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Do transposable elements have functions of their very own?

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Abstract

Philosophers who study the problem of biological function often begin their deliberations by reflecting on the functions of parts of animals, or the behavior of animals. Applying theories of biological function to unconventional or borderline cases can help us to better evaluate and refine those theories. This is the case when we consider whether parts of transposable elements (TEs)—bits of “selfish” DNA that move about within a host genome—have functions of their own, that is, whether the parts of TEs have the function of helping the TE move about within the genome. Here I argue that whether or not the parts of TEs have functions depends crucially on whether collections of TEs form “populations,” by which I mean, here, a group of individuals of the same type that impact one another’s chances of persistence or multiplication, by impacting one another’s access to a shared resource. I think there is suggestive, but not conclusive, evidence that some TEs have functions of their own. Considering the problem of TE functionality, then, has value both for philosophy and for biology.

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Notes

  1. Note that the selected effects theory, as traditionally conceived, is neutral between directional versus stabilizing selection. Whether the selection process in question causes a trait to spread through a population, or merely to be maintained at a certain level, it can acquire a selected effect function. This point is emphasized by Linquist et al. (2020).

  2. Garson (2021a) gives an overview of different construals of the notion of a “selection process” among theorists of function.

  3. For more details on selection in clay particles, see Cairns-Smith (1985). For extraordinary images, see Christidis (2011).

  4. See Garson (2011, 2017, 2019).

  5. See Millikan (1989); Neander (1991); Schwartz (2004); Garson (2016, Chapter 1), for discussion of these meta-analytic questions.

  6. See Cappelen (2018), for an extensive treatment of the general problem. He suggests, following Railton, that paradigm cases might be one part of a more comprehensive account of topic-switching (p. 120). Garson (2021b) and Wakefield (2021) discuss the problem as it pertains to definitions of mental disorder.

  7. One might protest that the idea of divine retribution in agriculturalist society is an example of an artifact function, and not the sort of natural function I’m interested in here, but that’s not obvious to me. Just as striped zebras might out-reproduce stripeless ones on account of their fly-deterring power, communities with certain religious ideas might out-persist others by virtue of their power to minimize conflict (Wilson 2002). In that case, I’d be inclined to say that those ideas have functions in the same sense that zebra stripes do.

  8. Fodor and Piatelli-Palmarini (2010) develop this skeptical point of view.

  9. Garson (2019, Chapter 6) offers a solution in terms of connectivity. For criticism, see Conley (2020); Schulte (2021); Bourrat (2021); also see Matthewson (2020) for discussion.

  10. This brief discussion must suffice for now. Garson (in prep) develops this point, and responds more extensively to critics.

  11. Lewontin (1970, p. 1) asks us to envision two strains of bacteria multiplying at different rates in a test tube. He claims that even if they don’t impact each other’s survival chances, this is still an example of natural selection. I am not convinced that this actually is an example of natural selection at all, but that is beside the point [for discussion, see Lennox and Wilson (1994, p. 70); Godfrey-Smith (2009, p. 48)]. My point here is that I’m not resting my case for my account of function on the claim that the way I define “population” tallies with the way all biologists define it.

  12. Kremer et al. (2020) describe a possible case of a cooperative interaction between TEs.

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Acknowledgements

I wish to thank the participants of the workshop, Evolutionary Roles of Transposable Elements: the Science and the Philosophy, held in Halifax, Nova Scotia on Oct 20-21, 2018. I particularly wish to thank the organizers, Stefan Linquist and Ford Doolittle, for their valuable feedback on an earlier draft, as well as comments from an anonymous reviewer.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Hunter College and The Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, NY, USA

    Justin Garson

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Garson, J. Do transposable elements have functions of their very own?. Biol Philos 37, 20 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-022-09855-0

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