Up until now, research on the relationship between fertility and lifetime childlessness and living arrangements has been relatively scarce for developed countries. The goal of this report was to consider the case of Spain, a paradigmatic strong family society (Reher 1998) with a record of the lowest low fertility over the past forty years. Our basic hypothesis that childlessness is a relevant determinant of living arrangements among elderly women was fully confirmed for Spain with data based on a broad sample of the 2011 population census. A statistically significant and strong association was shown to exist between completed fertility and living alone. The number of children ever born among fertile women also proved to be a good predictor of living alone among older women, especially among women with larger sibsets. Since our results were adjusted for basic demographic and social characteristics, several potential confounders have been discarded.
An interesting aspect of this relationship between fertility and living alone is the extent to which the sex of surviving children modifies the co-residential options of elderly women. The pertinent literature (Lee 1992; IMSERSO 2014) has emphasized the importance of daughters as family caregivers, suggesting that the chances of living with a daughter are higher than living with a son. As the census database does not contain the sex of children ever born, including this variable in our models was not possible. However, observing the proportions in the census of older women living only with a daughter or a son was feasible and provided an indirect way of addressing this issue. Here the results were mixed. While the census data did not confirm the existence of an overall preference for older mothers to live with daughters rather than sons, it did reveal a distinctive pattern associated with age whereby the older the mother living only with one child, the higher the probability of living with a daughter. This finding corroborates that daughters are the main family caregivers as mothers age and become increasingly unable to take care of themselves. This only becomes clear among women >80 years of age, while at younger ages when they are far more capable of taking care of themselves, co-residence with a sole child tends to be co-residence with sons. In other words, as women enter into what has been called the ‘fourth age’, they certainly have a greater stake in having daughters than in having sons.
Part of the explanation for the basic association between fertility and living alone is strictly demographic: non-existent or small numbers of offspring shrink the pool of kin (children and grandchildren) available for co-residence, thus reducing the opportunities for living with others independent of any residential preferences. Furthermore, since low fertility and childlessness is most common among never married women, living alone during later life is also the result of having no partner. For an ample portion of elderly women, it is the lack of kin caused by childlessness that leads to single living. Not surprisingly and related to these results, at least in Spain, childless older people who do not live alone are also more likely than women with children to live in households with no kin at all (results not shown here). In addition, even among women who have had children the likelihood of living alone diminishes with the number of children even born. In sum, women’s marital and reproductive trajectories alter the opportunity structure for co-residence, shaping their living arrangements and ultimately fostering living alone during old age.
This straightforward demographic explanation for living alone in later life is not entirely satisfactory on three counts. (1) In the case of women with large families, there may be, in addition to the demographic mechanism, an element of educated values affecting family solidarity that is stronger in larger families than in smaller ones. (2) In the case of the 25% of older Spanish women with children who also live alone or the 62% of childless women who live with others, factors related to choice may also be relevant. There is an increasing preference for residential autonomy involved for all older women and most visibly for those with children who live alone or those who are childless and who live with others. (3) The ongoing improvements in the health and economic status of older people make living alone increasingly possible among them at increasingly older ages.
Census micro-data are of little help when examining preferences and do little to distinguish voluntary from involuntary behaviours. Nonetheless, the observed trends allow some room for interpretation. The growth of living alone over the past three decades among baby boom female cohorts—with historically low rates of childlessness—points to the existence of increases both in the preferences for solo living (López-Doblas 2005) and in the social and economic resources available for maintaining this kind of household (Zueras and Miret 2013). At the same time, the nonlinear effect of age on living alone among elderly Spanish women—first increasing then decreasing their rate of single living as they age—also indicates that the voluntary option for this type of living arrangement has its limits due to a decreasing ability to live alone that makes single living an increasingly difficult option beyond a certain age. It is at these very advanced ages, often called the ‘fourth age’, when childlessness becomes a major issue for these oldest old women who require support during this final phase of their lives.
Implications for the future
Our results not only underscore the importance of offspring as a buffer against living alone during old age, but also suggest that there will be increasing shortfalls in family resources available for elderly women in the future. In societies where the fertility patterns prevailing during the second half of the twentieth century have included high proportions of small families with few or no offspring, a growing number of childless older women will face increasing shortages of kin and will be obliged to live alone in the coming decades, independent of their residential preferences. Along this same line, the sharp reduction in completed family size taking place over the past 40 years is undermining the weight of relatively large families (3 or more children) and limiting their ability to act as a buffer against living alone. The implications of shortages of immediate kin may be more difficult to manage in familistic societies like Spain where relatively low public support from welfare state institutions is compensated, at least in part, by the higher assistance, backing, help and aid coming from cohesive family networks (Puga et al. 2006; IMSERSO 2009). Since living arrangements constitute one of the most basic social resources available for older people providing them with proximate potential caregivers in case of impairment or illness, women living alone, be they childless or those with small sibsets, are likely to be a vulnerable group, particularly during later stages of their lives. In a country like Spain, these supportive living arrangements tend to be overwhelmingly family-based and the role of available kin in these circumstances should not be underestimated.
Although certainly not alone in the developed world, Spain represents an extreme example of these patterns due to its persistently low levels of fertility in recent decades. Projecting the completed fertility of women 65+ for the next two decades is a straightforward exercise given that women 45+ had ended their reproductive lives in 2011 and are unlikely to have any more children. Results here are conclusive (Fig. 3). In the next two decades, as the first cohorts of women participating in the baby bust become elderly themselves, the completed fertility of older women will begin to decrease sharply and the number of childless women will increase by a factor of 1.38 reaching an unprecedented total of 1031 million childless elderly women by 2031. Projecting the growth of childless women over the next twenty years among cohorts with completed fertility in 2011, and keeping their rates of living alone constant—a very conservative assumption—the estimated number of older women living alone in Spain will reach the unprecedented figure of almost 1.9 million within the next 15 years.
This revolution in single living will be tempered in part by the fact that in Spain the proportion of older women living with a partner will also increase in the near future, due to ongoing improvements in male survival (Abellán and Pujol 2013). Nevertheless, the growth of women living alone is perfectly compatible with this underlying counter trend, much as shown during the 1981–2011 period (see Table 1) when the growth of women living alone was much higher than that of women living with a partner. Moreover, while the increase in older women living with a partner is likely to persist in the future, it will do so at a diminished rate given the increasing importance of divorce among adult and elderly women.
We have chosen not to take this forecasting exercise beyond 2031, but alternative projections taking into account other components of these subpopulations (for instance, educational attainment) would point to even larger numbers of elderly women living alone in the next decades. If we push these projections a bit further to include women whose cohort fertility is well below replacement and levels of childlessness well above 20%, the number of childless older people and consequently the number of those living alone promise to increase until well past 2040.
In conclusion, the association between fertility and living alone has proved to be strong among older women in Spain. In particular, since both childlessness and single living are on the rise in most developed societies, this association should be considered a relevant aspect of ageing. Childlessness can and should be considered a crucial component for projections of the future numbers of elderly women living alone. It is important to test for this relationship in both familistic and non-familistic societies in order to ascertain the extent to which it is generalizable to other parts of the developed world and how it might vary in different contexts. If our general thesis is confirmed elsewhere, the long-term social implications of childlessness and low fertility will be far greater than what has normally been thought. It promises to become a key element not only in explaining present and future trends in living alone during later life but also in defining the limits of vulnerability during that crucial period of life.