only lobbying and testifying for their own, narrow issues and sometimes battling each other over carve-outs for particular technologies in state-level RPS policies (Culhane et al. 2021).
Another source of division in pro-climate coalitions is between those who advocate for market-based, technocratic approaches to climate mitigation versus those who advocate for more holistic, climate justice approaches involving large public investments in jobs, infrastructure, equity, and health (Boyle et al. 2021). The more holistic approach acknowledges the power of the polluting elite, who have strategically invested for decades in undermining public trust in government and minimizing protections and support for marginalized communities, communities of color, and economically disadvantaged groups who are being disproportionately impacted by climate change and pollution (Stephens 2020). To further concentrate their wealth and power, big business has also reduced worker rights and protections, and it has shifted corporate culture to prioritize shareholders instead of workers (Stephens 2020). This approach tends to be aligned with progressive-left political coalitions, whereas the technocratic approach has a more moderate political position and tends not to emphasize issues of structural inequality. The structural vulnerabilities and under-investment that has been revealed by the COVID-19 pandemic have strengthened the political appeal of the holistic investment-based climate justice approaches (Boyle et al. 2021).
Most adopted and proposed state-level climate policies are based on a narrow, technocratic, carbon-centric model, which misses opportunities to invest in marginalized communities (Galvin and Healy 2020). To date, climate policy has been largely designed within the context of “climate isolationism,” which refers to the common framing of climate change as a narrow, isolated, discrete, scientific problem that requires a technological solution (Stephens 2020). Decision-makers working through a climate isolationism lens often focus in a technocratic way on achieving carbon reductions while inadvertently dismissing the social justice implications and human dimensions of these measures (Stephens Forthcoming 2021). Controversy surrounding California’s cap-and-trade program illustrates the conflict between climate justice and mainstream, technocratic policies (Basseches et al. 2021).
Until the Green New Deal framework gained traction on the national stage in 2018 (Galvin and Healy 2020), climate policies were often limited to market-based approaches. With more diverse leadership, including women, people of color and Indigenous people, a new approach is emerging that links climate/energy policy with jobs and economic justice, health, food, housing, and transportation. Several states and cities have proposed ambitious Green New Deal policies, such as New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Boyle et al. 2021). This approach focuses on justice-oriented policies and direct investments in under-invested in households and communities. For example, climate justice proponents are now pushing for more equitable housing and community development, equitable access to clean and affordable energy, and more inclusive public engagement around climate policy development (Clifton and Kelly 2020). An expansion of the “just transition” concept includes worker protections and recognition of fossil-dependent communities and consumers (Healy and Barry 2017).
A related division in pro-climate policy coalitions is between actors who advocate for energy-transition policies (including those with a justice orientation) and actors who focus more on opposition to unwanted energy infrastructure and fossil fuel reliance. A review of many different types of state-level climate policies revealed that there are many more policies to advance renewables than there are to end fossil fuel reliance (Burke and Stephens 2017). Climate justice activists have thus engaged in multi-year protests targeting fossil fuel infrastructure, advocating for supply-side climate policies such as fracking bans, fossil fuel moratoria, state pension divestment campaigns, and litigation for climate harms (Piggot 2018; Healy & Barry 2017). Controversy about whether or not institutions and investment portfolios should “divest” from fossil fuels demonstrates this division in pro-climate policy coalitions (Trinks et al 2018); many colleges and universities have resisted the urge to divest and have pledged instead to “invest” in renewables (Mikkelson et al., 2021, Stephens et al 2018).
Another important division in pro-climate coalitions is between the labor and environmental wings of progressive coalitions. Since the 1990s, “green jobs” and economic development frames have emerged along with some partnerships between unions and environmentalists (e.g., the United Steelworkers and the Sierra Club in the BlueGreen Alliance, (Hess 2012). These partnerships have reduced the longstanding image of environmental policy as a threat to working-class jobs; however, not all unions support the “green jobs” approach, and mistrust and opposition remain. For example, in some states, utilities have worked closely with their own workers and unions to mobilize opposition to energy-transition policies and fossil-fuel opposition (e.g., anti-pipeline mobilizations) by arguing that the opposition policies will harm local economies, taking away jobs. In states with a strong extractive fossil-fuel sector, anti-green labor alliances can also extend beyond utility unions to unions and other workers in the mining, drilling, and processing industries.