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Is It Ethical for For-profit Firms to Practice a Religion? A Rawlsian Thought Experiment

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Abstract

Recent judicial rulings and changes in federal and state legislation have given for-profit corporations a growing list of rights and constitutional protections, including the right to practice religion free from many types of federal or state restriction. In this paper, we highlight the implications of these developments using Rawls’ (A theory of justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971) Theory of Justice to explore the consequences of for-profit corporate religious freedom for consumers and employees. We identify preliminary principles to spark a discussion as to how expanding religious freedom for businesses and fair access to goods and services can coexist in the for-profit marketplace.

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Notes

  1. We use the term “corporate religious practice,” as shorthand for owners of a for-profit firm practicing their religion in the internal (e.g., hiring, employee insurance, promotions) and market-facing (e.g., products and services offered, consumer groups the firm refuses to serve) workings of the firm. We do not take any stand regarding the moral agency of a firm by using the term “corporate religious practice.”

  2. Business philosophers have for several decades hotly debated whether or not firms have the ability to make decisions leaving them responsible for their actions. Much is written on the question of whether or not firms have moral agency. However, given the current legal environment, it is clear that owners of for-profit firms currently have the right to practice a religion both in operations and in interactions with the buying public. Thus, in discussing a “for-profit firm’s rights to practice its religion,” we do not intend to make a statement about moral agency; rather, our intent is to reflect the current state of these rights within the US.

  3. Rawls conceptualization of self-respect is highly tied to the Aristotelian Principle (Moriarty 2009). Later works by Rawls focused more on the social basis of self-respect, rather than the feelings of self-respect (Moriarty 2009). However, Rawls posits the two are related. Additionally, philosophers have made clearer distinctions between self-respect and self-esteem, which are used somewhat interchangeably in Theory of Justice (e.g., Sachs 1981). We will not delve into these distinctions as such as discussion would stray too far from the purpose of our work—to examine the impact of for-profit firm’s owners practicing religion in the open marketplace. Because Rawls hypothesized relationships between one’s internalized self-respect and recognition respect, we have chosen to examine both in our discussion.

  4. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.

  5. In our study of A Theory of Justice and scholarly writings of Rawls’ theory, we did not find any discussion of moral agency concerning society’s institutions (governments, firms, organizations) within the context of a Rawlsian perspective. Business philosophers however, debate whether corporations have the capacity to take responsibility for morally right and wrong decisions. Some readers may question whether for-profit firms are moral agents with the capacity and the moral basis to make religious decisions. Fortunately, there is a large literature focusing on corporate moral agency to help address this concern. We will not, herein, join that debate, given our focus is on evaluating the morality of corporate owners’ religious practice rights, a right currently upheld and in practice in the US.

  6. Patterned after Marriott and CVS, respectively.

  7. Prior to June 1978, men of African descent were forbidden to be ordained as priests of Mormon Church based on Brigham Young’s belief that God cursed some with dark skin as punishment for Cain murdering his brother, Abel. Relatedly, others believed that the ancestors of individuals with dark skin supported Lucifer when he rebelled against God. In June 1978, the Mormon Church rescinded the ban on black males serving as priests (Turner 2012).

  8. Note that these positions are not universally held by practitioners, and we are not claiming that they are even widely held. Yet, current legislation does not require that the religious beliefs be universal or formally part of a religion. Indeed, the RFRA, the basis for Hobby Lobby’s exemption from the ACA birth control mandate, only requires a “sincerely held religious belief,” but not necessarily a mainstream belief nor one based on prevailing scientific consensus.

  9. The authors subscribe to the prevailing scientific view that homosexuality is not a choice. For additional information on the scientific basis of that claim, please see the American Psychological Association web site for a detailed discussion (2018).

  10. A final reminder that not all members of evangelical Protestant churches believe in hell. This belief could be part of many Christian faith communities, but certainly not universally held.

  11. We emphasize that all Americans who identify as evangelical Protestant may not hold the same beliefs as expressed in Hobby Lobby or in the Mississippi RFRA.

  12. Note that Marriott, the largest market share holder in the US has more than 30 branded products (Marriott 2018).

  13. This does not preclude a firm from refusing to serve customers because they are difficult, non-compliant, too time-consuming, or unprofitable. Discrimination is legally permissible for any reason except race, religion, gender, national origin, age, or sexual orientation (in some states). Relying on our analysis of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, we conclude that discrimination based on who a person is, e.g., members of the LGBTQ community, is unjust under all circumstances, even if the class of individual is not expressly protected by law.

  14. Clear and conspicuous notice is defined within the public policy literature and by governmental entities. Hoy and Andrews (2004) provide a detailed discussion of “clear and conspicuous.” See Stewart and Martin (2004) for an expanded, alternative definition of this concept as “understood and used.”

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Acknowledgements

The authors thank Joseph Levin and Elizabeth Gratz for their assistance with this paper, and West Virginia University for supporting sabbatical leave for the lead author.

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This study was not funded by any grant.

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Correspondence to M. Paula Fitzgerald.

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Fitzgerald, M.P., Langenderfer, J. & Fitzgerald, M.L. Is It Ethical for For-profit Firms to Practice a Religion? A Rawlsian Thought Experiment. J Bus Ethics 166, 159–174 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04136-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04136-5

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