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Learning from Failures of Co-owned Firms: Common Ownership and Information Disclosure Fraud

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Abstract

This study focuses on learning effects between firms connected by common ownership. We explore the learning effects in a certain setting that how decision-makers in focal firms learn from punishments for fraudulent disclosure in their co-owned firms. Baseline results show that punishments for fraudulent disclosure in co-owned firms reduce information disclosure fraud in focal firms. The effects still exist after excluding other potential channels of learning. In mechanism analyses, similarities between focal firms and their co-owned firms and influential common shareholders enhance the learning effects. Further, after the events in co-owned firms, there is improvement in internal control in focal firms, which contributes to the reduction of fraudulent disclosure. Additionally, empirical results mitigate the concern that the reduction of fraud is not driven by the learning argued in this paper but decision-makers alternatively conducting more other unethical behaviors such as real earnings management. In sum, empirical results support the existence of learning effects. As common ownership is an important but highly underexplored linkage between firms, future research can study learning effects between firms connected by common ownership in other suitable settings.

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Notes

  1. This study identifies common ownership with the quarterly disclosed data of the largest ten shareholders of listed firms. This is consistent with the literature that uses the largest ten shareholders to identify the connection between firms (e.g., Lai and Li, 2023; Wang and Zhou, 2022). There is common ownership between two firms in principle when these two firms have any common shareholders. But this is not applicable when specific research is conducted. There are three main reasons for us to use the largest ten shareholders: (1) the prevalence of common ownership created by the largest ten shareholders, (2) publicly disclosed data of the largest ten shareholders, and (3) higher importance of the largest ten shareholders than other minor shareholders.

  2. Similar studies have been conducted in the context of other firm connections such as board interlock. For example, Chiu et al. (2013) document that information about net benefits and technology of earnings management can be transferred between firms sharing common directors and thus lead to the contagion.

  3. The sample period begins in 2003 because the Corporate Governance Standards for Listed Companies is issued in 2002. We empirically test whether punishments for fraudulent disclosure in co-owned firms can reduce future commitment of fraudulent disclosure in focal firms. Since the commitment usually won’t be detected immediately, the sample period ends in 2018 to reserve time for the detection of fraud commitment.

  4. For robustness, we drop observations of which the firm is punished in year t or t-1, observations of which the firm is punished in year t, t-1, or t-2, and observations of which the firm is punished in year t, t-1, t-2, or t-3, separately, when constructing the samples. Baseline results still hold.

  5. Information disclosure violation events in which the firm doesn’t violate are excluded.

  6. We exclude the shareholder named Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company Ltd. or HKSCC Nominees Limited because its ownership represents the aggregate ownership of individual investors. Its ownership in two firms can’t be recognized as there being common shareholders. We also exclude shareholders named China Securities Finance Corporation Limited because its business activities mainly include the margin financing loan services that provide funds and securities for margin transactions, and the raising of funds and securities to facilitate such services.

  7. For punished firms of which the shareholder data are not disclosed at the end of the first (third) quarter, the violation data is matched with the shareholder data at the end of the second (fourth) quarter.

  8. New Accounting Standard is implemented in China in 2007.

  9. For vicarious punishments, see, e.g., Yiu et al. (2014).

  10. For more details of the method, please refer to Iacobucci (2012).

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Funding

This study was funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant Number: 72073101].

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  1. School of Accounting, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, China

    Ziwei Wang

  2. College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China

    Chunfeng Wang & Zhenming Fang

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Table 14 Definitions of variables
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Wang, Z., Wang, C. & Fang, Z. Learning from Failures of Co-owned Firms: Common Ownership and Information Disclosure Fraud. J Bus Ethics (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-024-05653-8

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