Abstract
This work is a critical consideration of several arguments recently given by Elliott Sober that are aimed at undermining the Laplacean stance on probability in evolutionary theory (and, by extension, the special sciences more broadly). The Laplacean contends that the only objective probability an event has is the one assigned to it by a complete description of the relevant microparticles. Sober alleges a formal demonstration that the Laplacean stance on probability in evolutionary theory is inconsistent. But Sober’s argument contains a crucial lacuna, one that likely cannot be repaired to yield the conclusion that Sober draws. He also argues that the Laplacean is committed to inferring semantic facts about probabilities from pragmatic facts about agents’ reasons for using probabilities. But Sober’s arguments against inferring semantic facts from pragmatic constraints would only undermine one basis for Laplaceanism. The Laplacean who formulates her position carefully need not leave herself vulnerable to Sober’s objection to inferring semantics from pragmatics.
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to Kevin Scharp, Roberta Millstein, Elliott Sober, and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this work.
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Gildenhuys, P. Laplaceanism defended. Biol Philos 31, 395–408 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-016-9518-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-016-9518-2