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Brain and mind operational architectonics and man-made “machine” consciousness

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Abstract

To build a true conscious robot requires that a robot’s “brain” be capable of supporting the phenomenal consciousness as human’s brain enjoys. Operational Architectonics framework through exploration of the temporal structure of information flow and inter-area interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations [by examining topographic sharp transition processes in the scalp electroencephalogram (EEG) on the millisecond scale] reveals and describes the EEG architecture which is analogous to the architecture of the phenomenal world. This suggests that the task of creating the “machine” consciousness would require a machine implementation that can support the kind of hierarchical architecture found in EEG.

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Notes

  1. This distinction is well known as dichotomy between the Weak Artificial Consciousness and Strong Artificial Consciousness (Holland 2003), where the Weak Artificial Consciousness deals with design and construction of machines that simulate consciousness or cognitive processes usually correlated with it, while the Strong Artificial Consciousness aims to design a true conscious machine. This separation between Weak and Strong Artificial Consciousness mirrors the separation between the ‘easy’ and the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness (Chalmers 1996). According to this distinction, ‘easy problem’ of understanding consciousness refers to explaining the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, focus attention, etc., whereas the ‘hard problem’ needs to answer the question why does subjective awareness of sensory information exist at all? Both mentioned dichotomies are strongly related to a third one—dichotomy between ‘access’ and ‘phenomenal’ consciousness (Block 1995). In the framework of this distinction, access consciousness is defined as availability for use reasoning and rationally in guiding speech, action and thought. In contrast, phenomenal consciousness is a subjective experience.

  2. Even though there are first attempts to create so-called ‘synthetic phenomenology’ (Gamez 2005, 2006; Stening et al. 2005; Chrisley and Parthemore 2007; Kiverstein 2007; Hesslow and Jirenhed 2007; Ikegami 2007; Haikonen 2007a, b), it is very early to speak about even possibility of achieving genuinely conscious machines. Despite productive work, there is strong awareness in the field of synthetic phenomenology that something crucial is still missing in the current implementations of autonomous systems (see Manzotti 2007; Ziemke 2007; Dreyfus 2007; Koch and Tononi 2008).

  3. In another words, phenomenal consciousness is a higher level of biological organization in the brain (Revonsuo 2006).

  4. Although it is often claimed that volume conduction is the main obstacle in interpreting EEG data, we have shown through modeling experiments that the proper EEG methodology reveals such EEG architecture which is sensitive to the morpho-functional organization of the cortex rather than to the volume conduction and/or reference electrode (for relevant details, we address the reader to Kaplan et al. 2005).

  5. That are largely still to be devised.

  6. Even though this framework has many similarities with other theoretical conceptualizations, it is quite distant from them in the core principles (for the detailed comparative analysis, see Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts 2006). Additionally, in the context of OA framework (and in contrast to other theories) there is a range of methodological tools which enable in practice to measure the postulated entities of the theory (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts 2008).

  7. These EEG phenomena are rarely exploited due to lack of analytical tools and methodology. Special techniques (which take into consideration the inherent nature and structure of EEG signal) are required for the detection of them (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts 2001, 2008).

  8. See Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts (2005).

  9. Quantitatively such phenomenon is assessed through the measure of synchronization of EEG segments (structural synchrony) obtained from different brain locations (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts 2001, 2005).

  10. Each OM is a metastable spatial-temporal pattern of brain activity; it is so because the neuronal assemblies which constitute OM have different operations/functions and each does its own inherent “job” (thus expressing the autonomous tendency), while still, at the same time, been temporally entangled among each other (and thus expressing the coordinated activity) in order to execute common complex operation or complex cognitive act of a higher hierarchy (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts 2004b, 2005). As has been proposed by Kelso (1995) metastability relates exactly to the phenomenon of a constant interplay between these autonomous and interdependent tendencies (see also Bressler and Kelso 2001).

  11. Note, that we use the term ‘nonconsiousness’ instead of ‘unconsciousness’. We are not going to enter into the extensive debate about the difference of these terms, but they are quite distant and should not be intermixed. In short, unconscious material is still presented somewhere within the mental sphere, but usually is inaccessible for awareness. Only within the mental world it does make sense to speak of conscious or unconscious events or processes (Allen 1994). In contrast, nonconscious processes are nonmental in nature—they are simply not available to mental experience, they are physical or neurophysiological processes (Searle 1992).

  12. The actual neuron-physiological machinery is hidden from our awareness,—it is transparent to us. In other words we have access only to the content, but not the vehicle, of the phenomenal information (see also Revonsuo 2006; Haikonen 2007b).

  13. Isomorphism is generally defined as a mapping of one entity into another having the same elemental structure, whereby the behaviors of the two entities are identically describable (Warfield 1977). A functional isomorphism on the other hand requires the functional connectivity between its component entities (Lehar 2003). It is an extension to Muller’s psychophysical postulate (Muller 1896), and Chalmers’ principle of structural coherence (Chalmers 1995). Therefore, two systems that are functionally isomorphic are, in virtue of this fact, different realizations of the same kind (Shapiro 2000). In other words, two functionally isomorphic different systems bring about the same function that defines the kind. But, if two particulars differ only in properties that do not in any way affect the achievement of the defining capacity of a kind then there is no reason to say that they are tokens of different realizations of the kind (Shapiro 2000).

  14. Such approach coincides with a positive methodology suggested by Chalmers (1995) for facing up to the hard problem of consciousness. The main points of this methodology are: (a) pay careful attention both to physical processing and to phenomenology, (b) find systematic regularities between the two, (c) work down to the simpler principles which explain these regularities in turn, and (d) ultimately explain the connection in terms of a simple set of fundamental laws.

  15. An alternative approach to consciousness which is based on the process-oriented ontology (Whitehead 1927/1978; Griffin 1998) has been suggested by Manzotti (2006). According to Manzotti, consciousness and physical reality can be conceived as two perspectives on the same processes. In this case there is no problem of re-presentation since the experience and the occurrence of the world are identical. More precisely, phenomenal experiences do not represent reality but are reality (for a detail see Manzotti 2006).

  16. Both, the material neurophysiological organization that characterizes brain and the informational order that characterizes mind necessarily involve such events as operations at their cores (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts 2003, 2005).

  17. It seems an extreme point of view, but one that is gaining some currency in recent discussions of brain-mind interaction (for an example, see Pockett 2000; McFadden 2002; Revonsuo 2006; Freeman 2007a, b).

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Acknowledgment

This theoretical work was supported by BM-Science.

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  1. BM-Science - Brain and Mind Technologies Research Centre, PO Box 77, 02601, Espoo, Finland

    Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves

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Fingelkurts, A.A., Fingelkurts, A.A. & Neves, C.F.H. Brain and mind operational architectonics and man-made “machine” consciousness. Cogn Process 10, 105–111 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-008-0234-y

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