Abstract
Nearly every day we participate in the vast, interconnected global economy. In doing so, we engage in chains of transactions that ultimately result in our benefiting from, or enabling, wrongdoing by others. In some cases this seems to be in itself wrong, but in many cases it seems unproblematic. I develop a concept of ‘ethical distance’ and argue that our responsibility for the wrongdoing of others is a function of our ethical distance from it. Furthermore, I argue that the concept of moral responsibility is vague, but that when we become clearly responsible for wrongdoing by others, we ought to sever our connection to it.
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Notes
I cannot adequately defend this (empirical) claim here. However, even beyond (what I take to be) the claim’s prima facie plausibility, two things may be said. First, one only need open the newspapers for a few weeks to see large organizations accused of some wrongdoing or other. Given the pervasiveness of large organizations in the modern economy, we all interact with large organizations frequently, and they frequently interact with one another. The sheer number of such transactions thus makes it likely that we are all transactionally connected to wrongdoing. Second, the mere likelihood of this connection (and not necessarily its actuality) is sufficient to make my topic of ethical interest and import, for if a given action is likely to implicate someone in wrongdoing, that person may have a duty to avoid it, on pain of negligence. In making this latter claim, I follow Kolers (2001).
There are similarities between my treatment of this problem and that provided in Mellema (2003). However, there are significant differences as well. In particular, Mellema devotes considerable attention to the question of how ethical distance affects cases of collective responsibility, while my concern is with individual responsibility.
The philosophical literature on this is very large. A good place to begin is Fischer and Ravizza (1993).
Alternatively, my discussion could be cashed out in terms of blameworthiness (instead of responsibility). Given the intuitive conceptions I am working with, I do not think this would alter the central arguments of the paper.
This objection is sometimes leveled against versions of utilitarianism, the locus classicus being Williams (1973). Williams grounds the objection in the permissibility of pursuing personal life projects, which can be ruled out by excessively demanding ethical systems. Other times the objection is grounded in the idea that it is possible to go ‘above and beyond the call of duty’ and that, thus, any claims that ethics requires extreme sacrifice are suspect. Other times the objection is grounded in the idea that ethics must provide guidance for living a good and reasonably achievable human life, and that, thus, extremely demanding ethical systems cannot be correct. Chappell (2009) contains a collection of recent discussions of the demandingness objection.
Here, I am making an intuitive appeal after the manner of John Rawls’ method of ‘reflective equilibrium’. This method calls for seeking equilibrium between our general and our specific ethical judgments. The Austere Conclusion is a general judgment; our judgments about such things as whether it is ethically permissible to buy a cup of coffee are specific ones. Ultimately, we must give up (or refine) certain of these judgments to reach equilibrium. Insofar as I give preference to those judgments in which we have greater confidence, philosophers will also recognize a familiar move from anti-skeptical arguments given by some epistemologists.
Irvine considers another principle, the “Evil-Company Principle”, which I do not discuss in the text. According to this principle, it is wrong to invest in ‘evil companies’, which are defined (roughly) as companies that either directly engage in evil activities or that produce products whose primary use is evil. Irvine rejects this principle on the grounds that it would be acceptable to invest in a company that is presently evil if that investment would be used to ‘convert’ the company away from its evil practices (e.g., by replacing slave labor with free labor). Irrespective of this counter-example, I find the Evil-Company Principle unhelpful, because we are left wondering why it is wrong to invest in evil companies. The principles I discuss in the text address this.
The fungibility of money creates difficulties here. For the sake of simplicity, I am here assuming that it is ‘the same’ money that is changing hands.
This is different from Immanuel Kant’s famous version of the Universalizability Principle. Interpretation of Kant is problematic, but Kant’s principle appeals to what it is possible for a rational being to will into occurrence.
This is the sort of approach that moral particularists, such as Dancy (2004), would favor.
Kolers rejects the idea that it is permissible knowingly to seek or accept tainted profits for the purpose of donating them to charity, but I do not see why this should be the case. If one’s profits in their entirety are donated to a worthy cause, that seems sufficient to me to launder tainted profits. However, the situation is different if the Enablement Principle comes into play—that is, if one’s economic activity is enabling immoral activity. In that case, donating profits to charity results in a sort of ‘Robin Hood’ laundering—harming some to benefit others. Kolers rejects this, I think rightly. Apart from Kolers, I have been unable to find discussions of this specific issue in the philosophical literature.
It is arguable that not all employees of BRU share the same ethical distance; for example, those deciding where to invest BRU’s funds may be ethically closer to BigChemCo than those whose jobs do not involve this. This leads to the issue of duties and opportunities related to the occupation of institutional roles, which is discussed below.
For a portion of Aristotle’s discussion of these issues, including the cargo example, see Nicomachean Ethics III.1-5.
This, incidentally, fits with Kolers’ idea that shareholder activism can be used to moderate the Austere Conclusion.
As Aristotle says in Nicomachean Ethics I.3, “We must not expect more precision than the subject-matter [ethics] admits of.” This is W. D. Ross’s translation from Ackrill and Urmson (1998).
Virtue theorists, moral particularists, ethical pluralists, and even many Kantians will agree with the importance of judgment in particular cases.
References
Ackrill, J. L., & Urmson, J. O. (Eds.). (1998). The Nicomachean ethics (W. D. Ross, Trans.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Chappell, T. (Ed.). (2009). The problem of moral demandingness: New philosophical essays. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Dancy, J. (2004). Ethics without principles. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (Eds.). (1993). Perspectives on moral responsibility. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Irvine, W. B. (1987). The ethics of investing. Journal of Business Ethics, 6(3), 233–242.
Kolers, A. (2001). Ethical investing: The permissibility of participation. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 9(4), 435–452.
Mellema, G. (2003). Responsibility, taint, and ethical distance in business ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 47, 125–132.
Williams, B. (1973). A critique of utilitarianism. In J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams (Eds.), Utilitarianism: For and against (pp. 77–150). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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This article is not based on any human or animal research.
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This article has not been sponsored by funding from any organization (other than the author’s normal professorial salary).
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Lee Shepski passed away unexpectedly as his essay was moving to press. It was his wish to publish the essay.
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Shepski, L. Going the (Ethical) Distance. J Bus Ethics 116, 393–402 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1477-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1477-1