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Looking for Arguments

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Abstract

How do people find arguments while engaged in a discussion? Following an analogy with visual search, a mechanism that performs this task is described. It is a metarepresentational device that examines representations in a mostly serial manner until it finds a good enough argument supporting one’s position. It is argued that the mechanism described in dual process theories as ‘system 2’, or analytic reasoning fulfills these requirements. This provides support for the hypothesis that reasoning serves an argumentative function.

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Notes

  1. The Psychology of Proof (Rips 1994) for mental logic theory, How we Reason (Johnson-Laird 2006) for mental models theory and Hypothetical Thinking (Evans 2007) for (one) dual process theory. It should be said however that Rips has devoted a lot of work to argumentation aside from his theories of reasoning.

  2. Note that the example provided is one of a mixed difference of opinion—that is, one speaker rejects the acceptability of a standpoint. The example of a non-mixed difference could also have been provided—for instance, Margo could simply have raised doubts about the option of taking the Tube.

  3. A similar idea is expressed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in their classic study of argumentation: ‘One datum in argumentation consists of the agreements available to the speaker as supports for his argument. But this element is so large and capable of being used in so many different ways, that the manner in which one makes use of it is of paramount importance. Accordingly, before examining the use of this datum in argumentation, it is essential that we say something of the part played by preliminary selection of the elements that are to serve as the starting point of the argument and by the adaptation of these elements to its purpose’ (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 115).

  4. See Sperber (2000). This point does not garner unanimity (Dancy 2000) but is consensual enough to warrant accepting it, at least provisionally, here.

  5. Accessibility, or relevance, will be particularly effective at organizing the space of possible arguments after someone has already given an argument. In this case, relevance mechanisms may triangulate quite effectively on counter-arguments. For instance, if Margo says ‘walking will be fast’, one of the first things that may spring to Simon’s mind is ‘but taking the Tube will be even faster,’ precluding the need for an extensive search.

  6. This argument is developed in Mercier and Sperber (in press) so it will only be brushed here.

  7. The exception would be arguments that are made very often in similar contexts and for similar audiences. In this case, it should be possible to have an idea of what a good argument may be. A teacher may think, for instance, that arguments by analogy are particularly efficient in explaining a certain class of concepts.

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  1. Philosophy, Politics and Economics Program, University of Pennsylvania, 313 Cohen Hall, 249 South 36th Street, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA

    Hugo Mercier

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Mercier, H. Looking for Arguments. Argumentation 26, 305–324 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9256-1

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