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Can the Epistemic Basing Relation be a Brain Process?

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Abstract

There is a difference between having reasons for believing and believing for reasons. This difference is often fleshed out via an epistemic basing relation, where an epistemic basing relation obtains between beliefs and the actual reasons for which those beliefs are held. The precise nature of the basing relation is subject to much controversy, and one such underdeveloped issue is whether beliefs can be based on brain processing. In this paper I answer in the negative, providing reasons that the basing relation must be a specific psychological level relation between mental states, rather than being a brain process.Please provide missing KeywordsKeywords: Justification; Reasons and Causes; Basing Relation; Doxastic Justification

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Notes

  1. Perhaps presuming the causal theory is needlessly restrictive, as there are other models of the basing relation? For example, the doxastic model of the basing relation is a non-causal model of the basing relation, according to which S?s belief is based on S?s reasons if S also has a meta-belief that S?s reason is a good reason for S to have some belief (Tolliver 1982; Leite 2004). There is also a causal-doxastic model of the basing relation, which blends the causal model with the doxastic model (Korcz 2000). And, there are several other models of the basing relation besides. Nothing of consequence rides on presuming the causal model of the basing relation, so the conclusions reached below are equally viable for other models of the basing relation. In fact, my claim in Section Two that the basing relation is a psychological relation between mental states is actually more amenable to doxastic theories (and, by extension, to causal-doxastic theories) than causal theories, as the basing relation is unquestionably a psychological level meta-belief on doxastic theories, where the causal theory leaves open whether the basing is a psychological level relation or not. However, given that the causal model is dominant, I will follow this view.

  2. I leave open the possibility that the basing relation obtains between mental states (Turri 2009), or that the basing relation obtains between facts or propositions that mental states refer to (Wedgewood, 2006). In either case, the crucial point that the basing relation is a relation involving mental states, rather than brain states, is established.

  3. Granted, practical reasons are composed of logically related belief-desire pairings: S desires beer and believes there is beer in the fridge, which constitutes a reason for S to get the beer from the fridge. But theoretical reasons are composed of belief-belief pairings standing in a logical relation: S believes Socrates is human and that humans are mortal, which constitutes a reason for S to believe that Socrates is mortal. Epistemic basing concerns theoretical reasons, so the relevant sort of reasons are composed of logically related beliefs.

  4. It is possible to object here: surely non-doxastic states such as emotions, perceptions, sensations, memory and and character dispositions can serve as proper bases of beliefs at times. As Marshall Swain expresses: ?the class of states that can serve as reasons upon which a belief is based includes beliefs, perceptual states, sensation states, and (perhaps) unconscious states ? this list is ? probably not exhaustive? (Swain 1979, 30; cp. Evans 2013, 2945; Morettia and Piazzo, 2019, 76; Korcz 2000, 526). I grant that beliefs may also be based on these non-doxastic mental states. However, my concern is with inferential basing among doxastic states, so I focus on reasons as logically related beliefs. It is also worth noting that these non-doxastic states are mental states as well, so the conclusion that reasons are mental states is still established on this expanded definition of reasons.

  5. Support for the epistemic accessibility of the basing relation is gained from, but does not rely upon, access internalist models of justification. It is possible to object to the accessibility condition on basing by pointing to unconscious, hence epistemically inaccessible, reasons that sometimes serve to base beliefs as well (Evans 2013, 2946?2947; Vahid 2009a, 232; Korcz, 1997, 172). To borrow an example from Alvin Goldman, Sally reads about the health benefits of broccoli in the New York Times, and forms the belief that broccoli is healthy. Two years later she still believes that broccoli is healthy, but she cannot recall where she got her information from (Goldman 1999, 281). I grant that unconscious reasons sometimes base beliefs, but unconscious reasons are theoretically accessible to consciousness. That is, S has in the past consciously deliberated from those reasons to the belief, or S can become aware of the unconscious reasons through deliberation or conversation.

  6. For the sake of simplicity I shall say that S?s justifying reasons cause S?s beliefs, suppressing the quausation assumption that S?s justifying reasons, in virtue of their reasonableness, cause S?s beliefs. At relevant junctures below, I shall re-introduce this quausation assumption.

  7. It is worth reinforcing the source of the bad basing here, as some of these examples contain two possible reasons for the bad basing. In some cases the belief is not justified by reasons. For example, no reason justifies Smith?s belief that cats and dogs are conspiring against him. The bad basing, however, does not occur solely in virtue of the fact that Smith?s belief lacks justifying reasons. The bad basing would obtain even if Smith?s belief is justified by reasons. This is evident from the example from Moon: Holmes has reason to believe that Greta is the murderer, but a brain lesion, rather than those reasons, causes him to believe that Greta is the murderer, so his belief is not properly based. The source of the bad basing is the fact that S?s belief is not caused by S?s justifying reason.

  8. Pappas comes to a weaker conclusion than this, preferring to say that S may have knowledge after all, since S?s belief could be overdetermined, caused by both the brain manipulation of the technicians and S?s understanding of his reasoning process about the puzzle piece (Pappas 1979, 59). Of course, if S?s belief is also caused by his reasons, then S?s belief may be properly based, since the conditions on proper basing are satisfied. But the thought experiment can be reconstructed such that the technicians also block the causal efficacy of S?s reasoning. Robert Audi considers this possibility. Audi imagines the case where S forms a belief, and S?s belief is justified by S?s reasons. However, S?s reasons cause a machine to not only produce the belief in S, but the machine also suppresses the normal causal process from S?s reasons to S?s belief h, so that S?s belief is only caused by the machine. Audi concludes: ?do we have belief for a reason? I think not? (Audi 1986, 47). Why is S?s belief improperly based? S?s belief is not caused by S?s justifying reasons, so the conditions on proper basing are not satisfied. Rather S?s belief has a non-justifying-reason cause, namely, S?s machine-manipulated brain, so S?s belief suffers from bad basing.

  9. Noticing that brain processes lack the justifying inferential components of reasons is not particularly novel. Jerry Fodor notes, ?I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they?ve been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear on their list. But aboutness surely won?t; intentionality simply doesn?t go that deep? (Fodor 1987, 97; cp. Davidson 2001, 231; Wedgewood, 2006, 678ff). Hilary Putnam goes so far as to say that ?it is this same mindlessness of nature that makes the action guiding predicates ? ?is a justified belief? seem ?queer?? (Putnam 1981, 211). So strongly held is the view that justificatory reasons do not appear at the neurophysical level, some so-called via negativa physicalists define the physical as anything that is not mental (Campbell 1997, 224; Loewer 2001, 40; Papineau 2001, 12). On this view, in order for a brain process to be physical it would literally have to not have mental properties such as inferential or logical justifying relations between beliefs that are consciously deliberated intentional acts. Without endorsing this definition of physicalism, it is nevertheless clear that brain processes are typically conceived of as lacking the essential ingredients of reasons, and hence, since beliefs are based on reasons, beliefs are not based on brain processes (cp. Vahid 2009b, 126).

  10. It is also possible to object that epistemic access is not necessary for proper basing. As discussed above, reasons for belief may be forgotten or unconsciously processed, so those reasons for belief are not epistemically accessed, but those reasons for belief remain proper bases for beliefs. This conclusion also follows an externalist view of justification and knowledge. If epistemic access is not necessary for proper basing, the concern that brain processes are inaccessible does not tell against their ability to base beliefs. I grant that unconscious reasons sometimes base beliefs, but unconscious reasons are theoretically accessible to consciousness. The theoretical accessibility of unconscious reasons that base beliefs is contrasted with the inaccessibility tout court of the brain states that cause beliefs. As for the externalist case, I grant that other forms of proper basing other than S?s justifying reasons/beliefs may be available. The scope of this paper is to focus on that narrower band of beliefs properly based on S?s justifying reasons.

  11. There are two objections worth considering. First, it is possible to object that we can revise our brain states via our ability to revise our reasons which are identical with brain states. The response to this concern is the same as the response given above. S cannot revise her brain states qua physical properties of those brain states, so S?s beliefs cannot be based on her brain states in virtue of the physical properties of those brain states. If S can revise the mental properties of her brain states, then her belief could of course be based on the mental properties of those brain states. But this once again leaves the basing relation as a mental level phenomenon between mental properties of reasons and beliefs rather than S?s belief being based on brain processes qua physical properties. The second objection is that we may not be able to alter our reasons for belief in the first place. If unconscious reasons can base beliefs, and we are unaware of, hence do not directly alter, those reasons for belief, then it is possible for beliefs to be properly based even if the reasons for belief are not revisable. The same reply is available as given above. Namely, unconscious reasons are theoretically accessible. After being asked why she believes that chairs are sturdy, she considers the question for a while before realizing that her belief is based on the fact that chairs are made out of hard substances such as wood and metal, and hard substances are sturdy. Jan?s belief is properly based, despite the fact that Jan has never considered these justifying reasons for her belief before. The concern that we cannot alter our reasons for belief can also be reached by endorsing doxastic involuntarism. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the debate between the voluntarists and the involuntarists. However, one consequence of the arguments contained in this paper is that it provides support for doxastic voluntarism. Namely, that revisability is a feature of proper basing tells against the doxastic involuntarist view that revisability is not possible. If, however, doxastic involuntarism proves true, other arguments made in this paper can serve as the reason for which brain processes cannot base beliefs.

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    Dwayne Moore

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Moore, D. Can the Epistemic Basing Relation be a Brain Process?. glob. Philosophy 33, 26 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-023-09673-3

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