Journal of Business Ethics

, Volume 118, Issue 3, pp 655–665 | Cite as

Towards a More ‘Ethically Correct’ Governance for Economic Sustainability

Article

Abstract

In this paper, we propose that economic sustainability is seen in terms of (inter-temporal and inter-national) value creation. We claim that value appropriation (or capture), can become a constraint to economic sustainability. We propose that for sustainable value creation to be fostered, corporate governance needs to be aligned to public and supra-national governance. In order to achieve this, a hierarchically layered set of ‘agencies’, needs to be diagnosed and the issue of incentive alignment addressed. Enlightened self-interest, pluralism and diversity, as well as a representative supra-national organisation for world-wide economic sustainability can serve as a new, more ‘ethically correct’ governance for economic sustainability, but not a panacea.

Keywords

Governance Economic sustainability Agency Value creation and capture 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Judge Business School and Queens’ CollegeUniversity of CambridgeCambridgeUK

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