Abstract
In his works on argumentation, Aristotle develops three main forms: apodeictical, dialectical, and rhetorical argumentation; dialectic is subdivided into several subspecies. The purpose of this paper is to discuss all of the forms described by Aristotle, to examine their differences and to point out their interrelations. This leads to an examination of the differentiating criteria and their applicability in the case of each argumentation form—and in particular to the question regarding the number of criteria that are necessary to describe each form clearly and unambiguously. It is argued that Aristotle’s works on argumentation contain an implicit system of argumentation forms that is based on no more than three criteria.
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Notes
Aristotle’s works are cited by reference to each work’s title and the book, chapter, and line(s) of the respective quotations (cf. the Reference list).
There is a number of references from the Topics to the Analytics, but they do not support the thesis that Aristotle had already conceived the syllogism when he was writing the Topics. (See Barnes’ analysis of these references, in Barnes 1981, pp. 43–52.) The Topics are based on a pre-syllogistic notion of sullogismos.
Cf. J. Barnes (transl. of APo.), R. Smith (Top.) and others. See Smith 2007, par. 3.2.
See the discussion of this topos in van Eemeren et al. (1996, pp. 40–42).
Cf. Barnes (1981, p. 52, n. 56): The “logic of the original Apodeictic [viz. didascalic argumentation; SW] (…) [p]resumably (…) consisted of the various inference-schemata semi-formally and inexhaustively described in the Topics (…).” (my italics).
A general overview of the historical origins of Aristotle's argumentation forms has been given in Wolf 2006.
W.A. Pickard-Cambridge translates “tôn en tô dialegesthai logôn” by “arguments in dialogue form;” Dorion has “arguments dans la pratique du dialogue”.
Cf. SE 10/171a38–171b2 for a second instance of to dialegesthai, yet not in exactly the same meaning as in SE 2.
As to its etymological basis, a “dialogue between two participants” is not a redundancy, because the etymon of “dialogue” (viz. the verb “dialegesthai”) only refers to a conversation but does not specify (as it is sometimes alleged) the number of its participants.
Like an arguer in a disputation and a public speaker, also the poet is not confined to using valid conclusions. According to Aristotle, he is allowed to use invalid conclusions (paralogismoi; Po. 25/1460a18–20 et sqq.; cf. Po. 16/1455a12–14) and he may depict what is actually impossible (cf. Po. 24/1460a26–27 und Po. 25/1461b9–15). But unlike the historian, the poet is not obliged to render truthfully what happens or has happened: he rather depicts what is probable and may happen (Po. 9/1451a36–1451b5).
In the quoted passage Aristotle refers to eristic (not to sophistic) argumentation. But this discussion of premises and conclusions also applies to sophistical argumentation as (1) the two forms are said to differ only with respect to the arguer’s intention and (2) in this first list of (four) subspecies of dialectic Aristotle omits sophistic and only discusses eristic argumentation; the latter therefore also represents the former.
In all of these instances Pickard-Cambridge renders “agônistikos” as “contentious” (the usual translation for “eristikos”). Forster’s choice of “competitive”/“contentious” for “agônistikos”/“eristikos” is preferable by far (even if one might want to cite Pickard-Cambridge as a certain kind of further evidence for the synonymous use of the two words).
Liddell, H.G., R. Scott, and H.St. Jones. 1996. A Greek–English Lexicon, 18. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
The squared brackets and italics are Kennedy’s.
Kassel (1976, p.11) marks this passage as a later addition from Aristotle’s hand (see Kassel 1976, p. 11). The brackets and italics are Kennedy’s. Cf. Rh. I 2/1357a22–b36 for a second description of enthymemes (arguments from eikota, sêmeia, and tekmêria) that does not include paradigm arguments.
The brackets are Kennedy’s.
Moreover, the sample argument contains a severe logical problem: If we take it for granted that someone who is plotting tyranny seeks a guard, we still cannot deduce that someone who seeks a guard is plotting tyranny. However, this classic affirmatio consequentis does not severely affect Aristotle’s description of arguments from examples.
The brackets and italics are Kennedy’s. Freese translates: “(…) what makes the sophist is not the faculty but the moral purpose (…)”.
References
Texts and translations of Aristotle’ works
Aristotle. 1989. Prior Analytics (trans with intr., notes, and comm., by Robin Smith). Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co. [referred to as APr.].
Aristotle. 1975. Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (trans with notes by Jonathan Barnes). Oxford: Clarendon Press [referred to as APo.].
Aristotle. 1949. Aristotelous analytika. A revised text with introduction and commentary, ed. William D. Ross (=Aristotle’s prior and posterior analytics). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Aristotle. 1997. Topics, Books I and VIII. With Excerpts from Related Texts (trans with a commentary by Robin Smith). Oxford: Clarendon Press [referred to as Top. (books I and VIII)].
Aristotle. 1966. Topica (trans: E.[dward] S. Forster). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press [referred to as Top. (books II–VII)].
Aristotle. 1967a. Topiques (Livres 1–4). Texte établi et traduit par Jacques Brunschwig. Paris: Les Belles Lettres [Brunschwig 1967].
Aristotle. 1955. On Sophistical Refutations (trans: E[dward] S. Forster). Cambridge, MA: Heinemann/Harvard University Press [referred to as SE].
Aristotle. 1926. Topica and De sophisticis elenchis (trans: Pickard-Cambridge, W.A.). London: Oxford University Press.
Aristotle, 1995. Les réfutations sophistiques. Introd. trad. et comm. par Louis-André Dorion. Paris: Vrin.
Aristotle. 1996. The metaphysics (trans: H. Tredennick). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press [referred to as Met.].
Aristotle. 1968. Poetics. Introduction, commentary and appendixes by D. W. Lucas. Oxford: Clarendon [referred to as Po.].
Aristotle. 1967b. The “Art” of Rhetoric (trans: Freese, John H.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Aristoteles. 1976. Aristotelis Ars rhetorica, ed. Rudolfus Kassel. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter.
Aristotle. 1991. On rhetoric. A theory of civic discourse. Newly trans. with introd., notes, and appendixes by George Alexander Kennedy. New York: Oxford University Press [referred to as Rh.].
Aristotle. 2002. Rhetorik. Uebers. und erl. von Christof Rapp, Akad.-Verl., Berlin (=Aristoteles. Werke in deutscher Uebersetzung, 4.1/4.2) [Rapp 2002a/b].
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Brunschwig, J. 1967. Introduction. In Aristotle 1967a, VII-CXLIII.
de Pater, W.A. 1965. Les topiques d’Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne. La méthodologie de la définition. Fribourg: Éditions St. Paul.
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Flashar, H. 1983. Aristoteles. In Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie der Antike, vol. 3: Aeltere Akademie, Aristoteles, Peripatos, ed. H. Flashar, 175–457. Basel: Schwabe.
Kahn, Ch. 1978. Questions and categories. Aristotle’s doctrine of categories in the light of modern research. In Questions, ed. H. Hiz, 227–278. Dordrecht: Reidel.
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Kraus, M. 1994. Enthymem. In Historisches Woerterbuch der Rhetorik, vol. 2, ed. Gert Ueding, 1197–1222.
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Rapp, Ch. 1996. Aristoteles über die Rationalität rhetorischer Argumente. Zeitschrift fuer philosophische Forschung 50: 197–222.
Rapp, Ch. 2000. Topos und Syllogismos in Aristoteles’ ‘Topik’. In Topik und Rhetorik. Ein interdisziplinäres Symposium, ed. Th. Schirren and G. Ueding, 15–35. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
Rapp, Chr. 2002a. Einleitung. In Aristotle 2002, vol. 1, pp. 167–384.
Rapp, Chr. 2002b. Kommentar. In Aristotle 2002, vol. 2.
Smith, R. 1997. Introduction. In Aristotle 1997, xi–xxxv.
Smith, R. 2007, Aristotle’s logic. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, forthcoming URL:http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/aristotlelogic/ Accessed 3 Oct 2008.
Solmsen, F. 1929. Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik. Berlin: Weidmann [repr.: Weidmann, Hildesheim, 1975].
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van Eemeren, F.H., R. Grootendoorst, F. Snoeck Henkemans, et al. 1996. Fundamentals of argumentation theory. A handbook of historical backgrounds and contemporary developments. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Wolf, S. 2006. Historisch-systematischer Aufriss der Argumentationsformen bei Aristoteles, Tuebingen, University, URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-23303; URL: http://w210.ub.uni-tuebingen.de/dbt/volltexte/2006/2330/.
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The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their very valuable comments.
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Wolf, S. A System of Argumentation Forms in Aristotle. Argumentation 24, 19–40 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-009-9127-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-009-9127-1