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Proper functions: etiology without typehood

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Abstract

The proper function of the heart is pumping the blood. According to what we call the type etiological view, this is because previous tokens of the type HEART were selected for pumping the blood. Nanay (J Philos 107(8):412–431, 2010) argues that the type etiological view is viciously circular. He claims that the only plausible accounts of trait type individuation use proper functions, such that whenever the type etiological view is supplemented with a plausible account of trait type individuation, the result is a view that uses proper functions to explain proper functions. We refine this objection, and argue that Nanay at most establishes a potentially benign definitional circularity. However, we show that the type etiological view’s reliance on types nevertheless generates a vicious regress. Hence the type etiological view is false. We reject dispositional and modal alternatives to the type etiological view for the reason that they either cannot accommodate malfunction, or do so at the cost of proliferation; and then formulate a novel token etiological view that overcomes both problems because it makes no reference to trait types.

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Notes

  1. We use the ‘recent’ selection version of the view here, as outlined by Godfrey-Smith (1993, 1994) and Griffiths (1993). Neander (1991a, 1991b) and Millikan (1984) do not impose this restriction.

  2. Sober (1984, ch. 5) is the canonical defender of the negative view. See Neander (1988) for a response. For further discussion see Birch (2012) and the references therein.

  3. Note that recency enters into the individuation of typehood, and not as a restriction of selection as it features in the type etiological view.

  4. It might be added that, as Schwartz (1999) notes, the invocation of recency also yields trouble for the type etiological view, for not all trait types are selected in recent history, despite bearing the relevant proper functions.

  5. See Millikan (1993).

  6. See Achinstein (1983, pp. 235–237).

  7. See Molnar (2003, p. 61).

  8. See also Lewis (1983b, p. 355).

  9. Cf. Williamson (2000, sec. 4.5).

  10. It should be noted that we have not considered organisational approaches here. See Mossio et al. (2009).

  11. Pargetter and Bigelow (1987, p. 196).

  12. A case on the present understanding is a centred world, i.e, a triple of some organism O, at some time t, and some world w. For discussion see Quine (1969), Lewis (1979a), and Vetter (2014).

  13. In a more recent paper Nanay (2012) qualifies the view: what counts as a relatively close may depend upon one’s explanatory project. Artiga (2014) raises interesting objections against this qualification. In particular, he argues that it fails to do justice to the investigation into, and scientific disagreement about function attributions. Since it does not affect the arguments that follow, we have set this complication aside.

  14. Strictly speaking, standard type etiological views do invoke inclusive fitness insofar as they draw on the selection of/selection for distinction. See Buller’s (1998) discussion on weak and strong views.

  15. Cf. Neander (1991b, p. 460).

  16. Another worry derives from the use of inclusive fitness. It might be argued that fitness is a relative phenomenon; to determine a trait’s fitness one must, say, take into consideration competitor traits. The worry is that this will invoke trait typehood. In response, we defer to the rewarding work of Buller (1998), who argues persuasively that there exists a coherent non-relative notion of fitness.

  17. This conception is imperfect, of course. See Siebel (2011). The remarks below could be reformulated to accommodate an interventionist conception (Woodward 2003).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 94305, USA

    Geoff Keeling

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

    Niall Paterson

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  1. Geoff Keeling
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Correspondence to Geoff Keeling.

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Keeling, G., Paterson, N. Proper functions: etiology without typehood. Biol Philos 37, 19 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-022-09850-5

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