Biology & Philosophy

, Volume 30, Issue 2, pp 267–276 | Cite as

Getting (even more) serious about similarity

Article

Abstract

This paper critically examines Weisberg’s weighted feature matching account of model-world similarity. A number of concerns are raised, including that Weisberg provides an account of what underlies scientific judgments of relative similarity, when what is desired is an account of the sorts of model-target similarities that are necessary or sufficient for achieving particular types of modeling goal. Other concerns relate to the details of the account, in particular to the content of feature sets, the nature of shared features and the assumed independence of feature weightings.

Keywords

Similarity Models Weisberg 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyDurham UniversityDurhamUK

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