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Secundum Quid and the Pragmatics of Arguments. The Challenges of the Dialectical Tradition

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Abstract

The phrase secundum quid et simpliciter is the Latin expression translating and labelling the sophism described by Aristotle as connected with the use of some particular expression “absolutely or in a certain respect and not in its proper sense.” This paper presents an overview of the analysis of this fallacy in the history of dialectics, reconstructing the different explanations provided in the Aristotelian texts, the Latin and medieval dialectical tradition, and the modern logical approaches. The secundum quid emerges as a strategy that is based on the pragmatic dimension of arguments, and in particular the complex passage from an utterance (what is said) to its logical form (a proposition in an argument). The medieval and modern logical theories attempted to explain from different philosophical perspectives how the pragmatically enriched semantic representation can be achieved, justified, and most importantly manipulated. The different analyses of this fallacy bring to light various dimensions of the pragmatics of arguments, and the complex interdependence between context, meaning, and inferences.

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Notes

  1. “Secunda autem propter id quod simpliciter, vel non simpliciter, sed aliquo modo, aut ubi, aut quando, aut ad aliquid dicitur. […] Propter id autem quod hoc quidem simpliciter, illud autem aliquo modo, et non praecipue, quando quod in parte dicitur, ut simpliciter dictum sumitur, ut si non ens est opinabile quod non ens est; non enim est idem esse quidvis, et esse simpliciter.”

    “Eas vero quae sunt propter id quod praecipue, illud autem, vel qua, vel ubi, vel aliquo modo, vel ad aliquid dicitur, et non simpliciter, solvendum est considerando conclusionem ad contradictionem, si contingit horum alquid passas esse.” Author’s translation.

  2. “Tunc uero extra locutionem <aliquis> arguit, quando ad alium sensum locutionem accomodat, in quo non fuit inuenta. Unde etiam recipiunt ueram: “Oculus est albus,” “Ouum est animal,” “Hic filius non est filius”.

    secundum hos sensus ad quos uis constructionis se non habet. Unde bene Aristoteles dicit Contra Sophisticas Importunitates. Importunos namque appellat, qui ratione postposita propter garrulitatem suam propositiones ueras iudicant, scilicet eos sensus, ad quos uis constructionis ex propria inuentione se non habet, sicut in supraposita inuentione per translationem fit.

  3. Secundum diversum locum provenit hec fallatia ut si in ali qua disputatione proponatur hec: ‘bonum est mactare patrem’ per subintellectionem unius loci, et in eadem inferatur hec: ‘non bonum est mactare patrem’ per subintellectionem alterius loci.” Author’s translation.

  4. “Sunt autem huius fallaciae duo modi principales. Unus est quando arguitur ab esse quod est secundum adiacens ad ipsum quando est tertium adiacens, sive affirmative sive negative. […] Secundus modus principalis est quando a parte eiusdem extremi arguitur ab aliquo sumpto cum addito ad ipsum, vel suum convertibile vel superius, per se sumptum, vel e converso.”

  5. This consequence is based on four rules: (1) From a distributed superior to a distributed inferior; (2) Negatively from a distributed superior to a distributed inferior; (3) From a superior to an inferior with a preceeding negation; (4) From the affirmative of one genus to the negative of another nonsubalternate genus (Bird 1961, 69).

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (research grant no. PTDC/FER-FIL/28278/2017).

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    Fabrizio Macagno

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Macagno, F. Secundum Quid and the Pragmatics of Arguments. The Challenges of the Dialectical Tradition. Argumentation 36, 317–343 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-022-09568-4

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