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On argument acceptability change towards legal interpretation dynamics

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Abstract

We propose a formal theory built upon an abstract argumentation framework for handling argumentation dynamics. To that end, we analyze the acceptability dynamics of arguments through the proposal of two different kinds of sets of arguments which are somehow responsible for the acceptability/rejection of a given argument. We develop a study of the consequences of breaking the construction of such sets towards the acceptance of an analyzed argument. This brings about the proposal of a novel change operation which allows to determine which arguments should be removed from the framework so that another particular argument becomes accepted. Finally, the proposed model is formalized in the light of the theory of belief revision by characterizing the corresponding operations through constructive definition and an axiomatic characterization, connecting them through the corresponding representation theorem. The theoretical proposal constitutes the fundamentals for a system implementation in many dynamic domains of application. In particular, we show its application for handling the dynamics of legal interpretation. In that sense, this proposal constitutes a fundamental approach and theoretical justification to handle the dynamics of legal arguments through changes of interpretative canons. We show a possible concretisation of our abstract theory for the legal domain by analysing a real legal case from the Argentinean jurisprudence. Such a system would be capable of suggesting alternative critical points in the current state of affairs of a legal case towards pursuing a specific goal for which the case is being investigated.

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Notes

  1. It is important to keep in mind that we work in the context of civil (or continental) law systems which have some specific particularities regarding the way legal decisions are bound to precedents. The binding to precedents in the civil law is flexible and subjective: references to precedents are usual for providing legal support to decisions, but whether they are fully or partially followed in a fresh case is open to the sole judge’s decision. Precedent’s strength is not comparable to norms’ inferred from written legal codes. Thus, legal interpretations, defined by the application of some of the alternative interpretative canons, are mostly a responsibility of each judge. It is for that reason that legal interpretations can be seen as a particular subjective practice in the civil law.

  2. The notation \(\wp ({\varTheta })\) is used for referring to the powerset of \({\varTheta }\).

  3. In the context of legal reasoning, we assume a legal criterion which renders a hierarchical preference from a legal viewpoint. For instance, it will be preferred those sets of arguments based on formal regulations over arguments that appear from the application of interpretative canons. However, relying only on such idea may be somehow naive, since it is highly likely that extensions include arguments constructed upon both such legal sources. In Sect. 6 we will discuss an alternative for the definition of an appropriate legal criterion to determine a univocal preference relation among extensions.

  4. Inverting the Levi identity leads to an inconsistent intermediate state. This is not an issue in argumentation since we only incorporate new pairs to the defeat relation. The inversion of the Levi identity is also safe for structured and logic-based argumentation as is shown in Moguillansky et al. (2012), Moguillansky (2016) and Moguillansky and Simari (2017).

  5. In the context of legal reasoning, the best representative remainder would be the least valuable in accordance to the legal criterion referred in Eq. 4. As we will see, this should be constructed by looking for the related best valuable partially admissible set. This will be clear from its application to a legal case in Sect. 5 and its further discussion in Sect. 6.

  6. Please refer to Sect. 6 for a discussion on the concretisation of a legal criterion.

  7. http://argumentationcompetition.org.

  8. Since weighing legal arguments can depend on rates, it would be possible to determine in advance whenever a current calculus will not be enough for outweighing a previously constructed extension. Of course, this would depend on the concrete formalisation of a legal criterion.

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Acknowledgements

A preliminary version of this work was published in the proceedings of FOiKS 2016 (Moguillansky 2016) we would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and conference audience for their insightful comments. This work was partially supported by UNS (PGI 24/N051, PGI 24/ZN32) and CONICET (PIP 11220170100871CO) and EU H2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant Agreement No. 690974 for the project MIREL: MIning and REasoning with Legal texts.

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  1. Socio-Juridical and Artificial Intelligence Research Lab (JuriSIA), Institute for Research in Computer Science and Engineering (ICIC), National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET), Universidad Nacional del Sur (UNS), Bahía Blanca, Argentina

    Martín O. Moguillansky & Luciano H. Tamargo

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  1. Martín O. Moguillansky
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  2. Luciano H. Tamargo
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Correspondence to Martín O. Moguillansky.

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Moguillansky, M.O., Tamargo, L.H. On argument acceptability change towards legal interpretation dynamics. Artif Intell Law 29, 311–350 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-020-09277-x

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