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Notes
Harris (2010).
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it (Hume 1739).
In an 1997 essay "Non-Overlapping Magisteria" for "Natural History" magazine, and later in his book (Gould 1999), Gould put forward what he described as "a blessedly simple and entirely conventional resolution to… the supposed conflict between science and religion" (Harris 2010). He draws the term magisterium from Pope Pius XII’s encyclical, Humani Generis (1950), and defines it as "a domain where one form of teaching holds the appropriate tools for meaningful discourse and resolution," and describes the NOMA principle as "the magisterium of science covers the empirical realm: what the Universe is made of (fact) and why does it work in this way (theory). The magisterium of religion extends over questions of ultimate meaning and moral value. These two magisteria do not overlap, nor do they encompass all inquiry (consider, for example, the magisterium of art and the meaning of beauty) " (Harris 2010). In a speech before the American Institute of Biological Sciences, Gould stressed the diplomatic reasons for adopting NOMA as well, stating "the reason why we support that position is that it happens to be right, logically. But we should also be aware that it is very practical as well if we want to prevail." Gould argued that if indeed the polling data was correct and that 80–90 % of Americans believe in a supreme being, and such a belief is misunderstood to be at odds with evolution, then "we have to keep stressing that religion is a different matter, and science is not in any sense opposed to it," otherwise "we're not going to get very far." However, he did not consider this diplomatic aspect to be paramount, writing in 1997: "NOMA represents a principled position on moral and intellectual grounds, not a mere diplomatic stance."In 1997, he had elaborated on this position by describing his role as a scientist with respect to NOMA:
Religion is too important to too many people for any dismissal or denigration of the comfort still sought by many folks from theology. I may, for example, privately suspect that papal insistence on divine infusion of the soul represents a sop to our fears, a device for maintaining a belief in human superiority within an evolutionary world offering no privileged position to any creature. But I also know that souls represent a subject outside the magisterium of science. My world cannot prove or disprove such a notion, and the concept of souls cannot threaten or impact my domain. Moreover, while I cannot personally accept the Catholic view of souls, I surely honor the metaphorical value of such a concept both for grounding moral discussion and for expressing what we most value about human potentiality: our decency, care, and all the ethical and intellectual struggles that the evolution of consciousness imposed upon us.
In the midst of controversy, Harris makes the “claim that morality and values relate to facts about the well-being of conscious creatures” (Harris 2010, p. 32).
Harris (2010, p. 6).
Harris (2010, Introduction, ftn. 9).
Casebeer (2005).
Flanagan (2002).
Harris (2010, p. 32).
Greene et al. (2001).
Hauser (2006).
Harris (2010, p. 105).
Dennett (2003).
Harris (2010, p. 106).
Harris (2010, p. 107).
Hitchens (2007).
Dawkins (2006).
Dennett (2006).
Armstrong (2009).
Haught (2009).
Frith (2008).
Burton (2008).
Burton (2008, pp. 188–195).
Harris (2010, p. 129).
Zuckerman (2008).
Hall et al. (2010).
Culotta (2009).
The assumption that the mind is the product of the brain is integral to almost everything neuroscientists do. Harris (2010, p. 180).
Harris (2010, p. 173).
Harris (2010, p. 176).
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Shaw, B. The Moral Landscape. J Bus Ethics 108, 411–415 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1310-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1310-x