Abstract
In this paper, I argue that, just as the problem of unconceived alternatives provides a basis for a New Induction on the History of Science to the effect that a realist view of science is unwarranted, the problem of unconceived objections provides a basis for a New Induction on the History of Philosophy to the effect that a realist view of philosophy is unwarranted. I raise this problem not only for skepticism’s sake but also for the sake of making a point about philosophical argumentation, namely, that anticipating objections to one’s claim is not the same as supporting one’s claim. In other words, defending p from objections does not amount to support or evidence for p. This, in turn, presents dialectical and pragma-dialectical approaches to argumentation with the following question: does proper argumentation require that arguers anticipate and respond to unconceived objections?
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Notes
The sort of anti-realism I have in mind here is parallel to the sort of anti-realism that is opposed to scientific realism along the epistemological dimension (Psillos 2006, p. 135); that is, “the epistemological commitment to regard theories as constituting knowledge of both observables and unobservables” (Chakravartty 2013). In that respect, this sort of anti-realism amounts to agnosticism about theoretical knowledge (van Fraassen 1998, p. 213). See also Mizrahi (2012a).
I take it that a serious objection to a philosophical theory is ground for suspending belief about that theory in much the same way that an alternative and equally confirmed theory T 2 is ground for suspending belief about competing theory T 1. A rough-and-ready argument for this claim goes like this: We should not believe theories that are unlikely to be true or approximately true. Theories that have serious objections are unlikely to be true or approximately true. Therefore, we should not believe theories that have serious objections. As a perceptive referee pointed out, one could argue that not all serious objections are equal, and hence warrant suspension of belief, in much the same way that not all alternative theories are equal, and hence warrant suspension of belief. For example, among theories T 1, T 2, T 3, which explain phenomenon P equally well, T 2 might be more worthy of belief than T 3, say, because it is simpler, more parsimonious, more elegant, more comprehensive, etc. Typically, however, scientific antirealists tend to think that these theoretical virtues are not truth-conductive. Constructive empiricists, in particular, distinguish between epistemic and pragmatic virtues (van Fraassen 1980, p. 87).
Some might think that there is an important difference between alternative, equally confirmed scientific theories and serious objections to philosophical theories, namely, the explanatory function of the former as opposed to the latter. Recall, however, that antirealists do not think that explanatory virtues carry any epistemic weight (see footnote 3 above). In fact, constructive empiricists are critical of Inference to the Best Explanation. See, e.g., van Fraassen (1980, p. 143) and Muller (2008).
As a perceptive referee pointed out, the final conclusion of the New Induction on the History of Philosophy, i.e., (NIP3), has not played a role in my argument for the “defense ≠ support” thesis so far. I do make use of this conclusion in what follows. Recall that, for the purposes of this paper, anti-realism amounts to agnosticism about theoretical knowledge. See footnote 2 above.
Also note that my thesis is that disarming objections against a claim does not lend support (either conclusive or defeasible) to that claim. In other words, defense ≠ support. So to object to my thesis by claiming that disarming an objection O to theory T does lend some defeasible support to T is to assert precisely what I deny.
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I am very grateful to two reviewers of Argumentation for invaluable comments on earlier drafts.
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Mizrahi, M. The Problem of Unconceived Objections. Argumentation 28, 425–436 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-013-9305-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-013-9305-z