Abstract
We suggest approximately optimal bidding strategies for games, where similar items are auctioned repeatedly. Considering players’ bounded rationality in practice, the results can further motivate the application of market-based approaches in resource allocation problems. We specialize the bidding algorithm for first-price payment schemes, the building blocks of several simplified selling mechanisms, that are common in practice.
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Danak, A., Mannor, S. Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions. Ann Oper Res 196, 189–199 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-012-1148-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-012-1148-8