Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

, Volume 28, Issue 3, pp 381–407 | Cite as

Reasoning about coalitional agency and ability in the logics of “bringing-it-about”

Article

Abstract

The logics of “bringing-it-about” have been part of a prominent tradition for the formalization of individual and institutional agency. They are the logics to talk about what states of affairs an acting entity brings about while abstracting away from the means of action. Elgesem’s proposal analyzes the agency of individual agents as the goal-directed manifestation of an individual ability. It has become an authoritative modern reference. The first contribution of this paper is to extend Elgesem’s logic of individual agency and ability to coalitions. We present a general theory and later propose several possible specializations. As a second contribution, we offer algorithms to reason with the logics of bringing-it-about and we analyze their computational complexity.

Keywords

Logic Bringing-it-about Coalitions Agency Ability Complexity 

References

  1. 1.
    Abdou, J., & Keiding, H. (1991). Effectivity functions in social choice. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Alur, R., Henzinger, T. A., & Kupferman, O. (2002). Alternating-time temporal logic. The Journal of the ACM, 49(5), 672–713.CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Belnap, N., & Perloff, M. (1988). Seeing to it that: A canonical form for agentives. Theoria, 54(3), 175–199.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Belnap, N., Perloff, M., & Xu, M. (2001). Facing the future (agents and choices in our indeterminist world). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Bottazzi, E., & Ferrario, R. (2011). Critical situations from spontaneous to sophisticated social interactions. In New trends in the philosophy of the social sciences, Madrid, 28–29 September 2011.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Broersen, J., Herzig, A., & Troquard, N. (2006). Embedding alternating-time temporal logic in strategic STIT logic of agency. Journal of Logic and Computation, 16(5), 559–578.CrossRefMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Broersen, J., Herzig, A., Troquard, N., & (2007). Normal simulation of coalition logic and an epistemic extension. In Proceedings of TARK, 2007. Brussels, Belgium: ACM DL.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Broersen, J., Herzig, A., & Troquard, N. (2009). What groups do, can do, and know they can do: An analysis in normal modal logics. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 19(3), 261–290.CrossRefMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Brown, M. A. (1988). On the logic of ability. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 17, 1–26.CrossRefMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Carmo, J. (2010). Collective agency, direct action and dynamic operators. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 18(1), 66–98.CrossRefMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Carmo, J., & Pacheco, O. (2001). Deontic and action logics for organized collective agency modeled through institutionalized agents and roles. Fundamenta Informaticae, 48, 129–163.MATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Chellas, B. (1969). The logical form of imperatives. Stanford: Perry Lane Press.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Chellas, B. (1980). Modal logic: An introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    Davidson, D. (1967). The logical form of action sentences. In N. Rescher (Ed.), The logic of decision and action. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Elgesem, D.: Action theory and modal logic. Ph.D. thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, Oslo (1993).Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Elgesem, D. (1997). The modal logic of agency. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2(2), 1–46.MATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  17. 17.
    Frankfurt, H. (1988). The importance of what we care about. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. 18.
    Goranko, V., Jamroga, W., & Turrini, P. (2013). Strategic games and truly playable effectivity functions. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 26, 288–314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. 19.
    Governatori, G., & Rotolo, A. (2005). On the axiomatisation of Elgesem’s logic of agency and ability. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 34, 403–431.CrossRefMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  20. 20.
    Halpern, J. Y., & Moses, Y. (1992). A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics of knowledge and belief. Artificial Intelligence, 54(2), 319–379.CrossRefMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  21. 21.
    Harel, D., Kozen, D., & Tiuryn, J. (2000). Dynamic logic. Cambridge: MIT Press.MATHGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Herzig, A., & Schwarzentruber, F. (2008). Properties of logics of individual and group agency. In Proceeding of advances in modal logic (pp. 133–149).Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Herzig, A., & Troquard, N. (2006). Knowing how to play: Uniform choices in logics of agency. In Proceedings of AAMAS, 2006 (pp. 209–216). IFAAMAS.Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Horty, J. F. (2001). Agency and deontic logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar
  25. 25.
    Jones, A., & Sergot, M. (1996). A formal characterization of institutionalised power. Journal of the IGPL, 4(3), 429–445.CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  26. 26.
    Kanger, S., & Kanger, H. (1966). Rights and parliamentarism. Theoria, 32, 85–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. 27.
    Kapitan, T. (1996). Incompatibilism and ambiguity in the practical modalities. Analysis, 56(2), 102–110.CrossRefMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  28. 28.
    Kenny, A. (1975). Will, freedom and power. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    Ladner, R. E. (1977). The computational complexity of provability in systems of modal propositional logic. The SIAM Journal on Computing, 6(3), 467–480.CrossRefMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  30. 30.
    Lindahl, L. (1977). Position and change–A study in law and logic. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. 31.
    Mele, A. R. (2003). Agent’s abilities. Noûs, 37(3), 447–470.Google Scholar
  32. 32.
    Miller, S. (2001). Social action (a teleological account). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. 33.
    Norman, T. J., & Reed, C. (2010). A logic of delegation. Artificial Intelligence, 174, 51–71.Google Scholar
  34. 34.
    Pacheco, O., & Carmo, J. (2003). A role based model for the normative specification of organized collective agency and agents interaction. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 6, 145–184.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. 35.
    Pauly, M. (2002). A modal logic for coalitional power in games. Journal of Logic and Computation, 12(1), 149–166.CrossRefMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  36. 36.
    Pörn, I. (1970). The logic of power. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  37. 37.
    Pörn, I. (1977). Action theory and social science: Some formal models. In Synthese library (Vol. 120). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Google Scholar
  38. 38.
    Santos, F., & Carmo, J. (1996). Indirect action, influence and responsibility. In Proceedings of DEON, 1996 (pp. 194–215). New York: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
  39. 39.
    Santos, F., Jones, A., & Carmo, J. (1997). Responsibility for action in organisations: A formal model. In G. Holmström-Hintikka & R. Tuomela (Eds.), Contemporary action theory (Vol. 1, pp. 333–348). Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar
  40. 40.
    Santos, F., & Pacheco, O. (2003). Specifying and reasoning with institutional agents. In Proceedings of ICAIL, 2003 (pp. 162–170). Edinburgh: ACM.Google Scholar
  41. 41.
    Schmid, H. B. (2008). Plural action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 38(1), 25–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. 42.
    Sebastiani, R., & Tacchella, A. (2009). SAT techniques for modal and description logics. In A. Biere, M. Heule, H. Van Maaren, & T. Walsh (Eds.), The handbook of satisfiability (Vol. 2, Chap. 25). Amsterdam: IOS Press.Google Scholar
  43. 43.
    Segerberg, K. (1971). An essay in classical modal logic. Uppsala: Filosofiska Studier, Uppsala Universitet.MATHGoogle Scholar
  44. 44.
    Shapley, L. S., & Shubik, M. (1971). The assignment game I: The core. International Journal of Game Theory, 1(1), 111–130.CrossRefMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  45. 45.
    Sommerhoff, G. (1969). The abstract characteristics of living systems. In F. E. Emery (Ed.), Systems thinking: Selected readings. Harmonsworth: Penguin.Google Scholar
  46. 46.
    Troquard, N. (2012). Coalitional agency and evidence-based ability. In Proceedings of AAMAS, 2012 (pp. 1245–1246). IFAAMAS.Google Scholar
  47. 47.
    Troquard, N., van der Hoek, W., & Wooldridge, M. (2009). Model checking strategic equilibria. In Proceedings of MoChArt 2008, lecture notes in computer science (Vol. 5348, pp. 166–188). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.Google Scholar
  48. 48.
    Tuomela, R. (1995). The importance of us. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
  49. 49.
    Turner, J. H. (1988). A theory of social interaction. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
  50. 50.
    Vardi, M. (1989). On the complexity of epistemic reasoning. In Proceedings of LICS, 1989 (pp. 243–252). Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society.Google Scholar
  51. 51.
    von Kutschera, F. (1986). Bewirken. Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 24(3), 253–281.Google Scholar
  52. 52.
    Wobcke, W. (1997). Agency and the logic of ability. In Agents and multi-agent systems formalisms, methodologies, and applications (pp. 31–45).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Laboratory for Applied OntologyInstitute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (CNR)PovoItaly

Personalised recommendations